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For what is sillier than to talk about talking,
since talking in itself is ever a silly business,
except when it is indispensable.
Cicero, De Orato I. xxiv. 112.
INTRODUCTION
There is a lot of talk about talking in the legal academy at present.
Legal scholars are taken With the subject of interpretation of legal
language in all of its forms-constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions,
rules, and regulations.' The myriad of articles on interpretation of
legal texts discuss many possible approaches, also discussed in this
Article,2 but they do not focus on the special context considered
here-that of rules created to regulate the adversary system.
The advocacy context, in which courts interpret rules of procedure
such as rules of evidence, is a wonderful forum to explore the
problem of interpretation as it presents the debate in stark form:
evidence rules have meaning only in the context of particular cases,
so how shall we interpret abstract rules of evidence in concrete cases?
This Article traces the debate over interpretation of legal texts back
to its roots in the ancient law courts, demonstrates how the debate
played out in the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
illustrates how the debate plays out in current interpretations of the
Federal Rules.
1. Although one wonders whether significant others are listening. As one commentator
notes:
The Justices have not been reading their Derrida. Indeed, despite the lengthy
importunings of legions of law professors, the Justices have been neglecting to read not
only Derrida, but Foucault, Gadamer, Rorty, and Heidegger as well. Instead, as the
statutory construction cases of the 1989 Term demonstrate, they have been spending
their time reading (Noah) Webster, relying, both in fact and in articulatedjustification,
on notions of plain meaning routinely derided in contemporary legal scholarship.
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S.
Cr. REV. 231, 231.
2. See generally infra Part II.
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Other articles have criticized the United States Supreme Court's
current approach to interpreting the "plain meaning"3 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence,4 but the authors neither put the problem into the
context offered here, nor advocate the alternative approach discussed
here. In this Article, I will argue that of all the possible "schools" of
interpretation, the best approach to the construction of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is "practical reasoning," a school firmly rooted in
the realm of classical rhetoric and the method best suited to the
philosophical perspective of pragmatism that led to the creation of
the Federal Riles of Evidence.' Although this Article is concerned
primarily with the Federal Rules, its insights extend to any procedural
system with a codified set of evidence rules, for codification creates a
tension between the desire for predictability and certainty-provided,
in the views of some, by a "hard" text-and the demand for flexibility
posed by circumstances unforeseen by the drafters of the code.
3. See infra Part ILC (discussing 'plain meaning" rule of interpretation as applied by U.S.
Supreme Court).
4. Se, &g., Randolph N.Jonakait, The Supreme Co4 Plain MAaning and the Changat Rulzs
of Evidc 68 TEX. L REv. 745, 749, 782-86 (1990) (explaining that application of 'plain
meaning" approach to Federal Rules of Evidence will initially alter Rules in way unintended r
drafters and will subsequently freeze powers ofinterpreation previously recognized as belonging
to courts); see also Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Inteprrtation of the Federal Rules
ofEviden,453 OHIo ST. UJ. 1307,1319-32 (1992) (offering paricularly critical review of Court's
deference to legislature as rationale for using plain meaning); cf Edwrard R. Becker & Avbia
Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixten Y-arm-The Effir of Plain Affaning'
Jurispudence, the Need for an Advisory Committae on the Rules of Evidenk , and SutMstans for Selcte
Revisin of the RPde 60 GEo. WASH. L REV. 857, 867-76 (1992) (s-nipathizing with clarity
provided by plain meaning approach but noting weaknesses of approach when Congress has
provided no dear intent to alter common law). But seeEdwuardJ. Imwiinkelried, A BriefDefnse
of the Supreme Court's Appm to IMnt at of the Federal Rule of EVdenc, 27 IND. L REV.
267, 268-78 (1993) (using Federal Rule of Evidence 402 to support and defend plain meaning
approach). For direct response to Imwinkelried's assertions, see Glen Weissenberger, Are the
FederalRedesofEtvidena Statutet 55 OHIO ST. LJ. 393, 396-98 (1994) 1hereinafter I ln 'b-er
In a two-part article, Professor Taslitz argues that even when the Supreme Court says it is
following the plain meaning of the Rules, frequently it is not. Andrew E. Taslitz, Dattherts Guide
to the Federal Rules of Evidec Public Qoie Hmeneutic and the Not-SoPlain Meaning Rule, 32
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 3 (1995) [hereinafter Taslitz, Daubert]; Andrew E. Taslitz, InIrpi, MAed
and the Fedral Rules ofEvidenec A Calfor a PoliticaM Rlislic Hermenmics, 32 HARV.J. ON LEGIS.
(forthcoming 1995).
5. Professor Taslitz mentions the practical reasoning approach with approval, but does not
specifically apply it, preferring to discuss interpretation of evidence rules under the broader
rubrics of hermeneutics and the dynamic process of statutory interpretation advocated by
Professor Eskridge, who emphasizes interpreting statutes within their larger societal, political,
and legal contexts. Taslitz, Dauber, supra note 4, at 7; cf William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dnamic
Statutoy Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L REv. 1479, 1479 (1987) (advocating application of d)amic
approach to statutory, constitutional and common law interpretation). Practical reasoning is
certainly consistent with and encompassed within these broader approaches, but I find it useful
to discuss the ramifications of practical reasoning specifically, especially given its tight
connection with the classical history of legal advocacy.
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In Part I, I develop the historical and philosophical context of the
interpretative problem, first tracing the roots of the interpretation
debate back to its beginnings-in the law courts of ancient Greece
and Rome-and then showing how similar issues, resulting tension,
and resolutions surrounded the creation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In Part II, I trace the debate to its modern context, as it
plays out in approaches to statutory interpretation, and argue that the
best resolution of the problem is its ancient one, practical reasoning.
In Part III, I will explain, illustrate, and critique the use of practical
reasoning as an approach to interpreting evidence rules, focusing on
five United States Supreme Court cases: Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,6
United States v. Salerno,7 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,8
Williamson v. United States,9 and Tome v. United States.10
I. BACK TO THE BEGINNING: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIGINS OF INTERPRETATION DEBATES
A central message of this Article is that the current problems in
interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence arise in part from our
failure to recall the historical and philosophical perspectives that are
central to the advocacy context: rhetoric and pragmatism. Thus, in
this Part, I aim to refresh our recollection of these historical and
philosophical issues, for this context is helpful in deciding how to
interpret modem evidence rules. I begin with the origin of the
interpretative debate in classical rhetorical theory, which developed
from the needs of ancient law courts and lawyers, and attempt to
show how similar issues, concerns, and solutions surfaced during the
creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. Classical Rhetorical Theory and the Interpretation of Legal Texts
The history of Western advocacy systems and Western rhetoric go
hand in hand. Nevertheless, the links between law and classical
rhetoric are seldom acknowledged." I think this is in large part
6. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992).
8. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
9. 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
10. 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
11. SeeWILIAM TWINING, RETINKING EVIDENCE 219 (1990) (suggesting that legal profesion
no longer values the study of rhetoric). As Twining's citations indicate, some notable exceptions
exist. See geneally, e-g., PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW 168 (1987); PETER GOODRICH,
LEGAL DISCOURSE 1 (1986); BERNARD JACKSON, LAW, FACr AND NARRATivE COHERENCE 85-124
(1988); BERNARD JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY 12 (1985); CHAiM PEREu.,AN& L.
OLBRE C s-TYrEcA, THE NEv RHETORIC 20-23 (1971).
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because rhetoric suffers from a confusing variety of definitions, to the
point where even scholars of rhetoric tend to eschew the term,
preferring to use "the art of advocacy"12 or simply "communica-
tion." 3
Definitions of rhetoric are plentiful and often not particularly
helpful; they are either too narrow or too broad, and neverjust right
to suit another's intellectual taste.14 One can use "rhetoric" in its
most pejorative sense: empty bombast, hot air, all form and no
substance, or language that seeks to manipulate and hoodwink the
unsuspecting listener.'5 Additionally, one can move to a slightly less
negative (but more banal) notion of "rhetoric" as style: the presenta-
tion of the message.'6 One can also use "rhetoric" in a more
utilitarian sense: the art of using language to persuade, that is, to
seek agreement, cooperation, or action.17 Finally, one can view
"rhetoric" in its broadest sense: a synonym for communication and
the culture that is created through communication.18
Several other useful exceptions exist. Sr4 eg.,John E. Simonett. Formsi Rhdofic and Jnring
Younger 73 MINN. L REV. 805,805 (1989) (stating that legal profession has not placed adequate
value on art of rhetoric); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and ItsDenialIn LzgalDiscurse. 76 VA. L
REV. 1545, 1549 (1990) (employing rhetoric as method of studying legal thinking); James B.
White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Laijae, 50 U. CHL L REV. 849. 871-
94 (1983) (using Plato's comparison between rhetoric and dialectic as method for analy-zing
legal profession).
Martha Nussbaum, a philosopher and classicist, recently critiqued the legal literature on
practical reasoning. See Martha C. Nussbaum, SLptidrm About Pra'calReason in Literature and
the Law, 107 HARV. L REv. 714, 715 (1994). Nussbaum equates the work of modem advocates
of practical reasoning, such asJudge Richard Posner, with the position of radical, or Pyrrhonic,
skepticism, while she sets up her own version of practical reasoning as neo-.Aristotilian. Id. at
717-18, 729. Nussbaum, however, curiously omits reference to the sophists discussed in this
Article.
The most notable omission is Isocrates, with his emphasis on the moral quality of the orator.
See infra notes 51-58. My own argument is that modem advocates of pmctical reasoning are
returning to both the pragmatic philosophy and the belief in the importance of rhetoric in chic
discourse that marked the sophistical strain that follows into Aristotle's (and later, Cicero's and
Quintilian's) work. See infra notes 20-112 and accompanying text (examining works of early
rhetoricians).
12. Simonett, supra note 11, at 805.
13. RiCHARD D. RIEKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMU A'I4O4 IN LEGAL ADVOQACY 32
(1990).
14. Sw Wayne Booth, The Scope of Rhetoic Today: A Poemial Excusion, in THE PROSPECIS
oF RHmroc 93-114 (Lloyd F. Bitzer & Edwin Black eds., 1971). Wayne Booth frames the
problem in terms of fish and nets. If we use too large a net, we will catch some fish we might
want to discard; if we use too small a net, we will miss some fish we uant to catch. Id. at 95.
15. SoNJA K. Foss Er AL, CONTENMPORARY PrsPEC'rzvEs ON RHz'rotuc 1 (2d ed. 1991).
16. See RICHARD A. PoSNERI LAW AND LERATUR A ISUNDERSrOOD REIATION 272
(1988).
17. See infta notes 48-91 and accompanying text. This view is, in part, shared by Isocrates,
Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, although one senses in their discussion of the moral excellence
of the orator that rhetoric has a broader meaning.
18. SeeKENNEr BURKE, ARHETORIC OF MoTrms 43 (1969) (characterizing rhetoric as"the
use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond
to symbols"). To Burke, rhetoric is a part of the larger category of "symbolic action," which also
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In this Article, I return to the ancient Greco-Roman understanding
of rhetoric, looking to its blend of the utilitarian use of rhetoric and
the creative quality of rhetoric, for the guidance that it may shed on
today's task of interpreting rules of evidence. The value of a look to
the past is manifold, and is discussed later in more detail,19 but can
be quickly summarized here. First, it gives us a more complete view
of the context of the debates over the proper interpretation of legal
texts. Second, it tends to humble us, lest we fool ourselves into
believing we are discovering something radically new about legal
interpretation. Third, it expands our frame of reference so that we
may bring a deeper understanding to the problem of applying
abstract rules to concrete cases.
A brief look at the history of classical rhetoric reveals the inexorable
bond between rhetoric and law.2° Possibly the first "theorist" of legal
rhetoric was Corax of Syracuse, who wrote and taught in approximate-
ly 465 B.C.E.2' Corax's view of rhetoric arose in the context of a
specific judicial problem in Syracuse, a Greek colony on the island of
Sicily. As a democratic government had recently overthrown a
dictatorship,2 the courts were faced with disputes over property:
who was the rightful property owner, the owner before the dictator-
ship or the owner given the property by the dictatorship? These legal
disputes increased the need for training in forensic rhetoric. 3 In
ancient Greece, citizens could not hire advocates; they were required
includes poetics, science, and philosophy. Id. Yet Burke distinguishes rhetoric from three types
of symbolic action: "rhetoric is concerned with persuasion and identification, poetics Is
concerned with symbolic action in and for itself, science is concerned with symbolic action in
relation to the ends of factual knowledge, and philosophy is concerned with symbolic action in
relation to discussions offirst principles." Foss ETAL, supra note 15, at 174. James Boyd White,
a classicist and legal scholar, notes that often rhetoric "is thought of either as a second rate way
of dealing with facts that cannot really be properly known or as a way of dealing with people
instrumentally or manipulatively, in an attempt to get them to do something you want them to
do." James B. White, Law as Rhaori, Rhelorc as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Cormmunal Life, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 687-88 (1985). For White, however, rhetoric is something much broader,
it is "an art of constituting culture and community." Id. at 692. In his view, the way the
members of the legal community talk to and about each other, clients, and the world constantly
creates the identity of the community and culture. Id. at 690.
19. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the link between dassical rhetoric and law, see generally HAROLD
BARRETT, THE SOPHISTS 5 (1987); THOMAs M. CONLEY, RH roRIc IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION
1-52 (1990);JAMEs L GOLDEN ETAL, THE RHETORIC OF WESTERN THOUGHT 6-7 (4th ed. 1987);
GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSIcAL RHETORIC AND ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM
ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 81 (1980) [hereinafter KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC]; GEORGE A.
KENNEDY, A NEW HIsTORY OF CLASSICAL. RHETORIC 15 (1994) [hereinafter KENNEDY, NEW
HsTORY];JOHN POULAKOS, SOPHIsrfcAL RHETORIC IN CLASSIcAL GREECE 14 (1995).
21. SeeFOSS ETAL, supra note 15, at 1.
22. See GOLDEN ET AL, supra note 20, at 6-7.
23. See Foss ET AL, supra note 15, at 1-2. But cf. CONLEY, supra note 20, at 4-5 (questioning
historical validity of Corax's role in origin of rhetorical theory).
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to argue their own cases in court, before large juries drawn by lot.2'
Trials consisted chiefly of a speech by the plaintiff or prosecutor4
and a speech by the defendant.26 There were no judges; the jury
decided both issues of fact and law.Y Trials could last only one
day.2" There were no appeals; the only ground for relief from
judgment was the discovery of new evidence." Forensic oratory skill
was an essential part of the life of a Greek citizen." Teachers of
rhetoric, such as Corax and his student Tisias, who brought Corax's
teachings to Athens, offered instruction in the art of legal advoca-
cy.
1
Corax and Tisias are best known for developing the argument from
probability as the basis for forensic proof, in which matters of fact
could not be demonstrated with absolute certainty 2 They encour-
aged their students to use probability to argue on either side of a
case." For example, a plaintiff suing for assault might argue that
because he feared his assailant, he would never have attacked first.
The alleged assailant would argue that the plaintiff vas more likely to
strike first because he would want the advantage of the first blow.
Interestingly, the Greeks preferred this kind of circumstantial
reasoning, for they "deeply distrusted direct evidence in both criminal
and civil cases because of a knowledge that it could be faked or
bribed." 34
Corax and Tisias were the forerunners of the class of teachers of
rhetoric known as the sophists.' The sophists, actually the first legal
educators, have a bad reputation in modem times for many reasons,
24. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHiiromc, supra note 20, at 18. Women, noncitizens, and
physically disabled individuals, however, had to be represented in criminal cases rl another.
KENNEDY, NEv HISroRy, supra note 20, at 15. In criminal casesjuries could include up to 500
citizens. See GOLDEN Er AL, supra note 20, at 7 (noting that "Ojlury panels of 6000 were
regularly on call").
25. There were only private prosecutors; criminal cases were pursued tr persons with a
personal stake in the case. KENNEDY, NEW HISrORY, supra note 20, at 15.
26. GoLDEN Er AL, supra note 20, at 7.
27. KENNEDY, NEv HISTORY, supra note 20, at 15.
28. KENNEDY, NEv HISTORY, supra note 20, at 16. The time allotted for each side "ws
measured by a water clock." Id.
29. KENNEDY, NEV HISTORY, supra note 20, at 15.
30. GOLDEN ET AL, supra note 20, at 7.
31. GOLDEN ET AL, supra note 20, at 7.
32. Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 2.
33. FOSS ET AL, supra note 15, at 2.
34. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra note 20, at 21.
35. FoSs ET AL, supra note 15, at 1; se also iU at 2 (noting that "swpas means kno-,ledge
or wisdom"); cf. BARRErT, supra note 20, at 3 (noting that term sophist also was sometimes used
respectfully to refer "to poets, musicians, wise men, philosophers or other accomplished and
admired persons").
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primarily historical." Many of the sophists were not Greek citizens,
but itinerant foreigners, and the Greeks mistrusted foreigners.
37
Moreover, some of the sophists claimed that they could teach wisdom
or virtue for a price.'I This was doubly offensive to the Greeks, who
believed that virtue could not be taught or transmitted, and certainly
could not be purchased for a fee. 9 Plato, a philosopher and a
wealthy member of the Athenian elite, seized on these aspects of the
sophists and ridiculed most of them in his dialogues.4 0 Plato reviled
the sophists, who he blamed for the kind of rhetoric that led to the
death of his teacher Socrates at the command of an Athenian jury.
4'
Two sophists in particular were favorite targets of Plato. Protagoras
of Abdera (480-411 B.C.E.) is best known for the fragment of his
thought that survived: "Man is the measure of all things," which
conveyed a relativistic perspective that Plato, a believer in divine and
absolute truth, found reprehensible.42 Plato was similarly opposed
to the radical relativism of Gorgias of Sicily (480-375 B.C.E.).
41
Gorgias was obsessed with the structure and sound of language.44 As
Professor George Kennedy noted, "On Gorgias' lips oratory became
a tintinnabulation of rhyming words and echoing rhythms.,43
Because of his stylistic excesses, Gorgias was an easy target for
Plato.46 When we think of sophistry today, we thus generally think
of it in terms of the vile picture that Plato painted of Gorgias: a
manipulative, scheming con artist.
47
The real sophists, as opposed to those portrayed by Plato, had a
world view close to the philosophical perspective of pragmatism, the
basis of the "school" of interpretation called practical reasoning.
48
"The sophists envisioned an incomplete, ambiguous, and uncertain
world, interpreted and understood by means of language."49 Despite
its uncertainties, the world of the sophists was a practical world,
36. See POULAKOS, supra note 20, at 16-18.
37. See PouLAKos, supra note 20, at 16-18.
38. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 2.
39. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 2.
40. See PoULAKos, supra note 20, at 74 (citing Plato, Gorgias, in PLATO 258 (W.R.M. LUunb.
trans., 1929)).
41. BERNARD KNOX, THE OLDEST DEAD WHITE EUROPEAN MALES AND OTHER REFLECTIONS
ON THE CLASSICS 97 (1993).
42. See Foss ET AL, supra note 15, at 2-3.
43. KENNEDY, CLAssIcAL RHETORIC, supra note 20, at 29.
44. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 3.
45. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC, supra note 20, at 29.
46. See POULAKOS, supra note 20, at 74.
47. See Foss ET AL, supra note 15, at 4.
48. See infra Part I.D (describing practical reasoning as means of actualizing pragmatism).
49. Foss ET AL, supra note 15, at 3.
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concerned with concrete argumentation and decisionmaking in the
realms of law and politics
This strain of sophistry appears most prominently in the work of
Isocrates (436-338 B.C.E.), 51 who shared the sophistic interest in
rhetoric, but avoided the excesses and vices of some other sophists.1
2
Isocrates advocated rhetoric as the core' of Greek citizens' educa-
tion. Isocrates' notion of rhetoric, however, included what we
would consider today the study of liberal arts: philosophy, science,
mathematics, literature, history, and communication.' In his work,
Against the Sophists,5 Isocrates advocates the pursuit of practical
wisdom, for which moral character is essential. 56 Isocrates, in
contrast to many of his contemporaries, believed that moral character
could not be taught, but that "the study of speech and politics ...
[could] help to encourage and train moral consciousness."57 This
idea of the good, or moral, orator is essential to later classical
rhetoricians, such as Cicero and Quintilian, and may be useful in
determining what makes for the "best" interpretation of evidence
rules
8
The philosopher and scientist Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.), although
a student of Plato, adopted the sophistic emphasis on the contingent,
the contextual, and the practical elements of rhetoric in his treatise,
On Rhetoic.59 In On Rhetoric, Aristotle sought to systemize rhetoric,
which he defined as "an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the
available means of persuasion."6' Aristotle contrasted demonstrative
reasoning, which aims at scientific certainty, with practical reasoning,
which he termed dialectical reasoning, in The Rhetori The Topics, and
On Sophistical Refutations.1 Rhetoric, however, also belongs to the
50. Se FOSS ET AL, supra note 15, at 3.
51. SeeFoss r AL., supra note 15, at 3. Interestingly, Isocrates, the founder of a school of
rhetoric, was himself afraid to speak in public, and thus began his career as a wiTter of speeches.
Id.
52. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 3.
53. KENNEDY, CLASSIcAL RHETORIC, supra note 20. at 31. According to Kennedy. "Isocrates
made rhetoric the permanent basis of the educational system of the Greek and Roman world
and thus of many centuries as well, and he made oratory a literary form." Id.
54. GOLDEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 54-55.
55. Isocrates, Against the Sophist% in ISOCRATES 163 (George Norlin trans., 1929).
56. See KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHEORoC, supra note 20, at 32.
57. KENNEDY, CLAssICAL RHETORIC, spa note 20, at 32.
58. See infra notes 218-34 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between modem
school of practical reasoning and classical rhetoric).
59. ARSrOTLE, ON RHErORiC (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991); see aLso FOSS Er AL, sp-a
note 15, at 4.
60. AmsromT, supra note 59, at 36; see aso FOSS Er AL, supra note 15, at 4.
61. See George A. Kennedy, Introdution to ARISrOTLF, ON RHErORIC, =pra note 59, at 3,
12-13.
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realm of practical reasoning. Professor George Kennedy discussed the
difference between Aristotle's view of dialectic and rhetoric:
Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, not, as rhetoric does, by
continuous exposition. A dialectical argument does not contain the
parts of a public address; there is no introduction, narration, or
epilogue, as in a speech-only proof. In dialectic only logical
argument is acceptable, whereas in rhetoric... the impression of
character conveyed by the speaker and the emotions awakened in
the audience contribute to persuasion. While both dialectic and
rhetoric build their arguments on commonly held opinions
(endoxa) and deal only with the probable (not with scientific
certainty), dialectic examines general issues (such as the nature of
justice) whereas rhetoric usually seeks a specific judgment, (e.g.,
whether or not some specific action was just or whether or not
some specific policy will be beneficial).6
Logic and dialectic are pure "tools" or "methods" in Aristotle's
categories of knowledge;6 they "are applicable to all study but with
no distinct subject matter of their own."'I Rhetoric, in Aristotle's
view, however, is a blend of method, theory, and practice.65 Rhetoric
is in part a method (like dialectic), and yet reflects the theoretical
and normative aspects of ethics and politics; rhetoric is communica-
tion that moves the listener toward practical applications.66 Rhetoric,
more than the classical sense of dialectic, approximates the task of the
judge and advocate.
Aristotle identified three types of rhetoric: deliberative, judicial,
and epideictic.67 Although these types of oratory shared some
common questions, they each served specific functions: deliberative
rhetoric was political discourse in which the listener was asked to
evaluate a proposed future action;' judicial rhetoric was forensic
discourse in which the listener was asked to judge a past action;69
and epideictic rhetoric was ceremonial discourse in which the listener,
as spectator, judged the artistic ability of the speaker. ° Modem
62. Kennedy, supra note 61, at 26.
63. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 12.
64. Kennedy, supra note 61, at 12.
65. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 12-13.
66. See Kennedy, supra note 61, at 12-13.
67. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 48.
68. AiusroTLE, supra note 59, at 48. "The deliberative speaker is fundamentally concerned
to establish that a course of action will be expedient for the audience, or at least not harmful
to it. He may have something to say about justice, but that is secondary to his purpose."
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 72.
69. &e AusrToTLE, supra note 59, at 48.
70. AiusToTLE, supra note 59, at 48. The final cause, or end, of epideictic speech, which




debates have treated interpretation as a combined deliberative and
judicial question, sometimes emphasizing a reading of a text that
would provide the 'most useful effects in the future, and sometimes
emphasizing a particular reading as the "historically" accurate one, in
the sense of the drafter's original intent or purpose 7 '
Deborah Tam Steiner, a Columbia University classics professor,
recently noted the ambivalence of fifth and fourth (B.C.E.) century
Greeks toward legal texts in a democracy.' On the one hand,
"[isonomia, the equality of citizens before the law, depends in part on
the existence of a written legal code, a single standard of justice
accessible and visible to all."' s On the other hand, a written code,
standing alone, could become an instrument of tyranny, it
threatens to obscure its single or collective authors, and introduces
a new authority to supplant the citizen's voice. Athens and Sparta
both take measures to protect themselves against the ability of
writing to silence and to overrule: Lycurgus directs that the
Spartan laws not be written down, and in democratic Athens
inscribed decrees present themselves in the form of spoken
discourse and include a reference to the living voice of the
lawmakers.'
Ancient writers dealt in different ways with the potential of written
legal texts for good and evil. Plato, a vigorous critic of democracy,
recognized that a written code provides stability and order in civic life,
but argued that it was only a second-rate alternative to authority
exercised by a true ruler, informed by "royal epistene," skill and
wisdom. 5 Plato warned that the second-rate legislation reflects the
debased nature of the popular democracy. 6 Moreover, this evil is
compounded: "Because writing freezes words in lasting form, and
makes laws wholly independent of their author, it encourages the
fetishizing of its text."
77
Aristotle's approach was to draw a distinction betveen the two types
of law and to emphasize the importance of argumentation about the
meaning of the law.h The idios nomos were the vaitten laws." The
71. See infra notes 176-301 and accompanying text.
72. DEBORAH TARN STEUER, THE TtANr's wIrr 7 (1994).
73. Id.
74. 1& at 247.
75. l at 235; see also i(L (noting that royal episteme is possessed by few, and is generally
found in governments consisting of single or small-group rule).
76. See i& at 236-37.
77. I& at 236.
78. See id. at 232-33. "Where these unwritten laus are evoked, they are associated with the
rights of the people and stand as bulwarks against autocracy." Id. at 232.
79. See i. at 233 n.142.
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koinos nomos ° were laws that although unwritten, seem "to be agreed
to among all.""' Within this context, Aristotle discussed the "topics"
or propositions on which to base an argument about the meaning of
legal texts. He recognized that arguments about the definition or
interpretation of the terms of a text are critical to judicial outcomes:
Since people often admit having done an action and yet do not
admit to the specific terms of an indictment or the crime with
which it deals-for example, they confess to have "taken" some-
thing but not to have "stolen" it or to have struck the first blow but
not to have committed "violent assault" ... -for this reason, [in
speaking, we] should give definitions of these things: what is theft?
What [is] violent assault?... In so doing, if we wish to show that
some legal term applies or does not, we will be able to make clear
what is a just verdict.8 2
Aristotle suggested how to argue for an interpretation beyond the
"plain meaning" of the text and legislative intent:
Fairness, for example, seems to be just; but fairness is justice that
goes. beyond the written law. This happens sometimes from the
intent of the legislators but sometimes without their intent when
something escapes their notice; and [it happens] intentionally when
they cannot define [illegal actions] accurately but on the one hand
must speak in general terms and on the other hand must not but
are able to take account only of most possibilities; and in many
cases it is not easy to define the limitless possibilities, for example,
how long and what sort of weapon has to be used to constitute
"wounding;" for a lifetime would not suffice to enumerate the
possibilities. If then, the action is undefinable when a law must be
framed, it is necessary to speak in general terms, so that if someone
wearing a ring raises his hand or strikes, by the written law he is
violating the law and does wrong, when in truth he has [perhaps]
not done any harm, and this [latter judgment] is fair....
And [it is also fair] to look not to the law but to the legislator
and not to the word but to the intent of the legislator, and not to
the action but to the deliberate purpose and not to the part but to
the whole, not [looking at] what a person is now but what he has
been always or for the most part.... On the subject of things that
are fair let definitions be made in this way.
83
Thus, Aristotle's pragmatic response to the potential tyranny of legal
text was to demonstrate that it could be made more flexible and
equitable through the use of rhetoric. Such fairness was reached
80. See i.
81. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 88.
82. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 104.
83. ARISrOTLE, supra note 59, at 105-06.
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through constructing arguments about a text by looking to different
sources of interpretation.
The Greek writing on rhetoric of the fifth and fourth centuries
B.C.E. had an enormous impact on the Roman legal culture. Marcus
Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.E.)" and M. Fabius Quintilian (35-95
C.E.)' were Roman lawyers, philosophers, and educators who
synthesized and built upon the work of Isocrates, Plato, and Aristot-
le.' In the era of Cicero and Quintilian, classical rhetorical theory
in the legal context reached its peak. Each wrote handbooks of
rhetoric that advocated rhetoric as the basis for all dealings in civic
and practical matters."7 They also argued for the unification of
philosophy and rhetoric, culminating in Quintilian's definition of the
ideal orator as "the good man speaking well."'
For Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, the utililitarian uses
of rhetoric were not the sole measure of the "good" orator. They all
stressed that the orator, in his arguments, teaches through exam-
ple. 9 While these ancient rhetoricians offered various formulations
of the moral themes a speaker could adopt, they all argued that part
of being a "good" orator was participating actively in the process of
government, putting the interests of the political community above
self-interest."0 In doing so, the orator influences and inspires the
moral consciousness of his audience."
The interest in classical rhetoric waxed and waned through the
early Christian period (150-400 C.E.), the Middle Ages, the Renais-
sance, and the EnilightenmentY2 While rhetoric vras recognized as
an essential route to knowing and acting in the world of practical
affairs in the Italian Renaissance, during the other periods, it was
primarily relegated to issues of style and delivery.
93
In early America, however, Cicero and Quintilian had profound
influence on lawyers. During the colonial period, the American
84. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 5 (noting that leading Roman rhetoritidan Cicero
commonly drew from Isocrates' ideas on rhetorical style).
85. Se FoSS Er'AT-, supra note 15, at 5 (tracing influence of Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, and
Cicero in development of Quintilian's rhetorical style).
86. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 5.
87. Cicero wrote Delnventione (87 B.C.E.) and DeOratore (55 B.C.E.), while Quintilian vwote
Institutes of Oratory (93 C.E.). Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 5.
88. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 5.
89. SeePATRIaABIZzELL &BRuCE HERZBERG, THE RHETroRICALTRADmoN33,35-36 (1990).
90. See .
91. Se id. at 56.
92. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 6-8.
93. See Foss Er AL, supra note 15, at 7-11.
94. SeeROBERTA. FERGUSON, LAW AND LErS IN AMEIAN CULTURE 72-84 (1934); sw alo
JOHN C. ROLFE, CICERO AND HIS INFLUENCE 11-17 (1963). Oddly, With all the attention in recent
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Revolution, the Constitutional Convention, and the ensuing years,
these classical authors, focusing on the link between law, politics, and
rhetoric, were the backbone of the new republic:
95
The vitality of neoclassicism drew upon a premise that the lawyer-
writer took as his guiding principle in republican culture: namely,
that literature and politics belonged together within a higher sense
of civic purpose. As always, Cicero served as reference and
inspiration. De Officiis-John Quincy Adams called it the manual
of every republican-declared that, "the chief end of all men" was
"to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body
politic identical," and that the means to this end was "reason and
speech," which united men "in a sort of natural fraternity." It
followed that public eloquence on political themes was the highest
duty of the educated citizen. Here Cicero placed particular onus
upon the legal profession because it was so closely connected to
"the gift of eloquence."'
The ideal of the eloquent citizen/lawyer, originating in classical
rhetoric, became the ideal of early American intellectuals.
This discussion of legal classical rhetorical theory is not a naive and
nostalgic argument for a return to the good old days. For all its
insight, classical rhetoric is permeated by a sense of elitism; certain
individuals are deemed better suited for the role of citi-
zen/statesman/lawyer, and not surprisingly, they have tended to be
educated males in charge of their households. 7 Moreover, the
concerns of today seem far removed from the ancient city-states and
even the early American republic.
Still, to understand the modem value of the practical reasoning
approach to interpretation, it is helpful to understand its roots in
classical rhetorical theory, which was, in turn, tied to legal discourse.
The ancient philosophers understood that interpretation is a
rhetorical act; it is a human activity, not a process of nature.9"
Moreover, they believed that how one speaks influences the moral
legal scholarship to the "republican revival," there has been very little discussion of Its
relationship to rhetorical theory in the ancient Greek and Roman legal context. For an analysis
of the "republican revival" movement, see generally G. Edward White, Refleclions on he
"Republican Revival. • Interdisciplinary Scholarship in the Legal Academy, 6 YALEJ.L & HUMAN. 1
(1994).
95. Sm FERGUSON, supra note 94, at 73.
96. FERGUsoN, supra note 94, at 76 (citingJOHN QuiNCYADAMS, 1 LEcruRES ON RHEToRIC
AND ORATORY, DEUVERED TO THE CLASSES OF SENIOR AND JUNIOR SOPHLITRS IN HARVARD
UNvERSrfY 1, 136 (1810)).
97. SeeANTHONYT. KRONMAN, THE Losr LAwYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THELEGAL PROFESSION
37-42 (1993); see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Serious: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory
and the Moral Foundation ofDdiberativeDemocracy, 82 CAL. L REV. 329,396 (1994) (condemning
Arisotle's "best regime" for its policy of excluding women and "natural slaves").
98. See supra notes 48-91 and accompanying text.
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quality of one's community." After the legal realist and critical legal
studies movements, this insight should be as obvious as the discovery
that we generally speak in prose."0 Yet many modem advocates
and judges still tend to deny'' what the Greeks and Romans knew:
interpretations of legal texts are not found objects; interpretations of
legal texts are created and defended through rhetoric.l  Moreover,
a good number of the advocates and judges denying the rhetorical
nature of interpretation and advocating the desirability of "plain
meaning" are talking about evidence rules. 13
Advocates engage in rhetoric to persuade a judge to apply a
rule-for example, to admit or to exclude evidence. Judges, in turn,
use rhetoric in justifying their decision to interpret an evidence rule
one way or anotherY°4 We generally only refer to interpretation as
"rhetorical" when we mean it is bad rhetoric, empty bombast masking
other agendas. But the process of interpretation is really a process of
argumentation, rhetoric in its broader, less pejorative sense.Y°5 One
cannot practicaly separate the moment of adjudication from the
process of justification. In theory, one can separate them, but the
moment of decision is subject to analysis, if at all, only by psychoana-
lysts." Yet the actual judgment, the exercise of power and authori-
ty, is expressed through language. Sometimes that language is curt:
"affirmed," "reversed," "granted," or "denied." But more often a
judgment is accompanied by detailed justification."' Criticism of
the rhetoric of interpretation focuses our attention on the adequacy
of the justification.
"Theories" of statutory interpretation, such as intentionalism,
purposivism, public choice analysis, textuaism, and practical reason-
ing, are simply rhetoric. I deliberately use "simply" rather than
"mere" in this context. As the history of Western thought indicates,
99. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
100. MoLIERE, THE WOULD-BE GE.T.MAN act 2, sc. 4, in THE MIs.qtinmOPE & OTHER P,S
(Signet Classic Paperback ed., Donald M. Frame ed., 1968).
101. SeeWetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1562-66.
102. See Wetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1563-64.
103. For an example of such cases, see generally fnfia Part II1B-D.
104. SeeWetlaufer, supra note 11, at 1557-66.
105. &eWetlaufer, supm note 11, at 1556-57 & nn33, 5 (iflusIating constructive and useful
nature of rhetoric by incorporating "rhetorical notes" as means of revealing author's own bias).
106. While this sounds abit like classical legal realism, my position, ith its emphasis on the
persuasive power and educative responsibilities connected to the Court's eias is distinct. ,.m
infra notes 266-301 and accompanying text.
107. See MarthaJ. Dragich, Wl the Federal Couts of Appeals Peish f T7Lj POl? OrDos tLe
Declining Use of Opinions to E ain andJustifyJudicid Dsions Pose a Greater Threal?, 44 AM. U. L
REv. 757, 760 (1995).
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there is nothing "mere" about rhetoric.108 Yet I say that interpreta-
tion is "simply" rhetoric, in that we sometimes get carried away by our
theorizing and our search for the universal, the certain, and the
predictable. We fail to remember that we are engaged in a process
of justification that is, at the core, rhetorical, contextual, and fluid.
Classical rhetoricians are important because they understood and
accepted this; we should build on their insights.
Finally, classical rhetoric provides a lesson in ethical pedagogy. The
classical authors, apart from Plato, viewed rhetoric as an amoral
process, but all stressed the importance and positive moral influence
of studying and emulating "good," in the sense of ethical, speak-
ers." There is a renewed interest in this theme on the part of legal
scholars who believe it matters a great deal how courts talk.1
I will suggest that judges who interpret, or talk about, evidence
rules could do so in a more ethical way;111 a view based on a con-
cept from classical rhetoric: the concept of ethos.' Ethos is the
persuasive power that comes from the credibility of the speaker,
credibility that the speaker brings to a situation, and, then, either
builds upon or loses through her speech. I argue that the way the
Supreme Court currently talks about evidence rules damages its ethos.
This is harmful because it both reduces the Court's persuasiveness
and detracts from the Court's power as an educative institution. That
discussion is postponed until one sees what interpretative options the
Court has available to it. In order to evaluate those options, it is
important to set forth the vision that the drafters of the Federal .Rules
of Evidence had for their code, for one can see a clear link to the
classical tradition, which has since been ignored but which could
provide guidance in resolving problems of interpretation.
B. Pragmatism in the Creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence
I demonstrate in this section how issues regarding the interpreta-
tion of legal texts were confronted during the early attempts to codify
evidence rules, the American Law Institute's (AU) Model Code of
108. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 484-85 (1989).
109. See GaIston, supra note 97, at 376-77; Isocrates, supra note 55, at 171 (condemning those
who "attempt to teach others when they are themselves in great need of instruction").
110. Seegeneraliy, e-g., MARYANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALL& THE IMPOVERISHMENTOF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 57-79 (1991); KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 11-52; Christopher L Eisgruber, Is the
Supreme Court anEducativeInstitution?, 67 N.Y.U. L REV. 961,964-72 (1992);Jerry Frug, Argument
as Character, 40 STAN. L REv. 869, 871-82 (1988); Mark Tushnet, Style and the Supreme Court's
Eduational Role in Governmen4 11 CONs'r. COMMENT. 215, 215 (1994).
111. See infra notes 266-301 and accompanying text.
112. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 48.
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Evidence"' and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence,"' and dur-
ing the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves." 5
The perspective of pragmatism provided the resolution of those
issues, and pragmatism is tied inexorably to the legacy of classical
rhetoric. In rejecting absolutist theories of reality while also rejecting
the despair of radical skeptical philosophy,"" pragmatism follows
the rhetorical tradition of Protagoras, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and
Quintilian: this tradition emphasized the contingent and contextual
nature of reality while recognizing the practical, and sometimes
conflicting, desires to act in one's self-interest and in the interest of
the community."1
7
Pragmatism is almost as difficult to define as rhetoric. An initial
problem is that what might be called pragmatism goes by many
names, such as neopragmatism," 8 practical reason,119 practical
113. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942).
114. UNiF. R. EVID. (1953).
115. See STEPHENA. SALTZBURG &MICHAELM. MARTIN, FEDERALRULES OFE iDENCE MANUAL
(5th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1994).
116. See Idary Pumnam, A Reconsideration ofDewjan Democra, 63 S. CAL L REV. 1671, 1672
(1990); see also Michael Axiens, Pwgrms Is Our Only Prduct Legal Refom and the C0cfication of
Evidence, 17 LAw & Soc. INQuiRY 213, 247-52 (1992) (discussing intellectual history and rejection
of skepticism in context of codification of evidence rules); Michael L Seigel, A Pragmatic Cn'lique
of Modem Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW. U. L REV. 995, 998 (1994) (discussing belief that
contemporary evidence scholarship can be traced to "optimistic rationalism").
117. S&esupra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
118. Neopragmatism is the most recent strain of pragmatism. Its best knowm advocates are
Richard Rorty, RichardJ. Bernstein, and Hilary Putnam. SegneralF RCHARDJ. BEP1TEIN,
BEYOND OBJEGrIVISM AND REIATrvISM (1983); RICHARD RoRiy, CoSEQuENcEs OF PRAG!.s4.T1.S
(1982); Putnam, supra note 116. Modem neopmgmatists build on the work of the earlier
American pragmatism of Charles Peirce, William James, andJohn Dewey. To compare these
earlier authors, see generallyJOHN DEWEY, LOGIC THE THEORY OF INQUIRY (1938); WU.uAm
JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND FOUR ESSANS FROM THE MEANNG OF TRUTH (1942); Charles S. Peirce,
What Pragmatism I4 in COLLECrED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEmCE Vol. 5, p.1 (Charles
Hartshome & Paul Weiss eds., 1965).
Neopragmatists, however, distinguish themselves from this earlier tradition in two vwa). First.
neopragmatists "talk about language instead of experience or mind or consciousness, as the old
pragmatists did. The second respect is that we have all read Kuhn, Hanson, Toulmin, and
Feyerabend, and have thereby become suspicious of the term'scientic method." Richard Rorty,
The Banality of Pragmatism and thePoeby ofjust4e, 63 S. AL L. REV. 1811,1813 (1990). In this
respect, the neopragmatists also differ from the early legal realists, who were obsessed with the
psyche and the possibilities of the empiricial method and the social sciences. For more on this
distinction, see generally JERONME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Anchor Books 1963)
(1930). The link between legal realism and the older version of pragmatism is apparent in
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who some have labelled a realist and some have alled a
pragmatist. ComparePoSNER, supra note 16, at 287 (labelingHolmes as legal realist) uwthThomas
C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatim, 41 S ,AN. L REV. 787, 793 (1989) (labeling Holmes as
pragmatist). I would add another difference between the new or"neo" pragmatism and the old.
Some neopragmatists have stressed the dimension ofself-consciousness, a concept encompassing
the realization of the political effect that one's gender, sexual orientation, race, and so forth can
have on one's perspective. See MargaretJane Radin, Vie Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL
L REv. 1699, 1725 (1990). While the early pragmatists/realists emphasized the psychological
dimensions of decisionmaking, they did not seem to be as open about their own contexts and
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wisdom, 2' and skepticism."' Nevertheless, the common denomina-
tor of pragmatism, whatever its label, is the rejection of
foundationalist theories of truth and knowledge. "The goal of
foundationalism is to provide a uniform and objective method for
judges (and presumably scholars) to answer difficult legal ques-
tions." 2 12 The dominant foundationalist view in evidence law is
"optimistic rationalism,""r which is "the belief that the overarching
function of evidence law is to maximize the (already fairly high)
probability that factfinders in our adjudicatory system will accurately
determine objective historical truth."24 In Part III of this Article,
I will show how optimistic rationalism pervades the Supreme Court's
current attempts to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence, with
sometimes poor, and sometimes disastrous, results. In the next
section of this Article, I argue that the drafters of the Federal Rules
self-awareness. Hence some neopragmatists tend to be more autobiographical in their"theoretl-
cal" writing. Moreover, these writers stress that in the "conversations" or "dialogue" advocated
by other neopragmatists, politically and economically oppressed groups do not get the same
opportunity to talk, whether about talking or anything else.
Neopragmatism has been embraced by legal scholars. S generaly RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE (1990); StevenJ. Burton, Law aspracticalReason, 62 S. CAL. L REV.
747 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Intepredation as Practical
Reasoning 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatisra and the Constitution,
72 MINN. L REV. 1331 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and theFirst
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987); Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical
Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL L REV. 1137 (1990); Richard A.
Posner, TheJurisprudence of Skepticim 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988); Eileen A. Scallen, Constilu-
tional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a ThreeDimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 623 (1992);Joseph Singer, The Plajer and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE LJ.
1 (1984); Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1569 (1990).
119. See Burton, supra note 118, at 776-84. Practical reason, in my view at least, Is a
philosophical perspective or outlook. Practical reasoning, as discussed in this Article, is a
method of argumentation used to justify a particular interpretation. One argues under the
method of practical reasoning because of one's adherence to pragmatism or practical reason-a
belief in the unavailability of universal, absolute, objective truth, yet a rejection of nihilism,
120. "Practical wisdom" is an especially confusing term because some scholars seem to use
it as a synonym for a perspective that views truth and knowledge as contextual and contingent.
See POSNER, supra note 118, at 287-88 (identifying common sense, custom, precedent, intuition,
history, and time as contextual sources for practical wisdom). Others add the dimension of
moral character to the term. See, g., Galston, supra note 97, at 371-72 (emphasizing "excellence
of the soul"); REONMAN, supra note 97, at 41-44 (looking to qualities of sobriety, fair-mindedness,
and incorruptability); Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 717 (adding quality ofcompasslon to practical
reasoning).
121. The use of the term skepticism is troubling, for there are (and were in classical terms)
various types of philosophical outlooks called skepticism, ranging from the most paralyzing,
nihilistic philosophies to the sophistic and Ciceronian belief in action based on the best available
sources in the face of an uncertain and unpredictable world. SeA COMPANION TO EPISTEIOLO-
cw 457-64 (Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa eds., 1992) (distinguishing among traditional,
contemporary, and modem views of skepticism).
122. Seigel, supra note 116, at 1010.
123. TWINING, supra note 11, at 75.
124. Seigel, supra note 116, at 996.
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drafted the Rules from the perspective of pragmatism. Practical
reasoning, a mode of argumentation based in classical rhetoric and
reflecting the perspective of pragmatism, is accordingly the most
appropriate means of interpreting the Federal Rules.
Several writers have done a thorough job of tracing the develop-
ment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,'25 and I will only briefly
summarize their efforts in order to show the connection between the
philosophical perspective of classical rhetoricians and the drafters of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Professor Thomas Mengler notes that
the Federal Rules strike "'a middle course between vague generalities
and constricting particularity. '""26 After reviewing the Advisory
Committee Notes, the drafters' testimony before both houses of
Congress, and congressional materials, he concludes that there is no
clear direct evidence of why the drafters chose the "middle
course,""w but argues that there is strong circumstantial evidence
that the reasons were similar, if not identical, to the reasons advanced
for the ALI's Model Code of Evidence and the 1953 Uniform Rules
of Evidence." a
The debate over the scope of codification of evidence rules began
at the ALI in 1940." Professor Edmund Morgan, the Model
Code's Reporter, set out several options.' The first vras Dean
Wigmore's proposal of a catalog of rules, "so detailed that few, if any,
situations not covered by the Code should arise."' The primary
virtues of this detailed code were that it increased stability and
predictability in evidentiary decisions and provided the most disci-
plined means for controlling the truth-finding process of the trial.' s
A second alternative was that ofJudge Charles E. Clark, who proposed
"a simple creed," which consisted of "'one broad rule of admissibility
125. S ag., Ariens, supra note 116, at 247-52; David P. Leonard, P,7wr and RAponsMility in
Eviden Law, 63 S. CALL REV. 937,952-68 (1990); Thomas AL Mengler, The 77zoy ofDlacrdion
in the Federal Rules of Evienc-, 74 IOWA L REV. 413, 414-16 (1989).
126. Mengler, supra note 125, at 414 (quoting Proposed Rubs ofEvidene Hearings Before the
Subcomm on Reform ofFederal COiminal Laws of the House Comm. on theJudidary, 93d Cong., Ist ses.
91 (1973) [hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Professor Edward W. Cleary, Reporter to
the Advisory Committee)).
127. Mengler, supra note 125. at 415-24.
128. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 437.
129. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 432.
130. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 433.
131. Mengler, supra note 125, at 433 (citingJohn H. Wigmore, The Ar~ian Law Itil ute
Code ofEvdenceRules: A Dissent 28 A.B.AJ. 23,24-27 (1942)).
132. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 433 (citing Edmund KL Morgan, Discussing Code of
Evidence Tentaive Draft No. 1, 17 A.L.. PRo. 1, 66 (1940)).
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of relevant evidence' and a few subordinate rules to clarify the main
rule.,t3
Morgan's proposal fell in between Dean Wigmore's and Judge
Clark's. Morgan offered "a 'series of rules in general terms,' without
attempting 'to frame rules of thumb for specific situations.'"'
1 4
Morgan's rationale for this approach was threefold, and in total
reflects a pragmatist perspective. First, Morgan took basic issue with
Wigmore's foundationalist theory of rationalism. He argued that "a
lawsuit is not, and cannot be made, a scientific investigation for the
discovery of the truth,""s because the parties may choose not to
present all of the available evidence, the evidence that is presented
may be inherently defective (such as the product of a weak memory
or skillful liar), and "as in all other experiences of individuals in our
society, the emotions of the person involved-litigants, counsel,
witnesses, judges, and jurors-will play a part."" For these reasons,
Morgan argued that even detailed evidence rules could not make a
trial a "pure" objective and analytical search for the truth.1
3 7
Instead, evidence law should aim at allowing the factfinder to "hear
and consider those data which reasonable men confronted with the
necessity of acting in a matter of like importance in their everyday life
would use in making up their minds what to do."I' Yet Morgan
pointed out that this perspective could only be implemented on a
contextual basis; "drafting fine-tuned rules of evidence to deal with
every case was impossible." 9
Morgan added two other reasons to reject Wigmore's proposal. He
argued that Wigmore's detailed and complex code would interfere
with the efficient operation of trials, where evidence decisions have to
be made quickly and in the heat of the moment.4 Finally,
Wigmore's detailed code was accompanied by his insistence that there
133. Mengler, supra note 125, at 433 (quoting Morgan, supra note 132, at 82 (statement by
Judge Clark)). Judge Clark's appeal for simplicity and brevity was similar to the philosophy
behind the then-existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of which he wras the principle
architect. lI&
134. Mengler, supra note 125, at 436 (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Forward to MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE 1, 7 (1942)).
135. Morgan, supra note 134, at 3, quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 433.
136. Morgan, supra note 134, at 7, quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 433.
137. Morgan, supra note 134, at 4, quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 433.
138. Morgan, supra note 134, at 7, quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 435; ef. Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 22, § 5038(c) (1995). Section 5038(c) sets the following standard of evidence In
administrative law proceedings: "Any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of
evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs,
regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper
the admission of such evidence over objection in civil actions." Id.
139. Morgan, supra note 134, at 7, quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 435.
140. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 435.
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be no appellate review, lest appellate courts feel compelled to reverse
a trial court for any deviation from the code. 141 Morgan argued that
it was unacceptable to cut off all judicial review of evidence rulings-a
litigant ought to have some recourse to appellate reviev, to prevent
"material prejudice to ... substantial rights."'4 Thus, Morgan
would not sacrifice appellate review-which he regarded as a
necessary check on the fairness of the trial court proceedings--for
judicial efficiency.
For this same reason, Morgan rejected Judge Clark's proposal of a
creed, which also made evidentiary rulings unrevievrable. 1 In
addition, Morgan pointed out that if the proposal was amended by
adding appellate review to the creed, each "new evidence situation
would invite appeal and lead to a common law of evidence,"'" thus
eliminating the practical stabilizing value of codification."¢
While the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence
never explicitly announced that itwas adopting the philosophical basis
of the Model Code and Uniform Rules, 6 its members, two of
whom had participated in drafting the Uniform Rules, 47 consistent-
ly restated Morgan's rationale for the Model Code in explaining the
form of the proposed Federal Rules." Moreover, the Reporter of
the Advisory Committee, Professor Edward W. Clear, later wrote an
article on the interpretation of the newly enacted Federal Rules of
Evidence, which echoes Morgan's perspective.'4
In stating his reasons for rejecting Wigmore's detailed code and
Clark's general creed, Morgan virtually echoes the philosophical
perspective of the sophists, Aristotle, and the pragmatists, who view
knowledge as uncertain and context-dependent, yet acknowledge that
practical action is possible, and indeed necessary, in the face of this
uncertainty."W Professor Steven Smith has noted that if pragmatists
are to be taken seriously, then "we are all pragmatists," for any
141. See Mengler, sup-, note 125, at 435.
142. Morgan, supra note 134, at 15, quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 435.
143. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 435.
144. Mengler, supra note 125, at 435.
145. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 435.
146. Professor Mengler speculates that this was because the Advisory Committee vished to
avoid the political wrangling that occurred over the Model Code and the Uniform Rules.
Mengler, supra note 125, at 437.
147. The two participating members were the Chair of the Advisory Committee, Albert
Jenner, andJudge Joe E. Estes. Mengler, supra note 125, at 436.
148. See Mengler, supra note 125, at 436-37 (describing relationship between Model Code
and Uniform Rules).
149. See gseraly Edvard W. Cleary, Prelirnnay Notes on Reading the Rulas of E idenae, 57 NED.
L REv. 908 (1978).
150. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 323.
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reasonable person can accept its tenets.' He argues that the utility
of pragmatism is simply exhortatory, as it calls on "scholars and judges
to avoid intellectual vices that they already acknowledge as such but
are nonetheless prone to commit."
5 2
In the next Part of this Article, I set forth the interpretative
methods, or argumentative strategies, the Court could use in
interpreting evidence rules. Then in Part III, I demonstrate that
while Professor Smith might be right that the members of the
Supreme Court are all pragmatists at heart, they do not talk like
pragmatists when they interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence. They
do not sound like Professor Morgan. They do not sound like
Professor Cleary. I argue that the Supreme Court's recent efforts to
interpret evidence rules have created a level of serious confusion,
generating the kind of unpredictability and uncertainty that the Court
supposedly wants to eliminate. Moreover, the approach the Supreme
Court currently takes in interpreting evidence rules unnecessarily
diminishes its ethos. A practical reasoning approach, I argue, is
consistent with the pragmatism that gave rise to the Federal Rules. As
Professor Morgan noted, such a perspective does not eliminate
uncertainty; it acknowledges uncertainty and tries to work as well as
possible despite the realization that it will never produce perfect
results.' I will add that practical reasoning has an additional
benefit: using practical reasoning would add to the Court's ethos,
which in turn affects its ability to persuade and to educate.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY "ScHooLs" OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The basic arguments in the rhetoric of interpretation are well
established1M I will attempt to capture them here, as they apply to
evidence rules. Despite their differences in emphasis, all of the
theories share the concern that in "interpreting" a statute or rule, a
court is trespassing on the function of the democratically elected
legislature. 5' Professors Eskridge and Frickey diagnose this as
151. Steven Smith, The PunUtt of Pragmatism, 100 YALE LJ. 409, 446 (1990).
152. Id. The essence of Smith's criticism is that pragmatism is a tremendous grasp of tie
obvious. I&. His response reminds me of my graduate school days, teaching public speaking
and argumentation at a midwestern university. My students often said, "but this is all common
sense." I replied, "yes, a good part of it is. But if it is just common sense, then why do you
complain so often and so bitterly about misunderstandings and miscommunication? It may be
common sense, but it's not so common." (Apologies to Mark Twain).
153. See Mengler, supa note 125, at 431-38 (discussing rationale of Morgan's Model Code).
154. A concise summary of these approaches is available in Philip P. Frickey, From the Big
Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in StatufMy Interpretation, 77 MINN. L REV. 241 (1992)
[hereinafter Frickey, Big Sleep], and Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118.
155. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 325.
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a form of "countermajoritarian anxiety": As unelected judges,
applying statutes enacted by our elected legislators, they feel some
pressure to tie their results rigorously to the expectations that
legislators had when they enacted the statute. Any result not
related to majoritarian expectations may seem illegitimate in a
democracy.156
Professor Glen Weissenberger has argued that such anxiety is
inappropriate when the Supreme Court interprets evidence rules
because the rules are created for the use of the court system and the
Supreme Court participated in the drafting of the rules."' A similar
argument has been made regarding the interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." While this view of the Supreme Court's
autonomy in the rulemaking process may have been true for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at one time, it is no longer the case
for those rules'59 and was never completely true for the Federal
Rules of Evidence."6
Congress', or to be more accurate, members of Congress', interest
in the Federal Rules of Evidence is evident from the history of the
Rules. The Rules initially were drafted under the Supreme Court's
power and under the procedure set forth in the Rules Enabling Act
of 1934.111 Professor Weissenberger traces the origin of Rules from
the first Special Committee on Evidence (which, from 1961 to 1963,
studied the need for a uniform code of evidence)" to the Advisory
Committee's work drafting the rules,16 and finally to their submis-
156. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 324.
157. SeWeissenberger, supra note 4, at 1319.
158. See Karen Nelson Moore, The Suprme C4ous Rode in Irntpreing th Faera Rules of Cfl
Procedure, 44 HASTINGS UJ. 1039, 1061-72 (1993).
159. See Richard L Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwatk: The Przipect For Procdural Plaomms 59
BROOK. L REv. 761 (1993).
160. See Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1309.
161. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 US.C. § 2072 (1988). The Enabling Act grants the
Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules regarding the practice and procedure of the
federal courts, but prohibits the Court from abridging, enlarging, or modifying any substantive
right. Id.
162. Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1319. This Committee, established by ChiefJustice Earl
Warren, recommended the adoption of a uniform set of federal rules of evidence in its 1963
report. Id
163. See Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1319 & nn.62-64. Following the rulemaklng
procedure the Court has adopted, the proposed rules drafted by the Advisory Committee were
also approved, first by the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and then
by the entire Judicial Conference. See 21 CHARLE A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.,
FEDERAL PRACTIcE AN PRocEDnaua EV-DENCE § 5006, at 101-04 (1977). The propoed rules
were also subject to extensive public comment. See id. After some additional changes r the
Advisory Committee, the rules were sent to the Supreme Court, who then tranmitted the rules
to Congress. See id
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sion to the Supreme Court."6 At this point, however, some mem-
bers of Congress raised questions about whether the Court had
exceeded its authority under the Rules Enabling Act.' Congress
avoided any potential problems when it enacted a statute that
provided that the rules could not take effect until Congress expressly
approved them.' After several modifications, 67 Congress enact-
ed the rules, and President Ford signed them into law on January 3,
1975.1' Professor Friedenthal suggests that Congress' active role in
the creation of the evidence rules in 1974 "may have spelled the end
of the autonomous role held by the Supreme Court for the past 40
years." 69
Professor Weissenberger argues that "[ e ]xcept in instances in which
it modified the text of certain Rules [of evidence], Congress' intent
was to ratify and enact the intent of the Supreme Court and its
Advisory Committee. "170 He then argues that the Advisory Commit-
tee and the Supreme Court never meant the "traditional tools of
statutory construction" to apply to the rules of evidence.' While
it is questionable whether this is an accurate statement of the intent
of the original Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court as of
1974,172 this argument is self-defeating. If Congress meant to defer to
the intent of the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court, then
the Supreme Court has the power to choose whatever method of
interpretation it wishes for "its" rules, and it predominantly appears
to wish to apply the "plain meaning" of the rules, as I discuss below.
Moreover, several theorists have argued that the best way to give effect
to the intent of a special interest group that has drafted legislation,
164. See Weissenberger, supra'note 4, at 1319 nn.63 & 69 (tracing complete history of
drafting of Rules).
165. SeeJack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crsss,
27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 682-85 (1975).
166. Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (1973) (reprinted at 28 U.S.C. § 2074 notes).
167. See Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1320 n.69.
168. See Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1320 n.69.
169. Friedenthal, supra note 165, at 675. .
170. Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1324.
171. See Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1325. Professor Weissenberger affirmed his views
in a follow-up article. See Wessenberger's Reply, supra note 4, at 402 (answering the question "Are
the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?" emphatically "no"). I argue here that the Federal
Rules are statutes, but that they are special statutes; the Court, which ordinarily is wholly
independent of the drafting process of the statutes it construes, is intimately involved with the
creation and evolution of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
172. See Cleary, supra note 149, at 909; see also id. at 919 (averring that "the accepted rules
of statutory interpretation are in general being applied by the courts [of appeals] to the Rules
with skill and thought"). Professor Cleary did not endorse one particular approach to statutory
interpretation, but I think his discussion of the alternative sources of interpretation, coupled
with his belief that the Rules did not speak for themselves, suggests that he might have agreed
with the practical reasoning approach.
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a description that would appear to encompass the Advisory Commit-
tee, is to strictly enforce the language of the rule as drafted.17
Thus, if Professor Weissenberger is correct, then he cannot criticize,
as he does, the Court's choice of interpretative schemes.
The bottom line is that any approach to interpreting the Federal
Rules of Evidence will have to confront the problem that while they
are rules of procedure, they are also statutes passed by Congress and
signed by the President The rules of evidence are indeed statutes,
but they are special statutes. At the moment, the Court and Congress
appear to share the rulemaking process, which means that while the
Court may be concerned with the practical functioning of the rule, it
will not, and probably should not, ignore the problem of its
"countermajoritarian anxiety."74
The following is a summary of the leading theories of statutory
interpretation, and the chief critiques of those theories. In the final
section, which outlines the practical reasoning approach, I draw from
these theories and strike a balance between the Court's concern about
its role vis a vis Congress, and Professor Weissenberger's concern that
the Court has abandoned "the wisdom of the common-law history of
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the capability of enlightened
growth." ' By openly returning to the rhetorically based method of
practical reasoning, the Court may finally find the right tone.
A. Inttionaism
The school of intentionalism acknowledges that legal language
often does not "speak for itself" and holds that a court should act as
the legislature's faithful agent, interpreting a statute in light of what
the drafters intended. 76  There are at least three forms of
intentionalism. The first looks to the actual, original intent of the
legislative body,'" while the other two versions resort to a legal
fiction of intent."
The first type of intent, actual intent, has been called "a myth, or
more accurately an oxymoron, or contradiction in terms, like military
justice or slam dancing. How can 535 legislators have an intent about
anything?" 179 The second type of intentionalism therefore acknowl-
173. See infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text (discussing public choice theory).
174. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 324.
175. Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1338.
176. Swe Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 325.
177. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 326.
178. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 326.
179. Frickey, Big Seep, supm note 154, at 248.
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edges that it is absurd to talk about "the" intent of a large legislative
body, whose members may "vote for bills out of many unknowable
motives, including logrolling, loyalty or deference to party and
committee, desire not to alienate blocks of voters, and pure matters
of conscience.""s Most intentionalists thus really resort to a conven-
tional, but fictional notion of legislative intent, represented by
statements in committee reports and speeches on the floor.
181
The third type of intentionalism, most recently advocated by Judge
Richard Posner, holds that even conventional legislative intent is
corrupt, in that the evidence of "legislative" intent, such as committee
reports, speeches, and articles, can be manipulated by special interest
groups to reflect their preferred interpretation.8  Because of the
impossibility of determining legislative intent through this evidence,
Judge Posner argues that a court must engage in "imaginative
reconstruction. " s That is, ajudge must imagine how the legislators
at the time of enactment would have answered the question had they
considered it.'"
Professors Eskridge and Frickey argue that although the imaginative
reconstruction approach to legislative intent makes more sense than
other versions, it is flawed in three ways. First, it requires judges to
"recreate the historical understanding of a past legislature."18
Unfortunately, it may be impossible for a modem interpreter, who
brings all of her biases and values to the problem, to do this in a
reliable way."6 Second, the theory puts the judge in an impossible
bind. Assumptions about law and society that ground certain statutes
may tum out to be wrong. 87 If this happens, the judge is left
180. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 326.
181. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 326-27.
182. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsis AND REFoRM 279 (1985).
183. See POSNER, supra note 182, at 286. Judge Posner has linked the imaginative
reconstruction approach to Aristotle. "Aristotle described his method of interpretation as the
method of'equity' (epieikeia); imaginative reconstruction would enablejudges to avert injustices
that literal interpretation would create." Richard A. Posner, Legislation and its Interpretation: A
Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 432 (1989).
184. Professor Frickey citesJustice Stevens' opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504 (1989), interpreting FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1), as an example of imaginative
reconstruction. Frickey, supra note 154, at 256 n,67. He also describes Justice Scalia's opinion,
concurring in the judgment, as a textualist approach, moderated by the canon of avoiding
absurd consequences. Id.; see also Veronica Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism, 44
Am. U. L REV. 127, 128 (1994) (noting "almost universal endorsement" of absurd result
principle, even by those, like Justice Scalia, "who are the most critical ofjudicial discretion and
most insistent that the words of the statute are the only legitimate basis of Interpretation").
Dougherty describesJustice Blackmun's dissent, joined byJustices Brennan and Marshall, as the
purposive approach. Id.
185. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 330.
186. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 330.
187. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 330.
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wondering whether to ask how the legislature would have answered
the question operating under its mistaken assumptions, or whether to
ask how the legislature would answer the questions under current
conditions."ss Finally, Eskridge and Frickey argue that as conditions
and circumstances change, statutes ought to be interpreted to be
consistent with those changes whenever practical, and a historical
"reconstruction" of original legislative intent prevents this."m
B. Purposivism
A second method of statutory interpretation is identified with its
chief proponents, Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. In The
Legal Process, Hart and Sacks attempted to remain faithful to the will
of the legislature, while avoiding the problems of intentionalism.191
Under this approach, ajudge is to read legal language carefully, then
think up the plausible purposes of the language, which are to be
rational, because the judge has to assume that the legislature
consisted of "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably."191 The judge may consult legislative history, but should
only use it as a last resort, and then only to help select among
possible functions of the provision.12
Purposivism has been criticized on several grounds. First, it allows
a judge too much discretion in determining the purpose of the
statute, which may lead the judge to substitute her own values for
those of the actual legislature.193 Second, it allows a judge to move
too freely beyond the text of the statute, which is the only concrete
evidence of the legislature's will and which provides the only stable
source of information on the rights and duties of the governed."
In addition, a significant challenge to both intentionalism and
purposivism has come from scholars of public choice theory, which
analyzes legislation using the methodology of economics." From
a public choice theory perspective, legal language is simply the result
of compromises struck by special interest groups that control the
188. Se Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 330-31.
189. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 331-32.
190. See genertay HENRx M. HART, JR. & ALBERT AL SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESs: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE AKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994).
191. Id at 1415.
192. S5e i. at 1284-86.
193. Se Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 336-37.
194. See Eskidge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 336-37.
195. See Frickey, Big Slep, supra note 154, at 250.
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legislature's agenda, so it is ridiculous to talk about the "legislative"
intent or the "legislature's" purpose. 196
According to Frickey, public choice. theory holds significant
implications for statutory interpretation. From the perspective of
public choice theory,
the deals struck in the legislature and embodied in statutes depend
upon interest group strength, which is not attributable to the sheer
numbers of people represented by the group, but rather by whether
the group can organize easily to promote its ends and whether it
can limit the benefits gained from its lobbying to its membership.
Small groups likely to receive discrete benefits or suffer dispropor-
tionate burdens are more likely to organize and lobby effectively
than the diffuse public. Hence, rather than assume, along the lines
of Hart and Sacks, that all statutes embody broad public-interest
purposes, we should expect to find lots of statutes that provide
concentrated unjustified benefits to small groups at the expense of
the general public.
197
Public choice theory generally has led its proponents in one of two
directions. Some public choice adherents, such as Judge Frank
Easterbrook, use the public choice critique to justify textualism.1 3
They argue that if statutes represent political compromises bargained
for by small but powerful interest groups, then the role of a court can
only be to enforce those bargains as they are written.'" The other
approach resulting from the public choice critique is practical
reasoning, which is discussed below.
Public choice theory, which may make most obvious sense in the
environmental or other heavily regulated fields, may seem inapplica-
ble to the procedural context, with its aura of neutrality. Recent
experience with the discovery rules, however, shows that the plaintiffs'
bar and defendants' bar are quite capable of intensive lobbying for
their respective interest groups.
2°°
196. Frickey, Big Sleep, supra note 154, at 250-51; see also Dougherty, supra note 184, at 131
(terming attempts to attribute intent or purpose to legislature "more fiction than fact").
197. Frickey, Big Sleep, supra note 154, at 250-51.
198. Se. Frickey, Big Sleep, supra note 154, at 253-54 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutei'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L REv. 533, 546-51 (1983)).
199. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCrION 89-102 (1991). For a recent example ofJudge Easterbrook's textuallsm applied
to evidence rules, see United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1465-67 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Easterbrook,J., concurring) (arguing that using residual exception of FED. R, EVID. 804(b) (5)
to admit testimony that would not be admissible under prior testimony exception (FED. 11L EviD.
804(b) (1)) results in "slighting" Rule 804(b) (5)). The introductory language of Rule 804(b) (5)
allows "[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions" to be
admissible under a hearsay exception.
200. See Marcus, supra note 159, at 805-12.
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C. Textualism and the Plain Meaning Rule
In a textualist approach, one interprets a legal text simply by
resorting to its "plain meaning.""1 A delightful irony is that there
is no plain meaning to the "plain meaning rule" or "textualism."
There are at least three versions of textualism and the plain meaning
rule, all requiring reliance on the text. t 2 The oldest version,
however, prohibits the use of any extrinsic material to interpret a
legal text, unless that reading would lead to absurd consequences,"°
while the "New Textualism"2t" looks to a text as simply the best
evidence of legislative intent or purpose.2° Thus, under this new
version, a court will apply the plain meaning of statutory language
unless the legislative history provides clear evidence that it should be
interpreted differently!' Both of these versions of the plain
meaning rule focus on whether the language is ambiguous, whereas
the third version of the rule acknowledges that while the language
may be ambiguous, the "plain meaning" in the sense of the "ordinary
meaning" ought to be the reading that controls.3° One could call
this the "most or plainest meaning rule"; it can be seen in those cases
where theJustices all purport to be applying the "plain meaning rule,"
201. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 340-41.
202. See eg., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of On'ginal Intent in Statuto Construdan, 11
HARv. J.L & PuB. POL'y 59 (1988) (identif)ing plain meaning as first step in statutory
interpretation); William Eskridge, The New Textualjm, 37 UCLA L REv. 621, 621 (1990)
(describing text as "most important consideration in statutory interpretation"); Clark D.
Cunningham etal., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases 103YALELJ. 1561,1561 (1994) (bookreview)
(discussing how linguists may help judges in "a principled and objective , ay that remains
grounded in the textual language").
203. See, eg., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (holding that vwhen
"language [is] plain, and leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole
evidence of the ultimate legislative intent"). At times judge Frank Easterbrook echoes this view.
As he believes that the idea of legislative intent or purpose is incoherent, the only alternative
is to strictly construe legal language to produce more certainty and predictability. Easterbrook.
supra note 202, at 59.
204. Eskridge, supra note 202, at 623.
205. See, eg., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) ("There
is no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the
legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes."), quoted in Huffman v. Western Nuclear,
486 U.S. 663, 672 (1988).
206. See Eskridge, supra note 202, at 655 (stating that New Textualisin drastically limits use
of legislative history); see also Note, Intent, Clear Statements; and the Comrwn Laur Statutar)
Interpretation in theSupreme Court 95 HAiv. L REV. 892,902 (1982) (noting that "absent explicit
authorization, the Court will not depart from statutory words").
207. See Cunningham et aL, supra note 202, at 1564. This "ordinary meaning" approach to
statutory text is also reflected injustice Scalia's "new textualism. Sce Eskridge, supra note 202,
at 655.
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but come up with different views of the plain meaning of the
language and argue that their definition ought to control.
203
Textualism has generated enormous controversy. Several argu-
ments support applying the plain meaning of a statutory provision.
The first two can be characterized as practical considerations, while
the last three reflect "countermajoritarian anxiety." First, respecting
the plain or ordinary meaning of a legal text gives effect to the
expectations and understanding of those citizens or officials who must
follow or administer the legislation.2° Second, by enforcing the
"ordinary" community's linguistic choices, the plain meaning rule
serves coordinating and stabilizing functions, preventing the substitu-
tion of idiosyncratic and contingent choices by individual judges.
2 10
Third, the text is said to be the most reliable evidence of the intent
of all of the participants in the legislative process (special interest
lobbyists, legislators, and the Executive). Fourth, textualism
narrows the scope of government action, allowing more opportunity
for private ordering, and is thus "consistent with the liberal principles
underlying our political order."1 2 Finally, limiting interpretation to
plain meaning prevents ajudge from grafting her own values onto the
legal text, substituting her views for those of the democratically
elected legislature and Executive.
218
The arguments against the plain meaning approach are similarly
powerful. First, there is the realist and post-modem critique that
words simply do not have plain meaning.2 14 Professors Eskridge and
Frickey argue that: (1) terms are often susceptible of multiple
definitions; (2) the meaning of a term is influenced by its context;
and (3) an interpretation of the "plain meaning" of a word will not
be objective (its central virtue) because "the interpreter's perspective
will always interact with the text and historical context."21  At the
208. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 242-43 (discussing cases in which "grounds for debate...
were not whether plain meaning would dominate, butjust what the plain meaning vas" (citing
California v. American Stores, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990) and United States v. Energy Resources
Co., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990))).
209. See Eskridge, supra note 202, at 623.
210. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 232; see also Clark Cunningham, A Linguistic Analysis of the
Meanings of 'Search' in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Common Sens4 77 IOWA L. REV. 541
(1988) (arguing that following ordinary meaning rule may result in more internally coherent
case law).
211. Eskridge, supra note 202, at 623.
212. Easterbrook, supra note 198, at 544-52.
213. See Easterbrook, supra note 198, at 544-52.
214. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 341-43; see alsoTowne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425
(1918) ("[A] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time In which
it is used.").
215. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 343.
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other side of the political perspective, even Judge Frank Easterbrook
argues that, while a moderate textualist position is defensible, the
strict "plain meaning" rationale is not:
Plain meaning as a way to understand language is silly. In
interesting cases, meaning is not "plain"; it must be imputed; and
the choice among meanings must have a footing more solid that
[sic] a dictionary-which is a museum of words, an historical
catalog rather than a means to decode the work of the legisla-
ture.2
16
Second, courts have been accused of selective application of the
plain meaning rule, resulting in uncertainty and unpredictability
rather than stability.217 Third, the plain meaning rule can produce
harsh results, unexpected by the drafters of the legislation. - 8 And,
in the case of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the rule Will take aray
much of evidence law's dynamic quality, forcing courts to decide cases
without considering evidentiary policy."
219
D. Practical Reasoning
Practical reasoning, with its origins in classical rhetoric, predates the
use of the term "pragmatism."' 0 But as I noted earlier, the philo-
sophical perspective of classical rhetoricians who advocated the use of
practical reasoning is a close kin to pragmatism.2' Practical reason-
ing, as I use the term and as it was used in classical rhetorical theory,
is an approach to argumentation; through it, one puts pragmatism
into action.
22
216. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, Histoy, and Structure in StatutM Inaepretalion, 17 HARV.JJ.
& PUB. PoIY 61, 67 (1994).
217. See eg., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1767-68 (1994) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing Justice Scalia's majority opinion for abandoning "plain meaning" of
bankruptcy code); Arthur w. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die The 'Flain-Afeaning Ru&e and
Stattoy Interpretation in the 'Modem" Federal Cour 75 COLUM L REV. 1299, 1308-12 (1975)
(criticizing 10th Circuit's application of plain meaning in context of federal nuclear program
as causing uncertainty).
218. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989); = aloJonakait,
supra note 4, at 747-48 (identifying case in which strict application of statute resulted in fine of
over $300,000 for refusal to pay wages of $412 (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 453 US.
564 576 (1982))).
219. Jonakait, supra note 4. at 749; = also Weissenberger, supra note 4, at 1811 (asserting
that application of plain meaning doctrine to evidentiary rules "vill distort the complex and
richly textured nature ofjudicial discretion which historically has been central to the operation
of all evidentiar rules").
220. See PHILIP P. WEINER, EVOLUTION AND THE FOUNDERS OF PRAGM ts M 190-204 (1965).
221. See supra notes 116-22 and accompan)ing text. '
222. Thus, as I use the term, "practical reasoning" is not always co-extenshe with 'practical
wisdom," which is the ideal set out by Aristotle (and in a sense, Cicero and Quintilian) of the
eloquent speaker who also possesses moral excellence. See Galston, supra note 97, at 351
(defining Aristotle's practical wisdom as form of prudence). As I argue later, however, the best
use of practical reasoning can add to a speaker's ethos and in turn can contribute to the ethical
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As with pragmatism, practical reasoning has been described in
various ways. 21 The common denominator of the descriptions is
that the practical reasoning approach rejects the notion that one
particular method of interpretation, such as consulting only the "plain
meaning" of statutory or constitutional language, should apply in all
circumstances.224 Judge Posner describes his view of practical
reasoning as "a grab bag of methods, both of investigation and of
persuasion. It includes anecdote, introspection, imagination,
common sense, intuition ... , empathy, imputation of motives,
speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory,
'induction' . . . , [and] 'experience. ' ""
Professors Eskridge, Farber, and Frickey have focused more on the
sources of interpretation in describing practical reasoning. In their
view, the interpreter, whether interpreting a statute or constitutional
language, tries to bring to bear on the language at issue all of the
possibly relevant sources for statutory or constitutional interpreta-
tion.226 In American legal culture, these sources may include: the
actual text (both in content and structure), the intentions of the
drafters or framers of the provision, the historical context of the
provision, the instrumental aspects of potential interpretations,
2 7
and the evolution of the language over time.228
development of the audience. In other words, consistent use of practical reasoning contributes
to practical wisdom. See infra notes 266-301 and accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text (highlighting various approaches to
practical reasoning, including investigative inquiry and contextual interpretation).
224. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 322.
225. Posner, supra note 118, at 838.
226. See; e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 354-62 (advocating use of text, history,
and investigative inquiry in statutory interpretation); Farber& Frickey, supra note 118, at 164647
(endorsing situational approach to legal analysis); Frickey, supra note 118, at 1208 (rejecting
foundational approach to Indian law and advocating shared values or "community's web of
beliefs").
227. One scholar has defined "practical reasoning" in terms of "reasoning from ends to
means." Seigel, supra note 116, at 1027; see also Vincent A. Wellman, Practical Jicasoning and
Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L Rm, 45, 88-92 (1985). As
Professor Welman states: "We are not concerned whether some state of affairs is true or false,
but whether instead the plan or decision will serve our purposes and gratify our desires." Id. at
90. Certainly this means-end rationality figured heavily in the outlook of traditional pragmatists,
such as William James andJohn Dewey. See g., NVILLAMJAMES, PRAGMATISM 197-236 (1907)
(describing pragmatism as understood by practical consequences ofactions);John Dewey, Logical
Method and Law, 10 CORNELL LQ. 17,26 (1924) (stating that logic ofjudicial decisions must be
evaluated "relative to consequences"); Grey, supra note 118, at 804-06 (describing pragmatism
as rooted in context and expectations where legal answers will vary based on desired social
purpose). In the classical sense of practical reasoning, however, the consequences of the
argument are just one consideration, one factor to be stressed in the process of persuading an
audience to choose one proposition over another. I think Eskridge, Farber, and Frickey are
closer to this sense of practical reasoning, as am I.
228. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 118, at 1645-47.
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In examining these various sources, the interpreter has to keep an
open mind and attempt to reconcile any inconsistencies as best she
can. 29 The resulting decision is
likely to be the product of a congeries of supporting, interactive
arguments, rather than a single deductive conclusion from one
source of meaning. In this way, statutory "construction" takes on
a somewhat literal meaning and often consists of supporting
arguments working like the "legs of a chair and unlike the links of
a chain." '
The "construction" metaphor is critical. A rule is written in the
abstract. When the abstract rule is asserted in a concrete case, the
decisionmaker must resolve a dispute between the values presented
by the abstract rule and the compelling presence of the facts of the
case, all presented through the prisms of the advocates' arguments.
When a judge thus confronts a rhetorical situation, which version
of reality will she advocate?"1 As others have pointed out, some
arguments will be easy because the "constructions" all really look the
same." There will, for example, be a fairly strong consensus, in a
community that looks to the Federal Rules of Evidence, that to qualify
for the ancient documents hearsay exception, the document must be
at least twenty years old.'S In other situations, the rhetorical
dilemma will be more challenging. If a document is nineteen years
and 364 days old, should it qualify for admission under the residual
229. Farber & Frickey, supra note 118, at 1647. This is not an easy process, which may
account in part for the "motivational" tone of Farber and Frickey's description of practical
reason:
[Practical reason includes] a concern for history and context; a desire to avoid
abstracting away the human component in judicial decisionnaking; an appreciation of
the complexity of life; some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a tolerance for
ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a skepticism of rigid dichotomies;
and an overall humility.
Id. at 1646. This is a perspective that is especially appealing to those who are familiar with the
reality of a courtroom.
230. Frickey, supra note 118, at 1209 (discussing significance of practical reason in context
of "dynamic" statutory construction in which statutory meaning can -ary according to time and
place (quoting ROBERT SUMMERS, INsfRUMENTAus.I AND mRI-AN LEGAL THEORY 156 (1932)).
231. Judge Becker and Professor Orenstein, in an influential 1992 article, set out many
problems with the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence and called for the creation of an
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence. S eBecker & Orenstein, supra note 4, at 864-63.
The Advisory Committee was in fact later established. SeADMiumSTnivE OFFICE OF THE UNnTE
STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 80 (1992) (approving recommendation to request ChiefJustice to reactivate Advisory
Committee). While I agree that the newAdvisory Committee will help to clarify language that
has posed problems, I am more concerned with the question of what a cor should do when
it is faced with competing interpretations of the language of an evidence rule.
232. SeePosner, supra note 118, at 838-40; s also Seigel, supra note 116, at 1028-29 (stating
that practical reasoning often reflects consensus of normative and descriptive statements).
233. FD. R. Evm. 803(16). Note that in another interpretative community, say of
thirtysomethings, 20 years old would never be considered "ancient,"
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exceptions to the hearsay rule?' In this situation, the judge's
rationale wvill become
part of a dialogue or conversation among the individuals participat-
ing in a practical endeavor. For some period of time, the tech-
niques of practical reason will lead different participants to
incompatible conclusions. As to issues of this sort, practical reason
will not yield a definitive answer because there is a lack of consen-
sus. If the issue is particularly intractable, consensus might take
years or even generations to develop. In the meantime, since
action cannot be suspended, participants in the dialogue will act
upon their individual practical judgments.ss 5
Moreover, as part of this conversation, the judge's rationale is subject
to criticism by advocates (appealing the decision or in arguing other
cases), other judges, and scholars.2s
The concept of a judge participating in a conversation or a
dialogue rather than issuing a ruling on a difficult question of
evidence may seem rather strange. The pace of most American trials
does not seem to allow for the relaxed, thoughtful, deliberative kind
of discourse connoted by a "conversation." 3 7 Indeed, the trial
context appears to call for just the opposite: quick and decisive
rulings, so that the trial may proceed.2 s While textualism and its
"plain meaning" approach may seem more appropriate for the trial
context, practical reasoning is the most appropriate. Practical
reasoning takes into account both the need for speedy decisions and
the need for more deliberation and argumentation on difficult issues.
It does so through a recognition of the diverse sources of arguments
over the meaning of a legal text and the different contexts faced by
the speaker and audience.
Eskridge and Frickey identify several sources of arguments about
the meaning of statutes, 9 and note that the Supreme Court resorts
to them in a certain order, forming a "funnel of abstraction," moving
from the most common and "concrete" source, the text itself, to more
234. FEm. . EVID. 803(24), 804(b) (5); cf. United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d 1453, 1466-68 (7th
Cir. 1993) (EasterbrookJ., concurring) (arguing that to admit hearsay under residual exception
when it does not qualify under separate exception results in "slighting" Congress' specific
language).
235. Seigel, supra note 116, at 1029.
236. See Seigel, supra note 116, at 1029.
237. Cf. RobertJ. Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Wthout Tails: Pragmatism and theArt of
Conversation in Legal Theoy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 69, 109-11 (1991) (positing "conversationalism" as
superior alternative to legal reasoning).
238. Cf. United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1087 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that trial
judge must "exercise tight control over the presentation of evidence to the jury" to maintain
trial's pace).
239. Cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 353-62.
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abstract sources.240 They argue that the Court seems to rely most
heavily on textual language, then on original expectations of the
drafters, the statute's purpose, the evolution of the statute, and finally,
on current values. 41 Professor Cleary the Reporter to the original
Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence,
argued for similar consideration of these sources in interpreting the
Rules.2
The funnel of abstraction is a helpful concept in the evidence
context. Text comes first, not because it "speaks for itself," but
because it is the touchstone.24 In federal court, when we need to
know if evidence is hearsay we can all look to Rule 801.21 While
advocates, judges, and scholars may go on to argue about its "real"
meaning, looking to the text first provides some degree of continuity
and stability.2" But the text of an evidence rule vras never meant
to be both the beginning and the end of the discussion. 6 The
drafters of the rules understood that this was impossible.247
The next most likely source to be cited is the drafters' understand-
ing of the rules,2" as reflected in the Advisory Committee Notes and
the reports of the House Judiciary Committee, the Senate Judiciary
240. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 353-62; soe aLso Nicholas S. Zeppos. The Uk of
Authority in Statuto Inkerratiaw An Ernpirca! Analys 70 TEX. L REV. 1073. 1115 (1992)
(confirming that Supreme Court does use sources of interpretation ith frequency identified
by Eskridge and Frickey's funnel of abstraction).
241. See Eskridge & Frickey, supa note 118, at 353-54.
242. See Cleary, supra note 149, at 909-17 (discussing sources of interpretation, including text
of rule, draft of Rules transmitted by Court to Congress, preexisting common law, Advisory
Committee Notes and other types of legislative history, Rules aen as whole, and context of
adversary system).
243. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 354.
244. FFD. R. EVD. 801.
245. Thus, first looking to the text of the rule satisfies practical concerns. See Cleary, supra
note 149, at 911.
246. SweEdmund M. Morgan, Forweardto MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 7 (1942) (V[D]rafting
fine-tuned rules of evidence to deal with every case vas impossible.").
247. Swe Cleary, supra note 149, at 911. Professor Cleary criticizes the plain meaning
approach by stating:
If what is meant [by the plain meaning rule] is that meaning is to be ascertained bry
reading the statute with the aid only of a dictionary and such aphorisms of construc-
tion as nosciturasoiisand ejusde geneds as maybe suitable, then it must be discarded
as unrealistic. The slipperiness of meaning combines iwith the ingenuity and
resourcefulness of the legal profession to render the evolution of a plain meaning r
this approach unlikely in any disputed situation, and if one should appear the chance
is greatly against its being acceptable. If, however, the plain meaning rule is read as
mandating the text of the statute as the prime source of meaning to be read in such
context as may be relevant, then plain meaning becomes a useful tool
Id.
248. See Eskridge & Frickey, sup-a note 118, at 356i-57.
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Committee, and the Conference Committee.2 49  This legislative
history is the next best source of interpretation in the case of
evidence rules because it represents the opinions of the evidence
"experts" on what the rules mean and what they.were intended to
accomplish.2 5  The views of the legal community, as reflected by
precedents interpreting the rules, weigh in next as the most "persua-
sive" authority,"1 followed by the alteration of the rules' language
and the scholarly community's analysis of the rules over time.
252
These sources, and the actual impact of the rules on the adversary
process, all serve as alternative sources of arguments about what a
particular rule means, providing additional support or "legs" for a
decision one way or another.
Resort to the funnel of abstraction also addresses the problem of
"countermajoritarian anxiety." " It allows the court to value the
enacted text, and thus respect congressional or executive actions,
while recognizing the unique quality of evidence rules.2- The
Federal Rules of Evidence are statutes, but statutes written mostly by
and for the use of courts, a characteristic that provides a strong basis
249. For the Federal Rules of Evidence, these are H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), repninted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 7075; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 7051; and H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 7098.
250. Textualists, such as Justice Scalia, often mock legislative history because it often
represents the statements of young congressional staffers and special interest groups more than
it represents the "intent" or the "purpose" of the Congress. SeeFrickey, BigSleep, supra note 154,
at 255. While this may be true, one could look at it in a different light. This legislative history
may represent the thoughts of those who were the most knowledgeable about the legislation in
dispute. Truly controversial legislation is unlikely to draw comments from only one side of the
issue.
More important, whatever validity the textualist argument has for general types of legislation,
it breaks apart when it comes to evidence rules, most of whose legislative history was created by
"experts," distinguished scholars, lawyers, and judges appointed by the Supreme Court to Its
Advisory Committee. Indeed, this legislative history (in the form of Advisory Committee Notes)
was reviewed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, theJudicial Conference of
the United States, and the Supreme Court itself before it transmitted the Rules and the Notes
to Congress. Cleary, supra note 149, at 913. Moreover, the Notes "were carefully scrutinized by
the involved congressional committees and subcommittees." Id. hile many members of
Congress are lawyers, one expects that the members of the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees in particular are dominated by members of the legal profession. Professor Cleary
regarded the congressional committee reports on the evidence rules to be "helpful and highly
authoritative." Id. at 914; see also Eileen A. Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The
Use and Abuse of the Advisoy Committee Notes, 28 LOY. L.A. L REV. 1283 (1995).
251. See Zeppos, supra note 240, at 1114-15. Note the metaphors we use in the legal
community, authority can be "binding" and "controlling" or it can be merely "persuasive." But
what makes the authority "binding" is the persuasive argument that a precedent is sufficlentiy
similar that it "controls" the result, or that a particular statute applies and "controls" the
outcome. Our language reflects the classic dilemma of the tyrant's writ--do the texts control
us or do we control the text through our arguments about it? Cf STEINER, supra note 72, at 23.
252. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 504-27 (1989).
253. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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for looking for interpretative guidance beyond the language of the
text2 5 This guidance is reflected in the House and Senate commit-
tee reports and the Advisory Committee Notes, as well as the common
law development and treatment of the rules.
In developing the funnel of abstraction, Eskridge and Frickey focus
on Supreme Court decisions.' But practical reasoning accommo-
dates the special decisional and rhetorical situations facing a trial
court and an appellate court as they interpret evidence rules. While
the caseload of most courts is increasing, there can be no doubt that
a trial court has much less time to rule on a question of evidence
than an appellate court. Thus, a trial court, following a practical
reasoning approach, will reach a result much like a textualist, relying
primarily on a fast reading of the rule's text, and only occasionally
resorting to extrinsic sources such as legislative history.P7 While the
outcome may look the same, the rationale for the process is actually
quite different. Strict textualists cut off the discussion after deciding
that the text is "plain," and moderate textualists may cast an addition-
al glance at the legislative history, but the discussion ends there
for the political reasons I discussed earlier.29 Trial judges using
practical reasoning may also cut off the discussion at text or legislative
history, but generally only to get through the trial in a reasonable
amount of time.
Moreover, while some trialjudges might engage in arguments from
the "plain meaning" of the rule, thoughtful trial judges know that
they are operating not only from the text, but also from their
255. see Cleary, supra note 149, at 910-14. Professor Cleary also viewed the Federal Rules as
special statutes. He noted the extensive common law history surrounding the federal rules and
its special audience: "M he Rules were working old ground, and ground that was near and dear
to much of the profession. By way of comparison, civil rights and antitrust involve new ground,
with no great accumulation ofjudge-made precedent, and regulate the behavior of clients rather
than lawyers and judges." Id. at 909. He noted, however, that the rules were statutes, and that
"[t]he primacy of the Congress with regard to procedural matters has never been seriously
contested." Id. at 910. In addition, he tried to show that while the rules are subject to
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, those tools were never meant to stifle what Cleary
saw as an inevitable process of evolution:
In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. "All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided... ." In reality, of
course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the
somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated power.
I& at 915 (quoting FFD. R. EVID. 402). Thus, while the federal courts were no longer "bound'
by case law existing before the passage of the federal rules, they could still be 'persuaded" byr
it. Id.
256. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 353 n.123.
257. A trial judge might, for example, take the time to consult legislative history or a
scholarly treatise on a motion in limine, briefed just before or during the tria.
258. Se Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 269-71.
259. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text
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experience on the bench and in practice. They weigh the potential
harm to the litigants from letting the evidence in or keeping the
evidence out, and they undoubtedly weigh the likely effect that an
erroneous ruling would have on the entire case on appeal.2 w These
considerations are not of the kind used by textuaists. 61
A trial judge also faces less pressure to issue a full justification for
her decision on a point of evidence. While a trial judge may state the
basis or alternative grounds for her ruling for the benefit of an
appellate court, time often does not permit extensive discussion.
Today, it is accepted that an appellate court or the Supreme Court
issues an opinion, justifying or explaining its decision.262 But this
was not always the case; early American courts did not engage in the
kind of justification that modern courts do." As the complexity of
legal issues and the "countermajoritarian anxiety" of the courts has
grown, judicial opinions have grown in length and complexity."
A trial court, under time pressure, is much more justified in citing
the text of a rule alone than is an appellate court, particularly the
Supreme Court, which faces evidence questions only when they have
continued to be hard, case after case. Courts of appeal and the
Supreme Court should always be willing to look beyond text for the
most complete and persuasive interpretation possible.2 5 They have
more of an obligation than a trial court to consider other sources of
interpretation and to justify their decisions to use or to reject them.
But what is the source of this obligation?
The responsibility of courts to engage in practical reasoning stems
from the importance of their ethos, which in turn affects their ability
to persuade and educate.2" Aristotle's use of the term ethos can be
translated as "character"267 or "credibility."21 Aristotle divided the
sources of persuasion or "proofs" into two types, nonartistic and
260. That is, how much discretion do they have? Would this ruling be considered an abuse
of discretion? If so, would it be harmless error?
261. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
262. SeeHAIGBOSMAJIAN, METAPHORANDREASONINJUDICEALOPINIONS29(1992) (discussing
utility of formal opinion in shaping appellate review).
263. See id- at 15-34.
264. See id.
265. See infra notes 302-637 and accompanying text. A longer Article could have compared
the Supreme Court's efforts with those of lower courts, but it would not have been published
in my lifetime.
266. See Eisgruber, supm note 110, at 1009 (discussing educative responsibilities of courts);
cf. BOSMAjAN, supra note 262, at 30 (writing that function ofjudicial opinion "is its contribution
to the continuity of society").
267. AusroTL, supra note 59, at 37 n.40.
268. GOLDEN Er AL, supra note 20, at 31.
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artistic. 69 Nonartistic proofs include testimony or documents, while
artistic proofs are provided through the speaker and her methods;
"thus, one must we the former and invent the latter."70 Aristotle
further divided the artistic proofs into three types: logos, appeals
based on reason and logic; pathos, appeals based on the emotions; and
ethos, appeals based on the character or credibility of the speaker-'
Today, logos is often elevated to the most important and noble part of
persuasion,' 72 but Aristotle stressed that the three elements were all
essential and inexorably linked to successful persuasion.' Indeed,
in Aristotle's view, if any aspect of persuasion dominated, it was
ethos.
274
A speaker begins with certain ethos in the eyes of audience
members, which depends upon the speaker's prior interaction with
the audience, the reputation of the speaker, the expertise the speaker
possesses, the context of the speech, and the way the speaker
conducts him- or herself even before the speech begins. 5 Ethos can
then be built up or lost through the content of the speech.?
The Supreme Court's power rests upon its ability to persuade.'
As a result, the development of its ethos is of central practical
importance; if the Court wishes to have its opinions implemented, it
can only do so by convincing its audience to respect them. While the
Court brings to its task over two hundred years of experience as an
institution, its ethos is at stake each time it speaks or issues an opinion.
According to Aristotle, there is persuasion "through character
whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker
worthy of credence."
278
The Supreme Court's ethos is important for a second reason. Many
scholars have argued that the Court has a role as an educator, citing
269. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 37 n.37. Later writers referred to nonartistic and artistic
proofs as extrinsic and intrinsic proofs, respectively. Id.
270. ARisTOTLE, supra note 59, at 37.
271. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 37-38.
272. See KENNEDY, NEW HISTORY, supra note 20, at 11-12.
273. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 38-39.
274. SeeARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 38. Aristotle appeared hesitant, however, to set out a
hierarchy, writing that "character is almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.
I&
275. ARisTOTLE, supra note 59, at 38. Aristotle himself did not give weight to the audience's
prior knowledge of the speaker in evaluating the speaker's dho& stressing that edhos ims revealed
and built through speech itself. Id. Professor Kennedy suggests that this is an historical
anomaly, resulting from the Greek law that litigants had to represent themselves and thus often
possessed no external authority. Id. at 38 n.43.
276. ARmOTLE supra note 59, at 38.
277. See Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 1005; so also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
PNncips of Constituional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1959).
278. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 38.
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Dean Rostow's point that the "Supreme Court is, among other things,
an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital
national seminar."2 79 While scholars may debate the content of the
Court's "curriculum,"210 they agree that the Court's "educative
responsibilities.., depend upon the excellence of its arguments."2 18
While the Court may teach different "subjects" over time, it both
reflects and alters its ethos by how it teaches, or how it argues. But
then the question becomes, if the Court is an educator, who are its
students?
The Supreme Court obviously has multiple audiences. The parties
read the decision to see which side has won and why.2 2 Lawyers in
other cases will read a decision to see whether it supports their
arguments or whether they will have to distinguish it away as, for
example, "mere dicta. "2ss There are, however, long-range audiences
too. Courts sometimes address "people who reflect back on the
controversy after the heat of conflict has passed."2s Indeed, dissent-
ing opinions, with no "binding effect" whatsoever, are directed at this
audience. Included in this "class" of long-range audiences forjudicial
opinions are undergraduates and law students.8 5
Professor Eisgruber stresses the importance of the Court's educative
responsibility toward this audience:
[Elven if only aspiring lawyers were to read the Court's opinions,
the Court's teaching may significantly influence public opinion.
Lawyers exercise considerable power in American society. If the
Court were able to inculcate in tomorrow's most powerful lawyers
a disposition to honor constitutional principles, that lesson could
provide both the Court and the Constitution with significant
protection in a crisis. These influential lawyers might, moreover,
reiterate and spread the Court's lessons, in contexts ranging from
client counseling to political speeches.2
6
279. Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character ofJudicial Review, 66 HARV. L REV. 193, 208
(1952); see also Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 962 n.2 (collecting citations to Rostow's claim by
"liberals, conservatives, communitarians, republicans, and feminists").
280. See Galston, supra note 97, at 380-81.
281. Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 964.
282. See Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 1008; see also BOSMAJIAN, supra note 262, at 28. This
highlights the rhetorical quality of a judicial opinion; if the parties were the only audience, a
court might well issue just the actual judgment, i.e., affirmed, reversed, etc.
283. SewBOSMAjIAN, supra note 262, at 34. Lawyers use this technique to avoid opinions that
contradict their clients' needs, just as we sometimes try to dismiss an argument by labelling it
"mere rhetoric." The irony is that we use the tool to try to destroy the effectiveness of the tool,
284. Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 1009.
285. Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 1009.
286. Eisgruber, supra note 110, at 1009.
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While I believe that the project of identifying the core "constitutional
principles" that the Court ought to teach is an ongoing one, Professor
Eisgruber's observation that students learn the lessons of the Supreme
Court through the example it sets echoes the classical rhetoricians,
who were concerned with how to best educate the lawyer-citizen.
Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian all stressed that a student
could become a "good" orator, in the sense of an ethical leader, by
following the example of other "great" orators.' They emphasized
that a speaker must cultivate moral excellence because of the lesson
one's performance conveys to others.
I see the impact of the current Supreme Court's lessons on my
evidence students; it is not favorable. As do many evidence teachers,
I teach the hearsay rule, its exceptions, and Supreme Court's cases
interpreting the Confrontation Clause, in that order. By the time we
study the Supreme Court opinions, my students are extremely critical
(as are evidence scholars)"0 of the reliability rationales behind
certain hearsay exceptions, such as "excited utterances.""' Excited
utterances are supposedly reliable because they are made without the
time or presence of mind to fabricate a lie.2 -  This rationale,
however, does not account for the negative effect stress and excite-
ment have on perception and memory, which has been well-docu-
mented for quite some time by social science research.' Yet my
students read Supreme Court opinions that reiterate the traditional
rationale for this exception 29 but fail to acknowledge the weakness
of the rationale, and their cynicism is palpable. The Supreme Court's
ethos is diminished by these cases. As a result, the Court both fails to
persuade and abdicates its educative responsibilities.
The use of practical reasoning to interpret evidence rules can add
to a court's ethos in a way that the other approaches to statutory
interpretation do not, in part because practical reasoning stresses
287. See KENNEDY, CLAsSiC.. RHETORIC, supra note 20, at 33-35.
288. See KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHEfromc, supra note 20, at 33.
289. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
290. See, eg., Eleanor Swift, Smo e and Miros The Failure of the Suprere Coud Accuracy
Rationale in White v. Illinois Require; A NAew Look at Confontation, 22 CAP. U. L REV. 145, 152
(1993) (criticizing Supreme Court's reliance on categorical reliability rationales of hearsay
exceptions). Swift notes that "[m]any evidence classes in law schools are spent analyzing the
weaknesses in the generalizations about declarants' sincerity, perception, memory and narrative
ability that underlie the categorical hearsay exceptions." Id,
291. The "excited utterance" exception is found in FED. R. EvID. 803(2). For more on Cases
discussing this exception, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 US. 836,857 (1990), and White v. Illinois,
502 U.S. 346, 354-56 (1992).
292. Thite, 502 U.S. at 354-56.
293. SeeSwift, supra note 290, at 154 n.38.
294. See Swift, supra note 290, at 152-54.
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completeness and candidness. Completeness, which involves
addressing all of the possible interpretations of a rule, is necessary
because the most persuasive "construction" will have multiple "legs"
on which to stand.295 Moreover, as every law professor tries to
teach, a "good" lawyer is the one who can see, and argue, all sides of
an issue.296 One should ask, therefore, whether the Court attempt-
ed to address all of the competing interpretations of a rule.
The need for candidness is related to the requirement of complete-
ness. When there are competing and conflicting sources of interpre-
tation, does the Court explain why it chooses one over the other?2- 1
Candidness increases a speaker's ethos. An audience is more willing
to believe a speaker who it believes is telling the truth. Aristotle
stressed this instrumental quality of ethos: "[W]e believe fair-minded
people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on
all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not
exact knowledge but room for doubt."21 The candor that marks a
practical reasoning approach thus contributes to the integrity of the
Court. Other scholars have argued for increased judicial candor on
this ground.2" An educator who is intellectually dishonest fails to
set any kind of positive example for his or her students.
Of course, determining whether the Court is being candid is
difficult, but discussing all possible interpretations would prevent the
Court from distinguishing away a rationale that is actually its basis for
decision. The Roman rhetorician Quintilian noted that "however we
try to conceal it, insincerity will always betray itself, and there was
never in any man so great eloquence as would not begin to stumble
and hesitate as soon as his words ran counter to his inmost
thoughts.""°  While Quintilian's observation is not correct in all
cases, and determining candidness is difficult, his insight certainly
holds true as to the Supreme Court's decisions involving evidence
rules, for the Court virtually trips itself up, as I will discuss below.
Foundationalist approaches to interpretation, such as textualism,
intentionalism, or purposivism, end the discussion prematurely by
295. See supra note 230 and accompanying text; cf. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 36 (defining
rhetoric as discovery of a/! available means of persuasion).
296. This lesson is frequently misinterpreted as seeing "both sides" of an issue, ignoring the
possibility that there may be more than two sides to a complex issue.
297. See infra notes 304-45 and accompanying text.
298. ARISTOTLE, supra note 59, at 38.
299. Seegeneraly David L Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74VA L REV. 519,556
(1988); David L Shapiro, In Defense of Judical Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 738 (1987);
Nicholas S. Zeppos,Judicial Candor and Statutoy Interpretation, 78 GEO. LJ. 353,400 n.272 (1989),




asserting that there is "true" or "correct" interpretation of a rule.
Although this kind of argumentation might seem to bolster the
Supreme Court's ethos by suggesting that the Court "discovers" rather
than "makes" law, such argumentation can actually diminish the
Court's ethosbecause the persuasive power of such arguments depends
on the suppression of competing arguments. 101 Competing argu-
ments, however, are hard to suppress, and the Court's ethos vranes
when they surface through a concurring or dissenting opinion or a
work of legal scholarship.
The process of practical reasoning invites judges to be open about
their argumentation and the criticism they may receive for their
efforts. By adhering to the qualities of completeness and candor, a
court shows that it is not discovering the true or correct interpreta-
tion, but that it is constructing the best interpretation possible in a
particular context. As it does, the court builds upon its ethos, it
increases the persuasiveness of its position and teaches us how we
might approach similar problems. I have tried to describe practical
reasoning in the abstract. In the spirit of pragmatism, however, it is
best to explain practical reasoning by contrasting it with other schools
of interpretation in the context of particular cases.
IL. APPLYING PRACTICAL REASONING
In the late 1980s, the United States Supreme Court began to take
a strong interest in the proper interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The Court consistently has held that only a "plain
meaning," textualist approach to interpretation is appropriate for
evidentiary rules.' I have chosen Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,
United States v. Salerno, Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, Williamson
v. United States, and Tome v. United States to suggest how a court might
profit from a practical reasoning approach to legal language. I argue
that Beech Aircraft Corp. provides a flawed paradigm of the practical
reasoning approach, while Salerno highlights problems in applying the
plain meaning approach to the Rules of Evidence. The Supreme
Court's most recent cases, Daubert, Wiliamson, and Tome, show the
Court struggling with its moderate textualism.8 0 3 I argue that
30l. Cf ARISTOTLE, suprn note 59, at 38 n.44 (noting that some classical rhetoricians advised
speakers to adopt one-sided approach because fIhir-mindedness" gives impression ofweakness,
while Aristotle argued that appearance of fair-mindedness gives speaker initial advantage).
302. See gerayJonakait, supra note 4 (discussing effect of plain meaning standard on
federal evidence law).
303. The Supreme Court's moderate textualist approach to interpretation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is explained in Inwinkelried, supra note 4, at 270-71.
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practical reasoning would have produced better decisions in these
cases.
A. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey: A Flawed Paradigm
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,' the Supreme Court interpreted
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C), the public records and reports
exception to the hearsay rule. The plaintiffs sued over the deaths of
their spouses, a Navy flight instructor and her student, who were
killed when their plane banked sharply to avoid another plane, lost
altitude, and crashed.' 5 The issue in this products liability case was
whether the crash was caused by human error or faulty equipment
manufactured by the defendants."6 The defendants offered into
evidence most of a Navy investigative report (the "JAG Report"),
including a statement, labelled as an "opinion," that the most likely
cause of the accident was pilot error. The trial court admitted
these "opinions" over plaintiffs' objection that "opinions" are not
admissible under Rule 803(8) (C).5 s
Rule 803(8) (C) exempts the following from the prohibition on
hearsay:
records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth ... in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness. °
The Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded
for a new trial, holding that Rule 803 (8) (C)'s language did not cover
the JAG Report's evaluative conclusions or opinions.3 10 The United
States Supreme Court, in turn, reversed, holding that
portions of investigatory reports otherwise admissible under Rule
803(8) (C) are not inadmissible merely because they state a
conclusion or opinion. As long as the conclusion is based on a
factual investigation and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness
304. 488 U.S. 153, 156 (1988).
305. See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 156 (1988).
306. Id. at 156-57.
307. See id. at 157-58.
308. See id. at 157-59.
309. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (C).
310. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 784 F.2d 1523,1528,1530 (11th Cir. 1986), affd on reh ,
827 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), reu'd, 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
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requirement, it should be admissible along with other portions of
the repor'
In justifying its holding, the Court came as close as it ever has to
reflecting the practical reasoning approach to interpreting evidence
rules.
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court relied on several different
sources of interpretation. Justice Brennan introduced the opinion by
acknowledging openly the countermajoritarian problem: "Because
the Federal Rules of Evidence are a legislative enactment, we turn to
'the traditional tools of statutory construction' in order to construe
their provisions," 12 and the Court began by examining the text of
the Rule.?13 The Court noted one court of appeals opinion that
read Rule 803(8) (C) strictly, drawing a sharp dichotomy between
"fact" and "opinion.""1 4 The Supreme Court, however, took a very
different approach to the text.
Justice Brennan did initially resort to a dictionary definition, but
only to show that there was more than one plausible interpretation of
the "factual findings" language in Rule 803(8) (C):
[I]t is not apparent that the term "factualfindings" should be read
to mean simply "facts" (as opposed to "opinions" or "conclusions").
A common definition of "finding of fact" is, for example, "[a] conclu-
sion by way of reasonable inference from the evidence." Black's
Law Dictionary 569 (5th ed. 1979). To say the least, the language of
the Rule does not compel us to reject the interpretation that "factual
findings" includes conclusions or opinions that flow from a factual
investigation.
315
Using a dictionary in this manner, rather than substituting the
authority of a dictionary for the arguments of the Court, opened up
311. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 170. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, dissented only on a separate issue of impeachmenL
Id. at 176-78.
312. Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
313. See id.
314. Id. (citing Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 221-22 (5th Cir. 1980)). The court in
Smith took an intentionalist approach, noting that Congress used the phrase 'opinions" in the
business records exception, FED. R. EVW. 803(6), but not in Rule 803(8) (C), and concluded that
"[s] ince these terms are used in similar context within the same Rule, it is logical to assume that
Congress intended that the terms have different and distinct meanings." Smith, 612 F.2d at 222.
Justice Brennan, however, refuted that interpretation by looking to the development of Rule
803(6), noting that the Advisory Committee was concerned that there might be ambiguity as to
whether diagnoses and test results ought to be admissible under the business records exception.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 US. at 163 n.8. In order to make dear that they were admissible, the
Advisory Committee had specifically included language stressing the admissibility of "'diagnoses
and opinions." Id. (quoting FED. R. Evm. 803(6) advisory committee notes). Justice Brennan
notes that the Advisory Committee did not have the same concern in Rule 803(8) (C), and thus
it was not strange that it did not use the same language. Id.
315. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 163-64 (emphasis added).
THE AMEiuCAN UNWERsrnY LAW REvEw [Vol. 44:1717
the discussion. Moreover, the Court went on to interpret the phrase
"factual findings" in the context of the sentence in which the phrase
appears: "Contrary to what is often assumed, the language of the
Rule does not state that 'factual findings' are admissible, but that
'reports... setting forth ... factual findings' (emphasis added) are
admissible." 16 Thus, using the common textualist approach of
resorting to a dictionary and a close reading of the disputed phrase
in its immediate context, the Court showed that the "language of the
Rule does not create a distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion.'
317
Although the Court began with the text of the Rule, it did not end
its discussion there. The Court went on to look to the legislative
history of Rule 803(8) (C), only to find that the judiciary Committees
of both the House and Senate issued conflicting remarks on the exact
issue in dispute and made no attempt to reconcile their views either
through amending the Rule's text or through the Conference
Committee report.18 The House Judiciary Committee was quite
clear that while it would not change the Rule as transmitted by the
Court, it "intend[ed] that the phrase 'factual findings' be strictly
construed and that evaluations or opinions contained in public
reports shall not be admissible."319 The Senate Judiciary Committee
responded equally directly:
The [Senate] committee takes strong exception to [the restrictive
House interpretation]. We do not think it reflects an understand-
ing of the intended operation of the rule as explained in the
Advisory Committee notes to this subsection .... We think the
restrictive interpretation of the House overlooks the fact that while
the Advisory Committee assumes admissibility in the first instance
of evaluative reports, they are not admissible if, as the rule states,
"the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness."
The [Senate] committee concludes that the language of the rule
together with the explanation provided by the Advisory Committee
furnish sufficient guidance on the admissibility of evaluative re-
ports.
3 20
316. Id. at 164 (quoting FD. R. EviD. 803(8)(C)).
317. Id.
318. IR
319. H.P REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1973), rerinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 7051,
7088, and cited in Bech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 164-65.
320. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 7051,
7064, cited in Bech Aircraft Coep., 488 U.S. at 165.
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Thus, the Court in Beech was left with "no definitive guide to the
congressional understanding," although it noted that "the Senate
understanding is more in accord with the wording of the Rule and
with the comments of the Advisory Committee.""2
This section of the Beech opinion illustrates how the Court can use
multiple, and sometimes conflicting, sources of interpretation to
"construct" the meaning of a disputed phrase. At this point, the
Court had stressed the importance of the text, while acknowledging
that it cannot be the end of the discussion. The Court had searched
for evidence of intent of the Congress that enacted the Rule. Also
note that while one approach to the conflicting Committee reports
might have been just to let them cancel each other out and rely on
alternative sources, the Court tried to weigh each report against the
other sources of interpretation in order to reach a resolution?22
Here, it argued that the Senate report was the more persuasive
authority because itwas consistent with both the text and the Advisory
Committee Notes." Hence, the Court not only used multiple
sources of interpretation, but also carefully and openly compared and
evaluated them against each other. The Court's argumentation, even
at this point, reflected both completeness and candidness.
The Court also exemplified this style of argumentation in its
footnote regarding the weight given the Advisory Committee Notes in
this situation: "As Congress did not amend the Advisory Committee's
draft in any way that touches on the question before us, the
Committee's commentary is partcularly relevant in determining the
meaning of the document Congress enacted" 24 This footnote is telling.
The Court openly set out the degree of persuasive force it vras giving
to the Advisory Committee Notes, suggesting that while the Notes
might always have some relevance, they are "particularly relevant"
where Congress has made no effort to change the language the
Committee drafted."s Moreover, the Court made no pretense that
it was using the Notes as evidence of Congress' intent or Congress'
purpose; the Court openly argued that it was engaged in constructing
321. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 165.
322. Seesupra note 321 and accompanying text (citing Court's compamtive analysis of Houe
and Senate interpretations, and finding Senate interpretation more consistent ith text of Rule
and comments of Advisory Committee).
323. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 165.
324. IM. at 165 n.9 (emphasis added).
325. Cf infra notes 589-90 and accompanying text (discussingJustice O'Connor's opinion
for the Court in 'Vilarnson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994). which ignores respectful
treatment previously given to Advisory Committee Notes in Beh Ahvajf Corp.).
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"the meaning of the document Congress enacted.3 26 The Court
thus acknowledged its responsibility to define the text of the evidence
rule enacted by Congress: while Congress has its role, the Court has
one as well.
The Court continued to argue in this manner in examining the
Advisory Committee Notes, taking care to consider the entire context
of the interpretative problem and being open about the values it
assigned to the sources of meaning. The Court found "no mention
of any dichotomy between statements of 'fact' and 'opinions' or
'conclusions'" in the Committee Notes, but found instead a concern
with whether what the Committee called "evaluative reports" ought to
be admissible."s Moreover, the Court looked not only to the Notes,
but also to "the focus of scholarly debate on the official reports
question prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules," which stressed
the problem that evaluative reports often contained "the investigator's
conclusions."
3 28
The Court examined the precedents discussed by the Committee,
and noted that all of the "evaluative reports" at issue stated conclu-
sions.129  The Court also noted that the Committee ultimately
concluded that the Rule presumes the admissibility of "evaluative
reports" unless "'sufficient negative factors are present.'"" The
Court pointed to the Committee's "provision for escape" from
admissibility in the final part of the Rule: the reports are admissible
"unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness. 3 1
Thus, the Court stressed the underlying practical concern of the
evidentiary rule:
This trustworthiness inquiry-and not an arbitrary distinction
between "fact" and "opinion"-was the Committee's primary
326. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 165 n.9.
327. Id. at 166.
328. Id. at 166 n.10 (citing, as "influential article relied upon by the Committee," Charles T.
McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wuer Use of Reports of Offiial lnvestigations?, 42 IOWA L. REV. 363,
365 (1957)).
329. Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 166.
330. Id. at 167 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee notes).
331. FED. R. EVD. 803(8), cited in Beech Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 167. The Court cites the
considerations that the Advisory Committee suggested might make an evaluative report
untrustworthy: "(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or experience;
(3) whether a hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared with a view to
possible litigation." Beech Aircraft Cap., 488 U.S. at 167 n.11 (citing FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory
committee notes). The Court explicitly contrasted an earlier case, in which aJAG Report was
found to be untrustworthy because of the inexperience of the investigator, with the case before
it, in which the district court found the JAG Report to be trustworthy. Id. at 167-68 n.11 (citing
Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (S.D. Ohio 1979)).
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safeguard against the admission of unreliable evidence, and it is
important to note that it applies to all elements of the report.
Thus, a trial judge has the discretion, and indeed the obligation, to
exclude an entire report or portions thereof-whether narrow
"factual" statements or broader "conclusions"-that she determines
to be untrustworthyM
2
The Court supported this functional or practical interpretation by
looking to the structure of the rules and pointing to other "safe-
guards" of trustworthiness, such as Rules 401 - and 403, which
allow a court to exclude irrelevant or unduly prejudicial evidence.'
The Court then turned to the broadest source of interpretation it
has in the evidence context, the philosophy of the adversary system:
"[I]t goes without saying that the admission of a report containing
'conclusions' is subject to the ultimate safeguard-the opponent's
right to present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight
of those conclusions.""s While it may "go[] without saying," this
assertion added to the sense that the Court had considered the full
context of the interpretative problem. Moreover, it taught as it
persuaded. By fully confronting all of the possible arguments for and
against a particular interpretation of "factual findings," the Court
practiced what it preached: that truth in the advocacy context is
created through the presentation and evaluation of opposing views.
The Court's final argument was a remarkably candid one, flawed
only by a careless remark in conclusion. The Court noted that, at this
point, it had built a practical construction of Rule 803(8) (C) that did
not call for "a distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion'"--an interpre-
tation that was "strengthened by the analytical difficulty of drawing
such a line."337  After citing numerous scholars in support of this
proposition,s" the Court illustrated the practical difficulty of
distinguishing between fact and opinionPs9 The Court noted that
332. Id. at 167.
333. FED. . EVID. 401.
334. FED. . EvID. 403.
335. Bezh Aircrafl Cwp., 488 U.S. at 168. The Court built on this argument later in the
opinion by referring to the opinion testimony provisions in Rules 702-705. Id. at 169 (citing
FED. R. EVID. 702-705); see aso infranote 345 and accompanying text (noting Court's illingness
to interpretFED. R. Ev/D. 803(8) (C) broadly, in mannersimilar to broad interpretation of Rules
702-705).
336. Bezch Aircraft Corp., 488 U.S. at 168.
337. Id.
338. Id. (citing EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE 27 (3d ed. 1984); W.LuAXD L
KING & DouGLAs PiLuNGER, OPINIoN EVIDENCE IN ILuNois 4 (1942), did in 3 JACK B.
WFeaTaIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEwsruN's EVIDENCE 701-03 (1994); . IEmPEr & S.
SALTLHUzRG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 449 (2d ed. 1982)).
339. See id. at 168-69.
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the trial court admitted a statement in the JAG Report that "'[a]t the
time of impact, the engine of 3E955 was operating but was operating
at reduced power.'"I While the trial court presumably felt this was
a "factual finding," the Court argued that it "could also be character-
ized as an opinion, which the investigator presumably arrived at on
the basis of clues contained in the airplane wreckage."4 1 The Court
simply refused to "draw some inevitably arbitrary line between the
various shades of fact/opinion that invariably will be present in
investigatory reports."' One cannot imagine a more candid
expression of the Court's approach to interpretation. The Court
could have stated a bright line: facts are facts and opinions are
opinions. Bright line distinctions convey a stronger image of certainty
and predictability; but a bright line would have been a false image in
this context, as the Court admitted. Its candor here is consistent with
the historical and philosophical heritage of pragmatism, which in turn
rests on the same awareness of the contingent nature of reality that
marks much of classical rhetoric.
The Court, however, slid backward in its very next phrase, thus
producing a flawed example of practical reasoning. Although it had
looked far beyond the text, the Court insisted on resorting to the
"plain language" argument:
[W]e believe the Rule instructs us-as its plain language states-to
admit "reports ... setting forth ... factual findings." The Rule's
limitations and safeguards lie elsewhere: First, the requirement that
reports contain factual findings bars the admission of statements
not based on factual investigation. Second, the trustworthiness
provision requires the court to make a determination as to whether
the report, or any portion thereof, is sufficiently trustworthy to be
admitted.s41
The Court damaged its argument by attempting to make the Rule
"speak for itself," suggesting a level of certainty about the proper
interpretation of the Rule that the Court.itself had shown did not
exist. The Court, however, immediately returned to constructing
the Rule by resorting to alternative sources. In the next paragraph,
the Court pointed to the "Federal Rules' general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony" in Rules 702-705, and




343. I. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(8) ()).
344. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (noting Court's recognition that langutage
of FED. R. EvID. 803(8) (C) creates no distinction between "fact" and "opinion").
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noted that there is "no reason to strain to reach an interpretation of
Rule 803(8) (C) that is contrary to the liberal thrust of the Federal
Rules."
Apart from the Court's use of the "plain language" argument, the
opinion in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey shows how a court can argue
for an interpretation under the practical reasoning approach. The
Court's interpretation of Rule 803(8) (C) considered several sources:
(1) the text, including both the disputed phrase "factual findings" and
its context; (2) the legislative history, including both the congressional
reports and the Advisory Committee Notes; (3) the case law, both
before and after the creation of the Federal Rules; (4) the role of
Rule 803 (8) (C) in relationship to other Federal Rules of Evidence;
(5) the context of the adversarial system; and (6) the practical
impossibility of drawing a justifiable distinction between "factual
findings" and "opinions" or "conclusions." Further, in considering the
alternative bases for its construction, the Court constantly revealed the
weight it was attaching to each source and why it vras doing so. The
resulting opinion was persuasive in the breadth and depth of its
arguments. Moreover, the Court taught a lesson about the role of the
Court in interpreting evidence rules and the limits of that interpreta-
tive power. By revealing the sources of its interpretation, by openly
setting out its choice to value some more than others, and by
acknowledging its practical constraints, the Court's opinion contribut-
ed positively to its ethos.
B. United States v. Salerno: Plainly and Poorly Argued
Unfortunately, the Court's subsequent performance in interpreting
evidence rules has not been as admirable as the Beech decision. In
this section, I contrast the Court's argumentation in Beech with its
arguments in United States v. Salerno. In Salerno, the Court used the
plain meaning approach to construe the "former testimony" exception
to the hearsay rule.3 This approach was flawed; applying the
practical reasoning approach instead would have built the Court's
ethos.
The defendants in Salerno were charged with a variety of federal
criminal offenses arising from mob efforts to rig bidding on construc-
tion projects in Manhattan."7 These construction contracts were
345. B ch Aircraft Corp., 488 US. at 169.
346. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
347. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. CL 2503, 2505-06 (1992). The most serious counts
alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b) (1988). Saenw, 112 S. Ct. at 2505-06.
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then purportedly allocated to a "'Club' of six concrete companies in
exchange for a share of the" proceeds."" s Two owners of the Cedar
Park Concrete Construction Corporation testified before the grand
jury under a grant of immunity. 9 Under questioning by the Assis-
tant United States Attorney, the two owners of Cedar Park "repeatedly
stated that neither they nor Cedar Park had participated in the
Club.
,350
During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence from various
sources that Cedar Park was a member of the Club. 51 In response,
the defendants tried to have the two owners of Cedar Park repeat
their exculpatory grand jury testimony. 52  The witnesses, however,
refused, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege. 53 The defen-
dants then tried to have the witnesses immunized so that they would
have to testify" The prosecution refused to grant the witnesses
immunity for their trial testimony, and the trial court was powerless
to order the prosecution to do so.355 The defendants then argued
that the witnesses were "unavailable" to testify under the terms of
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) (1), 15 and that they should be able
to submit the grand jury transcripts under the former testimony
exception to the hearsay rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (1),
which provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant
is unavailable as a witness:
348. IM at 2506.
349. 1& A note on grand jury practice and immunity may be helpful. In a federal grand
jury proceeding, the witnesses are questioned under oath in the presence of the grandjury and
court reporter, and only by the prosecution. GRAND JURY PROJECT, INC. OF THE NATIONAL
LAWYERs GUILD, REPRESENTATION OF WrrwESSES BEFORE FEDERAL GRANDJURIES 51.10(a) (3d ed.
1994). Witnesses or prospective defendants, known as "targets," may not be accompanied by
counsel. I& When a witness is granted "use immunity," he or she may no longer assert the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination because the Government is precluded from
using their grandjury testimony to prosecute them. Sre MCCOUIICK ON EVIDENCE § 143 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992). The immunity granted to the witnesses in SaMeno thus forced
them to testify.
350. SaLerno, 112 S. Ct. at 2506.
351. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 804 (2d Cir. 1991), ,red, 112 S. Ct. 2503
(1992). The Court of Appeals noted that this evidence was crucial to the Government's case
against the defendants. Id. at 808. Cedar Park vras "one of the largest contractors In the
metropolitan New York City concrete industry," and without Cedar Park, "there could be no
'club' of concrete contractors." Id. Without the "Club," the RICO charges would "simply
dissolv[e]." Id.




356. FED. R. EVID. 804(a) (1) (declaring that witnesses are deemed unavailable if they assert
existence of privilege not to testify, such as Fifth Amendment or attorney-client privilege).
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(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition
taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered
... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony
by direct, cross, or redirect examination
s 7
The defendants argued that this hearsay exception applied to grand
jury testimonyY
The trial court reasoned that, in questioning a witness before the
grand jury during the investigatory stages of a case, the Government
did not have a "similar motive to develop the testimony" of the
witness that it would have at trial." The trial court thus excluded
the testimony offered by the defendants, and the jury convicted the
defendants on all counts36C
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,6 1 holding
that while the Government may have had no motive to impeach the
witnesses, the Government's motive was irrelevant."s The court
reasoned "that in order to maintain 'adversarial fairness,' Rule
804(b) (1)'s similar motive requirement should 'evaporat[e]' when the
government obtains immunized testimony in a grand jury proceeding
from a witness who refuses to testify at trial."' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the appellate court's
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (1).1
Professor Jonakait has suggested that if the Supreme Court truly
wished to adhere to the plain meaning standard, individuals with no
knowledge of the history, policy, or reasons for the rules of evidence
would be best suited to apply them (because they would not be
distracted from plain meaning): "[W ] e may now find it useful to turn
to the neophyte in evidence to discover the content of the law."I
Although Professor Jonakait was being facetious, Chief Justice
Rehnquist seems to have taken him seriously as he assigned the
newest Justice, Clarence Thomas, to write the 8-1 majority opin-
ion."r  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case,
holding that because "we must enforce the words that [Congress]
357. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1).
358. See United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d at 804.
359. See hiL
360. See id at 802, 804.
361. Id at 813.
362. Id. at 806.
363. Salemo, 112 S. Ct. at 2506.
364. 112 S. Ct. 931 (1992).
365. Jonakait, supra note 4, at 783-84.
366. See Salerno, 112 S. Ct. at 2509 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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enacted," each element of Rule 804(b) (1) must be satisfied; a court
may not dispense with the "similar motive" requirement in the name
of "adversarial fairness.""6 7 The Court remanded the case for
consideration of whether the United States had a "similar motive,"
because the record was not fully developed on that issue.sss
In using a plain meaning interpretative approach in Salerno, the
Supreme Court damaged its ethos. The Court appeared to be hiding
behind the "plain meaning" of the Rule instead of addressing the
serious substantive problems with the application of the Rule in this
case. Had the Court used a practical reasoning approach, it not only
might have come to a different result, but also might have provided
a more fulfilling justification, one that both persuaded and taught.
In doing so, it would have protected and enhanced its ethos.
Justice Thomas began his argument with this fundamental premise:
When Congress enacted the prohibition against admission of
hearsay in Rule 802, it placed 24 exceptions in Rule 803 and 5
additional exceptions in Rule 804. Congress thus presumably made
a careful judgment as to what hearsay may come into evidence and
what may not. To respect its determination, we must enforce the
words that it enacted. The respondents, as a result, had no right
to introduce DeMatteis and Bruno's former testimony under Rule
804(b) (1) without a showing of "similar motive." This Court
cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants might prefer
different rules in a particular class of cases. 69
This statement represents a dramatic and fundamental shift from the
Court's approach in Beech, in which the Court accepted its responsibil-
ity to -actually determine "the meaning of the document Congress
enacted.""'0 Here, the Court reduced its role to a mere "enforcer"
of the language Congress enacted. The Salerno defendants challenged
this view, arguing that, in fact, courts do "alter" the rules as they are
written.371 The defendants pointed out that courts have implied a
requirement that statements admitted under Rule 804(b) (1) be made
under oath, even though that requirement is not stated in the
Rule.372 Justice Thomas responded, however, by arguing that an
oath is implicit in the fact that the Rule applies to "testimony," which
367. See id. at 2507.
368. IM. at 2508-09.
369. Id. at 2507.
370. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165 n.9 (1988).




"refers only to statements made under oath or affirmation," and cited
Black's Law Dictionary as authority3
One might think it unnecessary to resort to a dictionary if the
meaning of "testimony" were so plain. Justice Thomas vras really
engaging in the kind of textualism that tacitly acknowledges that the
text is ambiguous and then looks to a dictionary for the "ordinary" or
"most plain meaning." But as Professor Eskridge points out, this
simply replaces legislative history with "dictionaries and grammar
books. . and the common sense God gave us."
374
By choosing to rely on Black s Law Dictionary, Justice Thomas made
a rhetorical choice to provide a certain definition without acknowledg-
ing orjustifying his choice. Instead, he presented his argument as the
only conceivable and natural result. Had Justice Thomas chosen to
consult another favorite source of textualists, Webster's Dictionary, he
would have learned that "testimony" could just refer to narratives
given in the first person."a Although Webster's Dictionary initially
supports Justice Thomas' reading, it also provides alternative
meanings to "testimony": "2. evidence in support of a fact or
statement; proof. 3. open declaration or profession as of faith." 76
Neither of those definitions of "testimony" requires that it be given
under oath.STI
Moreover, a recent article jointly authored by a law professor and
several linguists stresses that dictionaries are inherently unreliable for
determining the "most plain meaning."" They point out, for
example, that "[d]ictionary-making is an inexact art, and it often
happens that usages are common for some time before lexicographers
happen to collect enough of them and realize that they represent a
distinct usage, and decide to revise an entry to include that us-
age."3 79  In addition, they stress the practical constraints on
dictionary-makers: "Dictionary entries are severely limited by time and
space constraints .... Whether a particular usage is listed first or last
in an entry has no bearing on whether it is the 'plainest' meaning for
373. It (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1476 (6th ed. 1990)).
374. Eskridge, supra note 202, at 669.
375. VEBS'm's ENCVCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1467
(1989) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S DICTfONARY]; see also Note, Lokingl Up: Ditionaries and Stalulor
Interpretation, 107 HARv. L REV. 1437 (1994) [hereinafter Loo.ingit Up].
376. WEBSTEr's DIfrIONAmr, supra note 375, at 1467.
377. WEBsr 's DIcnONARY, supra note 375, at 1467.
378. Cunningham et at, supra note 202, at 1614-15.
379. Cunningham et al., supra note 202, at 1615. The authors suggest that more empirical
sources, such as searches of the NEXIS database or surveys, would proide more help in
determining the "plainest" meaning of a word. Id; sa also id. at 1591.
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the word in the context in question."' Another commentator
notes that "[t]here are a wide variety of dictionaries from which to
choose, and all of them usually provide several entries for each word.
The selection of a particular dictionary and a particular definition is
not obvious and must be defended on some other grounds of
suitability." "8
Where the Court in Beech used a dictionary entry to show that the
phrase "factual findings" was subject to multiple interpretations, and
went on to justify its construction,' 2 the Court in Salerno used the
dictionary to suggest a determinate meaning of the phrase "testimo-
ny."' Dictionaries have become, for the Court, a way of ending
the conversation, but they are neither as authoritative nor as useful
for determining the plain meaning of a term as the Court suggests.
Moreover, if the Court fails to provide a justification for its use of a
particular dictionary or definition within a dictionary, it is not
persuading and it is not teaching-it merely imposes its preferred
meaning without justifying its preference.' This tactic not only
violates the criteria of completeness and candor, thus damaging the
Court's ethos, but also underscores the countermajoritarian problem;
the Court has imposed its own value choice in the guise of enforcing
the plain meaning of Congress' language.
Indeed, Justice Thomas' entire response to the defendants'
argument that courts do alter the Federal Rules of Evidence through
interpretation reflected the same incomplete and evasive techniques.
Instead of openly discussing the essential problem raised by the
defendants-how should the Court interpret the Federal Rules of
380. Cunningham et al., supra note 202, at 1615; see alsoA. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries,
Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HAtv.J.L. & PUB. POLY 71 (1994) (noting
indeterminacy and circularity of dictionary definitions).
381. Looking it Up, supra note 375, at 1445.
382. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 164 (1988); see also Looking it up, supra
note 375, at 1452 ("There is nothing wrong with employing dictionaries to identify the general
outlines of word meanings and then relying on contextual arguments from text, structure,
history, or policy to determine which meaning is appropriate.").
383. SeeUnited States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992) (noting that word "testimony"
.simply... refers only to statements made under oath or affirmation").
384. The Court in Beech expressly stated that it was using the dictionary definition of "factual
findings" as an "example" of "a common definition." Beech, 488 U.S. at 164. While the
dictionary was used as persuasive authority, it was given light weight; it was used only as an
illustration of the common meaning of the phrase. See id.
385. See Looking it Up, supra note 375, at 1446 ("[D]ictionaries can mask fundamental
arbitrariness with the appearance of rationality and make the subjectivity ofjudicial decisions
even more difficult to confront.").
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EvidenceP--Justice Thomas diverted the discussion into the
validity of the defendants' specific example. 3
In Salerno, the Court's most problematic arguments, however, were
those that attempted to confront the defendants' contentions that
"adversarial fairness" required the Court to dispense with a formal
showing of "similar motive."' The defendants first pointed out
that although evidentiary rules may specifically prohibit the introduc-
tion of certain evidence, a party may "waive" the protection of these
rules by relying on the substance of that evidence in its case (known
as "opening the door" to the evidence)." While there is no
specific rule on waiver, the defendants argued that the United States
had "opened the door" in this case by presenting testimony from
other sources that Cedar Park was a member of the Club." Justice
Thomas simply refused to address the issue of "adversarial fairness"
raised by this argument. He dodged it by contending first, that the
waiver doctrine was limited to the rules of privilege 91 (which is an
incorrect statement of the law"), and second, that even if the
waiver doctrine did apply, the United States had not opened the door
because it had not relied on the grand jury witnesses' testimony;
instead, it had used other sources to make its point that Cedar Park
was in the Club."93  While this strict application of the waiver
doctrine may bejustiflableJustice Thomas made no attempt tojustify
it; he just asserted it as dogma. He specifically failed to explain why
it is equitable for the Government to raise and introduce evidence on
an issue without allowing the defendants to rebut that evidence with
other, exculpatory evidence in the Government's possession.
Justice Thomas also rejected the defendants' argument that "ad-
versarial fairness" required that the Government be barred from
suppressing the presentation of exculpatory evidence."s The defen-
dants made a two-part argument on this issue. They cited a case in
which the Court required the Government to turn over transcripts of
a grand jury proceeding because "'it is rarely justifiable for the
386. Or, to paraphrase the Advisory Committee, how much "play" is there in the 'joints' of
the Federal Rules of Evidence? Swe infra note 686 and accompanying text (noting comments of
Advisory Committee's chair on how Federal Rules of Evidence should be interpreted).
387. Sew SaLmrw, 112 S. Ct. at 2507.
388. See id.
389. See id. at 2507-08.
390. See id. at 2508.
391. Id. at 2507-08.
392. See McCOMIcK ON EviDENCE, supra note 349, § 55.
393. Salemo, 112 S. Ct at 2508.
394. I&
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prosecution to have exclusive access to relevant facts.'" 95 The
defendants also advanced a practical policy argument: a "plain
meaning" reading of the former testimony exception would allow the
Government to manipulate the presentation of evidence through its
power to grant immunity. - 6 The defendants noted that if a witness
inculpates a defendant in testimony given during a grand jury
proceeding, the Government can immunize the witness, forcing the
witness to testify at trial."s But if a witness exculpates a defendant,
as the witnesses did in Salerno, the Government can simply refuse to
immunize the witness and attempt to exclude the grand jury
testimony on the basis of hearsay.93
Justice Thomas responded only by pointing out that the case cited
by the defendants construed a rule of criminal procedure, not a rule
of evidence." He did not attempt to explain the significance of
this distinction, merely reiterating that the language of Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b) (1) did not support the defendants' argument."'
The Court therefore remanded the case to the court of appeals to
determine whether there was a sufficient showing of "similar
motive.
" 4 °1
On remand, a three-member panel of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the Government did have a "similar motive" in
questioning the witness before the grand jury as it would have at trial,
and the court remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings. °2 The Second Circuit, however, agreed to rehear the
issue en banc. 3 The three-member panel decision was vacated
when the Second Circuit determined that the Government did not
have a sufficiently "similar motive,"" and upheld the defendants'
convictions. 5
The Court in Salerno appeared to believe that its argument was
strengthened by its terse response to defendants, but in fact just the
opposite was true. With its "plain" response, the Court missed its
chance to persuade and teach. Would a practical reasoning approach






401. 1& at 2509.
402. United States v. Salerno, 974 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir. 1992), vacated on reh' sub nom,
United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909 (2d Cir. 1993) (en banc).
403. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909.




to this case have made a difference? I think it would have in several
ways. Under the practical reasoning approach, Justice Thomas could
not properly have suppressed relevant arguments. For example, he
would have had to acknowledge that even dictionaries prove that
words may have more than one plain meaning," he would have
been forced to acknowledge that the court-created waiver doctrine
applies to evidence rules other than those of privilege, and that the
waiver doctrine could be applied in a broader fashion than the one
he suggested. 7 Moreover, he would have had to openly address
the defendants' argument that the Government was unfairly manipu-
lating the rules of evidence through strategic use of its power to grant
or withhold immunity.'
Most important, however, under a practical reasoning approach,
Justice Thomas would have had to justify his decision to value the
language of the Rule over all other considerations. 409 Justice
Thomas argued that the Court cannot alter the language passed by
Congress, a view that reflects "countermajoritarian anxiety."410 But
Justice Thomas missed the opportunity to understand, explain, and
teach what was really at stake. He could have differentiated rules of
evidence from other statutes. As Professor Weissenberger notes, the
Rules of Evidence are created by and for the use of courts.41' The
Supreme Court did not ignore its role in creating the Rules of
Evidence in the Beech decision;41 1 it should not have done so in
Salerno. The Federal Rules of Evidence may no longer be the sole
province of the Court, but neither are they the sole province of
Congress.
By rigidly "enforcing" the text of the former-testimony exception,
Justice Thomas failed to acknowledge the history and rationale behind
the "similar motive" language, which was set forth in the court of
appeals' opinion.41 The Government objected to the introduction
of the grand jury testimony because it was hearsay.4 14 The general
406. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 389-93 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 396-98 and accompanying text. Another potential factor in the Court's
decision, which is unstated in its opinion, but was raised by one of the dissentingjudges on the
appellate court, was that a finding that the grand jury testimony waus erroneously and
prejudicially excluded would lead to a very expensive retrial United States v. Salerno, 952 F.2d
624, 624 (1991) (Newman,J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The original trial
took 13 months. Id.
409. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992).
410. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 118, at 324.
411. Weissenberger, supra note 4; se also supra note 172.
412. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
413. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1991).
414. See izL at 804.
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prohibition of hearsay rests on the belief that hearsay statements
generally are unreliable for several reasons: (1) hearsay statements
are not made under oath; (2) they are made outside the presence of
the trier of fact who thus cannot evaluate the witness' demeanor; (3)
they are not subject to cross-examination before the trier of fact; and
(4) the statements have been made out of the presence of the
opponent of the evidence.415 Despite these problems, much hearsay
is admissible through one or more of the many exceptions or
exemptions to the hearsay rule.4 16 The court of appeals in Salerno
pointed out that, of all the possible exceptions, the former testimony
exception relied on by the defendants "is arguably 'the strongest
hearsay,' because of all the ideal conditions for the giving of
testimony (oath, opportunity for cross-examination, presence of trier
of fact, and presence of opponent), only the latter is absent."417 In
Salerno, even the latter was present; the Government (the opponent
of the evidence) was the only party present to examine the grand jury
witnesses.418
Moreover, Justice Thomas ignored the purpose of the specific
"similar motive" language that the court of appeals had declined to
enforce strictly.419  According to the Advisory Committee, the
function of the Rule's requirement that "the party against whom the
testimony is now offered.,, had an opportunity and similar motive
to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination"
420
is to insure fairness in "imposing, upon the party against whom [the
testimony is] now offered, the handling of the witness on the earlier
occasion. "421 When this purpose is considered in light of the facts
of this case, in which the former testimony was offered against the
prosecution, which was the only party in the grand jury proceeding
that had a chance to examine the witnesses, the Government's
objection to admitting the grand jury testimony seems much less
valid .4  This argument goes to the heart of the defendants' asser-
tion that "adversarial fairness" required that the language of the Rule
not be applied blindly.
415. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 349, § 245.
416. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 349, § 245.
417. Salerno, 937 F.2d at 804.
418. Id.
419. See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
420. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
421. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (1) advisory committee's note.
422. See id. ("[One should] recognize direct and redirect examination of one's ovm witness
as the equivalent of cross-examining an opponent's witness.").
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Additionally, unlike its approach in Beech, the Court in Salerno failed
to set the evidentiary problem within the context of the adversary
system.4z The Court in Salerno ignored the observation in Beech that
in addition to the Rules of Evidence, the adversary system provides its
own safeguard: "the ultimate safeguard-the opponent's right to
present evidence tending to contradict or diminish the weight of
those conclusions."" The Court in Salerno failed to explain why
this safeguard, so obvious in Beech that it almost went "without
saying,"' no longer warranted attention.
While Justice Thomas was certainly entitled to rely on the text of
the Rule, he should not have relied on it to the exclusion of all other
possible sources of interpretation. To craft the most persuasive and
candid opinion, Justice Thomas should have confronted all of the
relevant bases for interpretation, and justified his decision to enforce
rigidly the "similar motive" language. He did not even offer one of
the most common rationales for "enforcing" the plain meaning of a
rule: that the rule should, in theory, result in predictable and clear
results.426 Perhaps Justice Thomas neglected this rationale because
it would have discredited his position; the Court in Salerno could not
agree on whether there was evidence that the plain meaning of Rule
804(b) (1) had been satisfied.' Justice Thomas, viting for the
majority, said that there was no evidence of a finding of "similar
motive."' Justice Stevens, on the other hand, argued in dissent
that the plain terms of the Rule had been met; he argued that the
Government "dearly had an 'opportunity and similar motive' to
develop by direct or cross-examination the grand jury testimony" of
the witnesses.'
By failing to address all of the potential interpretations of the
former testimony exception, the implications of the defendants'
proffered interpretation, and the decision to enforce language that
served no apparent purpose in this particular adversarial context, the
Court in Salerno damaged its ethos. The Court attempted to "enforce"
rather than persuade; it failed to live up to its educative role. The
Latin roots of the word "education" mean "to lead or to draw out
423. Sw United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992).
424. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 168 (1988).
425. Id.
426. Sw supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
427. Saen=, 112 S. Ct. at 2508-09.
428. I&
429. It at 2509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of."" ° The Court in Salerno was more intent on forcing the "similar
motive" language upon this context than in drawing or leading out
the meaning of the language for this context. In doing so, the Court
was untrue to the historical and philosophical context of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals: A Mixed Bag
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals is more faithful to the historical and philosophical
roots of the Federal Rules of Evidence than the decision in alermo,
but the opinion ultimately fails by trying to blend a pragmatic
approach with a plain meaning approach. This section explains why
Justice Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion, and the Court
as a whole, damaged their ethos through their approach, and how they
might have addressed the problem better by using a consistent
practical reasoning approach.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court considered whether, to be admissi-
ble, scientific evidence was subject to the test of "general acceptance"
in the scientific community."' The question was whether this test,
commonly known as the Frye test,4" 2 had been incorporated into the
Federal Rules of Evidence."3 The Supreme Court held that Frye
had been superseded by the Federal Rules, and that trial courtjudges
bear the responsibility of insuring that a scientific expert's testimony
is relevant and reliable. '
In approaching the problem,Justice Blackmun stated, "We interpret
the legislatively-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence as we would any
statute."" In support of this statement, the Court cited Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.' This choice of support is interesting;
Justice Blackmun instead could have cited Salerno, which the Court
decided the previous term. Although Justice Blackmun did not
comment on his choice, it was apt because the approach to statutory
interpretation taken in parts of Daubert resembles Beech more than it
does Salerno. Because Justice Blackmun was inconsistent in his
approach to statutory interpretation in Daubert, however, he failed to
430. WEBSTER'S DIGTIONARY, supra note 375, at 454. This is an appropriate context for using
a dictionary. providing the etymology of a word. The Latin roots of"educate" are "e" (out) and
"ducere" (to draw or to lead). I&
431. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
432. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
433. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
434. IL at 2793, 2794-95.
435. ItL at 2793.
436. I& (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)).
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produce an opinion as well-argued as Beech, reducing rather than
building his personal ethos and that of the Court.
Justice Blackmun's opinion began very differently than Justice
Thomas' in Saerno. At the outset, immediately following the
statement of the facts and the issue, Justice Blackmun set forth the
context of the scientific testimony problem.' He noted both the
extensive criticism of Fye in law review commentary, and the debate
in both case law and commentary as to whether Frye vras incorporated
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Only after setting out the
context in this fashion did Justice Blackmun turn to the text of the
Rules.439
Justice Blackmun looked both to Rule 402, the basic rule of
admissibility,"0 and to Rule 702 itself."' There he found no
reference to the Frye "general acceptance" test.42 Then, without
finding that these Rules were ambiguous, Justice Blackmun consid-
ered the possible meaning of the Rules by examining their drafting
history_40 Again, he found no reference to Frye.' But Justice
Blackmun did not stop at textual or legislative history sources. He
noted that reading a "general acceptance" test into the Federal Rules
would be "at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and
their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
"opinion" testimony.'""5
Soon afterward, Justice Blackmun endangered his credibility and
that of the Court in dealing with the Court's case law concerning
common law evidence principles. He began by distinguishing United
States v. AbeV,6 in which the Court recognized a common law
doctrine to allow the admission of extrinsic evidence of bias."7
437. Daub e, 113 S. Ct. at 2792-93.
438. Id. at 2792-93 & nn.4-5.
439. Ld. at 2793.
440. Id. Rule 402 provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, orby other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible" FED. R. EVID. 402.
441. Dauber4 113 S. Ct. at 2794. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVw. 702.
442. Daubert, 1135 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
443. Id. at 2794.
444. Id.
445. Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
446. 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
447. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984). Professor Im i""kelried argues that AM is
consistent with the plain language of Rule 402, which holds that all relevant evidence is
admissible unless there is a rule, statute, or constitutional provision excluding it, because Ad
involved a common law doctrine allowing the admsion of evidence, rather than the excdusion of
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Justice Blacknun argued that the common law doctrine applied in
Abel was "entirely consistent" with Rule 402's general provision
admitting all relevant evidence (unless specifically excluded by
another rule, statute, or constitutional provision), and the Court
"considered it unlikely that the drafters had intended to change the
rule."' Justice Blackmun then noted that in Bourjaily v. United
States,"9 which dealt with whether a conspiracy must be proven by
independent evidence before the hearsay statement of a co-conspira-
tor could be admitted,' 0 the Court had failed to find this common
law "independent-evidence" doctrine in the Federal Rules of Evidence
and thus had held that the common law doctrine had been supersed-
ed by the Federal Rules.
451
By dealing in this manner with Abel, and particularly with Bourjaily,
Justice Blackmun failed to live up to the criteria of completeness and
candidness. In doing so, he damaged his personal ethos and the ethos
of the Court by exposing his argument to easy impeachment. While
Justice Blackmun used Bourjaily to support his argument, in fact he
had written a powerful dissent in Bouijailyjoined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, in which he had criticized the majority for its "overly
rigid interpretive approach," and had argued for "a more complete
analysis."452
In Bourjaily, Justice Blackmun clearly set forth his view of the
Court's role in interpreting evidence rules:
I agree that a federal rule's "plain meaning," when it appears,
should not be lightly ignored or dismissed. The inclination to
accept what seems to be the immediate reading of a federal rule,
however, must be tempered with caution when, as in the case of a
Federal Rule of Evidence, the rule's complex interrelations with
other rules must be understood before one can resolve a particular
interpretive problem.45
In the remainder of his dissentJustice Blackmun performed his own
"more complete analysis" of the co-conspirator exemption," which
is worth examining closely because it approximates the practical
reasoning approach and provides a contrast to Justice Blackmun's
approach in the remainder of his Daubert opinion.
evidence. Imwinkelried, supra note 4, at 283-84.
448. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
449. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
450. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 173 (1987); see also FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (2) (E).
451. Daubert 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
452. Boujai, 483 U.S. at 187-88 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
453. md at 187.
454. l at 188-202 (analyzing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E)).
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In Boujaily, Justice Blackmun began not with the text of the co-
conspirator exemption, but with the common law history and
evolution of that exemption. 5 He engaged in an exhaustive
discussion of pre- and post-federal rules case law, scholarly commen-
tary, the Advisory Committee Notes, the American Law Institute's
version of the exemption (which was rejected by the Advisory
Committee), and the general legislative history. He concluded that
there was no evidence that the drafters of the co-conspirator
exemption intended to eliminate the independent-evidence require-
ment and that there was evidence that the drafters intended to
incorporate that requirement."6
Justice Blackmun then confronted the Bouijaily majority's argument
that "the plain meaning" of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) allows
a judge to consider any nonprivileged evidence, including hearsay
statements, in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. 4 7  The
majority's view of its role was similar to the Court's view in SaLerno.
the Court is the enforcer, not the interpreter, of the congressional
language in the Federal Rules of Evidence. "  The majority in
Boudjaily argued:
Petitioner claims that Congress evidenced no intent to disturb the
bootstrapping rule, which was embedded in the previous approach,
and we should not find that Congress altered the rule without
affirmative evidence so indicating. It would be extraordinary to
require legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of Rule 104.
The Rule on its face allows the trial judge to consider any evidence
whatsoever, bound only by the rules of privilege. We think that the
Rule is sufficiently clear that to the extent it is inconsistent with
[Supreme Court case law recognizing the bootstrapping rule], the
Rule prevails.4 9
Justice Blackmun responded to this argument by asserting that the
Rules can only be construed in light of several interpretative sources
and the interrelationship of the language and purposes of the
Rules. Thus, while Justice Blackmun was candid and open about
455. Id. at 188-91.
456. Id at 192-94 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun might have noted that the Reporter
of the Advisory Committee supported his argument. Sw Cleary, supra note 149, at 918.
457. Bouaioy, 483 U.S. at 178. Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualiication of a person to be a izness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by] the
court, subject to the provisions ofsubdivision (b). In makingits determination itis not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R EVED. 104(a).
458. See United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992).
459. Boujaily, 483 U.S. at 178-79.
460. See id at 187 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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the difficulty of the Court's role as interpreter of the Rules, he
showed how the Court could legitimately reach a resolution:
Although one must be somewhat of an interpretive funambulist to
walk between the conflicting demands of these Rules in order to
arrive at a resolution that will satisfy their respective concerns, this
effort is far to be preferred over accepting the easily available safety
"net" of Rule 104(a)'s "plain meaning." The purposes of both
Rules can be achieved by considering the relevant preliminary
factual question for Rule 104(a) analysis to be the following:
"whether a conspiracy that included the declarant and the
defendant against whom a statement is offered has been demon-
strated to exist on the basis of evidence independent of the
declarant's hearsay statements." This resolution sufficiently answers
Rule 104(a)'s concern with allowing a trial court to consider
hearsay in determining preliminary factual questions, because the
only hearsay not available for its consideration is the statement at
issue. The exclusion of the statement from the preliminary analysis
maintains the common-law exemption unchanged
6'
Justice Blackmun concluded this section of his dissent by confront-
ing the majority's appeal to the "real world" need to use hearsay
statements of co-conspirators in prosecutions, noting that this need is
counterbalanced by the "real world" use of unreliable statements.
462
He advanced the practical argument that simply adding the hearsay
statement to other evidence of conspiracy is no guarantee of reliability
because the hearsay statement "will serve the greatest purpose, and
thus will be introduced most frequently, in situations where all the
other evidence that the prosecution can muster to show the existence
of a conspiracy will not be adequate."46 Thus, Justice Blackmun
added his "real world" sensitivity to the realities of the criminal
courtroom from the perspectives of both prosecutor and defendant.
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Boujaily reflected complete consider-
ation of the interpretative problem: respect for the language of Rule
104(a), without being a slave to it; respect for the history and purpose
of the co-conspirator exemption as reflected in the scholarly
commentary; respect for the intent of the Advisory Committee and
Congress; respect for the Supreme Court precedents on the "boot-
strapping" problem;4 A respect for the ten years of appellate court
decisions that found the "independent evidence" requirement to be
461. Id. at 194-95.
462. See id. at 196-97.
463. Id. at 198.
464. Bootstrapping is the problem of relying on the content of the statement Itself In
determining whether the statement satisfies the hearsay exemption.
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consistent with the Federal Rules; and respect for the practical
realities of prosecutors' need to use hearsay evidence of conspiracies
and defendants' need to protect themselves from unreliable evidence.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun was honest about the difficulty of
reconciling these elements while forging ahead and doing so in the
best way he could. His approach was persuasive; it educated us by
bringing out the complexity of the problem rather than cutting off
the discussion. Because he wrote as a dissenter, however, Justice
Blackmun built his own ethos (and that of Justices Brennan and
Marshall, who signed his dissent) rather than the Court's.
Unfortunately, Justice Blackmun's argument in Daubert was not as
consistent as his argument in Bouaily. In Dauber4 he vacillated
between "a more complete"' contextual approach and a plain
meaning approach.4" At times he admitted to the Court's interpre-
tative role, as he did in his Boutjaily dissent, but at other times he
resorted to the role of "the enforcer."4 7 As noted above, while he
began his discussion within the context of the debate over Fye, he
shifted in mid-opinion to the very type of textual argument he
criticized in Bourjaily. After citing the majority's approach in Boujaily,
Justice Blackmun quoted Federal Rule of Evidence 702,4 which
deals with expert testimony, and then commented that "[n]othing in
the text of [Rule 702] establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute
prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any dear
indication that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to
incorporate a 'general acceptance' standard."
4 11
Justice Blackmun did depart from the Boujaily majority's approach,
looking beyond the text and noting that the drafting history made no
mention of Frye&t Venturing into more abstract sources of inter-
pretationJustice Blackmun noted that the restrictive Fryerequirement
of "'general acceptance'" would conflict with the "liberal thrust" of the
Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to 'opinion' testimony."
472
465. Compare i. at 188.
466. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-94 (1993).
467. United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503, 2507 (1992); .=Daubner 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
468. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 ("Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes 'general
acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.").
469. See FD. R. EviD. 702.
470. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
471. See i& at 2790.
472. 1& (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 US. 153, 169 (1988)). But stDaid
L Faignman et aL, Chark Your Cystal Ball at the Cottwtse Door, Pl&se: ExpForino the Past,
Undenianding the Prsem, and WoningAbout the Future of Sdic E iencl, 15 CADOZO L REV.
1799, 1810-11 (1994) (arguing that Fiyeis not inherently more restricthe test than Federal Rules
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Justice Blackmun did not mention that the majority of courts of
appeals had found that the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporated
Frye.4'3 Nor did he confront his own argument in Boujaily that the
silence of the Advisory Committee regarding the "independent
evidence" rule was circumstantial evidence that they incorporated the
rule rather than rejected it.474 Thus, while he engaged in "a more
complete" analysis thanjustice Thomas did in Salerno, or ChiefJustice
Rehnquist did in Bourjaily, Justice Blackmun was neither as complete
nor as candid about the difficulty of his interpretative problem in
Daubert as he could have been,475 and as a result, his approach
became more problematic as the opinion continued.
Had Justice Blackmun's argumentation reflected the analysis in
Salerno, he could have stopped, and should have stopped, once he
failed to find "general acceptance" in the language of the Rules. But
Justice Blackmun did not follow the Salerno approach and, much to
Chief Justice Rehnquist's displeasure, did not stop.476  Given the
raucous debates over the appropriateness of expert testimony,
477
Justice Blackmun appears to have been determined to provide some
limitations on the admissibility of expert testimony. Yet, he did so by
inexplicably resorting, albeit surreptitiously, to a "plain meaning"
approach.
Justice Blackmun argued that scientific expert testimony must be
relevant to be admissible and, to be relevant, scientific testimony must
be reliable.4 78  The reliability of scientific testimony, in Justice
approach).
473. See Faigman et al., supra note 472, at 1809-10.
474. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 194-95 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
475. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CAPxOZo L.
REv. 1999, 2019 (1994). Professor Giannelli writes:
The Supreme Court should have acknowledged that Congress and the federal drafters
had simply overlooked lrye, and then proceeded to decide the issue on the merits. In
this respectJudge Becker's opinion in Downingis more convincing: "We conclude that
the status of the Fye test under Rule 702 is somewhat uncertain, but reject that test for
reasons of policy." This approach would have compelled the Supreme Court to
consider the justifications underlying the Fiye rule, and then determine whether the
reliability approach is superior.
Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1232'(3d Cir. 1985)).
476. See Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2798. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens,
dissented from this section of the opinion. Id. at 2799 (asserting that sub3tance of briefs dealt
more with scientific interpretation than statutory interpretation and therefore beyond scope of
judiciary). He argued that the guidance the majority offered, beyond resolving the question
presented, could only raise more problems and confusion. Id. at 2800 (questioning whether
judges can assume role of "amateur scientist" when ruling on admissibility of evidence).
477. SeeFaigman et al., supra note 472, at 1811 (pointing to work by "[v]arious commislions,
committees, task forces," and "educational programs," as well as "[proposed] rule changes," and
"litigation" as evidence of debates over admission of expert testimony).
478. Dauber 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
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Blackmun's view, could only be determined through the scientific
method.4 79 How did he know this? First, Rule 702 refers explicitly
to "scientific ... knowledge,"' which suggests that the testimony
has to be based on "the methods and procedures of science."43'
Moreover, he turned to Webster's Third New Intenational Dictionary to
note that the term "knowledge" applies "to any body of knovm facts
or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths
on good grounds."' Justice Blackmun asserted that "in order to
qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be
derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation- i.e., 'good grounds,' based on
what is known."4
Justice Blackmun set forth four nonbinding factors to help a trial
court evaluate whether scientific testimony is relevant and reliable.
First, the court should determine whether the scientific evidence has
been tested for "'falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.'"CA
Second, the court should look to see "whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication."4s
Third, the court should check "the known or potential rate of error
... and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation."' Finally, Justice Blackmun "resurrected"
Frye's "general acceptance" standard, noting that "[w]idespread
acceptance can be an important factor" in holding a particular piece
of evidence to be reliable. 47
This part ofJustice Blackmun's opinion was the most disappointing.
He made thejudge the "gatekeeper" for scientific evidence. In doing
so without adequately explaining whyl Justice Blackmun utilized
the very plain meaning approach he criticized in Bouijailyy and at
the same time demonstrated the incoherence of a "pure" textual
479. See iat at 2795-96 n.9 ("In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will
be based upon scientific validity.").
480. FED. R. Evm. 702.
481. Dauber4 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
482. WEBsR's THm NEv INTERNATnONAL DIcno, Axt 1252 (1986), qwutd in Dauh4ert 113
S. Ct. at 2795.
483. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
484. I& at 2796 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJEC"URES AND REFTrATIONS: THE GROTrH OF
ScENTnFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)). We might assume that the Court meant to include
replication of results, as that is also part of the scientific method.
485. I&
486. I& (citation omitted).
487. I&
488. Justice Blacamun chastised ChiefJustice Rehnquist for recognizing that hejudge has
a "gatekeeping" role without explaining "the nature and source of the duty." Id. at 2794 n.7.
Yet one can make a similar criticism ofJustice Blackmun.
489. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 186-88 (1987) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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reading of evidence rules. Justice Blackmunjust asserted that, under
Rule 104(a), the determination of reliability was for the trial
judge.4" He did not explain why Rule 104(a) applied. Moreover,
he did not discuss the possibility that the relevance of scientific
testimony could be a question for the jury under Rule 104(b).49'
ProfessorJonakait, writing three years before Daubert, predicted that
the "plain meaning" interpretation of Rule 104 would make the
question of scientific evidence a question for the jury under Rule
104(b):
'The problem is that someone has to determine whether a scientific
test is reliable before ajuror can rely on it. This preliminary issue
seems difficult, especially because trial judges will seldom have the
expertise to assess scientific worth, but the solution to this difficulty
under the plain-meaning standard is that the judge does not decide
scientific reliability. The admission of scientific evidence is a
question of conditional relevancy. Testimony based on the sci-
entific test aids the jury if it is relevant; it is relevant only if the test
is reliable .... The trial judge only "decides whether thejury could
reasonably find the conditional fact." Therefore, relevant scientific
evidence based upon tests of uncertain accuracy and validity are
admissible if the jury could reasonably find the tests to be reli-
able.
492
As Professor Jonakait's argument points out, Justice Blackmun's
conclusion that the relevance of scientific testimony was for the judge
to decide is far from obvious and warrants more discussion than it
received.493 As it stands, Justice Blaclmun's conclusion did not rest
on an argument; he simply chose to enforce the language of Rule
104(a).
Although there may be an explanation for Justice Blackmun's
strategy, Justice Blackmun's approach reflects negatively on his ethos
as well as the Court's ethos. Justice Blackmun's conclusion that the
trial judge must decide the admissibility of scientific testimony under
Rule 104(a) appears to contradict the Court's holding in Huddleston
v. United States.41 In Huddleston, the Supreme Court held that the
490. Daubert 113 S. C. at 2795 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)).
491. See FED. P. EVID. 104(b).
492. Jonakait, supra note 4, at 767 (quoting Huddeston v. United States, 488 U.S. 681, 690
(1988)).
493. SeeBert Black et al., Scence and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: ANew Scarch for Sdeniffic
Knowledge, 72 TEx. L REV. 715, 748 (1994) ("The convoluted structure of Rule 104 seems to
indicate at least the possibility that disputed scientific evidence might be admitted conditionally,
subject to a jury's finding it valid and helpful. Dauber, however, does not even consider this
possibility.").
494. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
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admissibility of evidence of acts by the defendant, offered to prove a
material issue other than character, is controlled by Rule 104(b)
rather than Rule 104(a).4- Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, reasoned that "other act" evidence is admissible only if
relevant, and it "is relevant only if the jury can reasonably conclude
that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor."' He
pointed out that where the relevance of a piece of evidence depends
on a finding of fact, the issue is left to the jury under Rule 104(b),
providing the jury could reasonably find that fact. Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejected the defendant's argument that because other or
"similar" act evidence carries an obvious danger of unfairly prejudic-
ing the jury, the trial court ought to decide the admissibility of the
evidence under Rule 104(a) ." Chief Justice Rehnquist added that
the defendant's argument "superimposes a level ofjudicial oversight
that is nowhere apparent from the language of' Rule 404(b).4
Thus, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of the other act was
to be admitted if there was sufficient evidence to support a finding by
the jury that the defendant committed the other act, and that there
actually was such a showing in the case.s
0
In Dauber4 Justice Blackmun squarely located the issue of scientific
testimony within the concept of relevance.501 He argued that, to be
relevant, scientific testimony must be valid.502 Moreover, he set out
his "general observations" on how scientific validity is to be deter-
mined, but he did not explain or justify why these factors are to be
examined by the judge rather than argued to the jury (assuming that
enough evidence has been presented to support a finding of the
validity of the scientific testimony).°
There are good arguments both for and against giving the judge
the responsibility of determining whether scientific evidence is valid.
One could argue that the determination of scientific validity is not a
question of historical "fact" in the sense meant by Rule 104(b).P
495. Hudd/ston, 485 U.S. at 689.
496. I&
497. Id.; see also FED. P, EVID. 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the
fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction
of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.).
498. Huddestn, 485 U.S. at 687.
499. I. at 687-88.
500. Id. at 689.
501. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
502. See i&
503. Se id. at 2796.
504. Thus, the determination of the scientific ilidity of expert testimony is unlike the issues
in Huddeston, which dealt with the use of evidence of other acts of the defendant.
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Also, one could argue that determining the scientific validity of an
expert's theory is necessary for the judge to determine "the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness""5 under Rule 104(a). Finally, the
Court had precedent for making this a Rule 104(a) determination.
In Bourjaily v. United States, the Court had held that the admissibility
of a co-conspirator's statement under the co-conspirator exception was
to be decided by the judge under Rule 104(a): "Preliminary
questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court."' 5 One could argue that the admissibility
of expert testimony similarly falls under Rule 104(a). Had Justice
Blackmun raised this argument, however, he would have been forced
to reconcile the Court's decision in Huddleston (treating the admissi-
bility of other act evidence under Rule 104(b)) with both Bourjaily and
Daubert, making the Court's inconsistency even more apparent.
On the other hand, it is not obvious that Rule 104(b) is limited to
determinations of historical fact, and even if it is, that scientific
validity is not, at least in part, a question of historical fact. Moreover,
one could point out that Rule 104(a) is "subject to the provisions of
subdivision (b),"5 °7 suggesting that if an issue of qualification de-
pends on a question of fact (as does scientific validity), then Rule
104(b) controls. Finally, scientific validity seems less like a mixed
question of fact and law, as are those questions decided under Rule
104(a),508 and more like a mixed question of fact and science.
While the Daubert majority was "confident that federal judges possess
the capacity to undertake this review,"" others, including Chief
Justice Rehnquist, were less confident about the role of federal judges
as "amateur scientists."
510
Conversely, there are good arguments both for and against granting
the jury the responsibility of determining the reliability (and hence,
the relevance) of scientific evidence. There are the textual arguments
that this role is or is not for the judge under Rule 104(a). As
Professor Farrell suggests, however, there are political and societal
505. FED. R. EvID 104(a).
506. Id., quoted in Boujaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987).
507. Id.
508. See id.
509. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
510. Id. at 2796-800 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I defer to
no one in my confidence in federal judges; but I am at a loss to know what is meant when It Is
said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsfability,' and I suspect some of
them will be too."); see also Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:
Epistemiology [sic] and Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 2183, 2202 (1994) ("The Supreme
Court's decision in Daubert calls for a discussion of new procedures, including the use ofjudlcal
assistants to bridge the gap between scientists and lawgivers.").
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arguments to be considered in allocating the question of scientific
validity to ajudge orjury:
In sociological and political terms, the debate over the admission
of scientific evidence, particularly novel scientific evidence, can be
seen largely as a struggle for power-a contest between the legal
and scientific communities and, within the legal community,
between judges and juries, over who vill redistribute wealth. Those
who hold the first, positivistic world view,.., vould contend that
it is either unreasonable or unconscionable to require a party to
compensate another's loss if, as a matter of scientific fact, there is
no demonstrable connection betveen the two and the compensat-
ing party could neither have prevented nor ameliorated the loss.
Requiring compensation in such a case would amount to nothing
more than a random tax. If this view is accepted, then legal
responsibility may be found, if and only if, it is based on scientific
fact, and scientists will teljudges,juries, and lavyers when they may
or may not find legal liability.
If one holds the alternate, constructionist view, juries would be
permitted to find a connection between the defendants' conduct
and the plaintiff' loss based, in part, on a sense of fairness,
intuition, and community norms, a process not necessarily credited
by scientists for their purposes. If so, then a finding of scientific
fact (statistically significant association, for instance) is not a
necessary condition to the finding of legal fact (proximate cause),
and power is at least shared by the scientific and legal communities.
This result is legitimate if we believe that a civil trial is not only a
search for historical truth, but also a kind of popularly approved
umpired game or ritual for the peaceful settlement of disputes
Professor Farrell's distinction between the competing epistemologies
of positivism and constructionism, as applied to the scientific evidence
problem, reflects the classical interpretation debate between the
positivist view of a pure text "speaking for itself," and the construc-
tionist view of a text being constructed through rhetoric. In Professor
Farrell's view, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Daubert is unsuccessful
because it mixes the two epistemologies, producing an incoherent
opinion that fails to provide adequate guidance to lower courts."'
I agree that the Daubert opinion reflects inconsistent epistemologies.
I have tried to show how this is revealed in Justice Blackmun's
language, through his mixing of a plain meaning approach and a
practical reasoning approach. My evaluation of the opinion, however,
goes beyond the instrumental criticism that it fails to provide clear
511. Farrell, supra note 510, at 2205-06.
512. Farrell, supra note 510, at 2207.
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guidance. I argue that, by trying to argue "both ways" without
revealing the conflict, uncertainty, and difficulty with his position,
Justice Blackmun's opinion is less clear and less persuasive, and his
own integrity is damaged. Justice Blackmun demonstrated in his
Bourjaily opinion that he is capable of a more complete and candid
approach. Moreover, in failing to acknowledge the majority's retreat
from the unanimous Huddesiton decision, he allowed the Court's ethos
to wane through its unjustified inconsistency.
513
The defect in Justice Blackmun's approach is highlighted in his
conclusion, where he tried to ameliorate the concerns raised by both
parties. For the defendant, who opposed the abandonment of Frye's
"general acceptance" testJustice Blackmun pointed out the elements
of the adversarial system traditionally used to test legal evidence and
prevent juries from reaching irrational results:
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.
Additionally, in the event the trial judge concludes that the scintilla
of evidence presented supporting a position is insufficient to allow
a reasonable juror to conclude that the position more likely than
not is true, the court remains free to direct ajudgment, Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 50(a), and likewise to grant summary judgment, Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 56.14
While ordinarily these insights would be consistent with a practical
reasoning approach, in that they consider the scientific evidence
question in the context of other procedural rules and the adversarial
system in general, here Justice Blackmun merely highlighted his
inconsistency. These "conventional devices," which serve as the
adversarial system's "safeguards," would justify giving the role of
determining the reliability of the scientific evidence, and thus its
relevance, to the jury.15
513. Cf Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance, inI MAJORWRITERS OFAERIA 510, 513 (Perry
Miller ed., 1962) ("A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little
statesmen and philosophers and devines.").
514. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
515. Moreover, Justice Blackmun failed to mention an additional safeguard that he had
stressed earlier;, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 allows a court to exclude relevant evidence "if Its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury." Id, Justice Blackmun quoted with approval Judge Weinstein's
opinion that "[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the
difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against
probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than
over lay witnesses." Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is Sound; It Should
Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991), quoted in Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
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Justice Blackmun then turned to the concerns of the plaintiffs and
amici. 16 In doing so, he tried to show sensitivity to the pragmatic
and rhetorical quality of the adversarial system, but ended up
embracing a conflicting epistemology. In responding to the plaintiff's
and amid's concern that giving the judge the role of evaluating
scientific evidence would "sanction a stifling and repressive scientific
orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth,"" Justice
Blackmun argued that "there are important differences between the
quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision.
Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quick-
ly."518 In stressing the practical needs of litigants and the judicial
system, however, he did not explain why having a jury evaluate
scientific evidence, together with the "safeguards" he listed, would not
produce "a quick, final, and binding judgment"" I1
I must speculate at this point aboutJustice Blackmun's failure to
explain, but I should point out that my need to speculate is a result
of Justice Blackmun's failure to be complete and candid. In giving
the judge rather than the jury the "gatekeeping role" over scientific
evidence, Justice Blackmun demonstrated the adversarial system's
love/hate relationship with the jury system. Society embraces the jury
system because it allows us to recognize the importance of community
values and other "extralogical" concerns in the resolution of disputes.
At the same time, society fears the jury's potential for "irrational" and
"inconsistent" verdicts.52 Hence, we have the "jury control" devices
Justice Blackmun discussed in Dauber: Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
directed verdicts, and summary judgments.2 1
Justice Blackmun's decision to give the "gatekeeping role" to the
judge may simply reflect a fear of uneducated and uneducatablejuries
dealing with complex issues of scientific evidence that has been
manipulated by the opposing experts and advocates. While this fear
might be well-founded if based on a comparison of the averagejuror's
reasoning abilities with those of the average judge, Justice Blackmun
did not make that case. Perhaps he did not make it because it smacks
of elitism, which is a type of countermajoritarianism: unelected




520. See Laurence H. Tribe, Tdal b Matematics Praion and Ritual in the Legal Pratss, 84
HAv. L REV. 1329, 1376 (1971) (discussing difficulty juries have in employing intuition and
other "humanizing functions" when faced with mathematical testimony).
521. Dauber, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
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federal judges elevating their wisdom over the uneducated masses.52
Indeed, it is reminiscent of Plato's argument that rhetoric corrupts
the masses through its tricks and appeals to emotion. 2 Justice
Blackmun had shown in his Bourjaily dissent, however, that the world
of the courtroom is not Plato's world of absolute Truth.
Resolving the substantive issue of whether judges or juries ought to
evaluate scientific testimony is not the purpose of this Article. Rather,
I seek to demonstrate that Justice Blackmun did not even try to
explain his decision to have the judge determine that the evidence is
scientifically valid before the jury can hear it. By simply asserting that
it was a Rule 104(a) decision, 24 he avoided discussing the conflict
between his opinion and the unanimous opinion of the Court in
Huddleston. Moreover, Justice Blackmun failed to acknowledge his
discomfort in allowing either the jury (because of his fear of the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of educating juries on evaluating
scientific evidence) or the scientists (because of their nonjudicial
status) to determine the reliability, relevancy, and admissibility of
scientific evidence. As a result, despite his occasional efforts to
acknowledge the larger context of the scientific evidence prob-
lem,. 5 Justice Blackmun failed to provide the completeness and the
candidness that mark the practical reasoning approach.
Finally, in a footnote, Justice Blackmun created confusion over the
Court's role in interpreting rules of evidence by comparing 'judicial
interpretation, as opposed to adjudicative factfinding" to "the
scientific endeavor."5 2' The difficulty is that one cannot tell what he
meant by the "scientific endeavor." He could have meant the
positivist tradition in science-the belief that "there are value-free,
empirically ascertainable facts that exist independent of the minds
that perceive them."5 27  Or he could have meant what Professor
522. See Farrell, supra note 510, at 2207 n.113. Professor Farrell discusses this problem:
Daubert is as much a case of class struggle between common jurists and elite judges as
a struggle between the scientific and legal communities. Judges have long exercised
their prerogative to limit the normativejudgmentsjuries may make, both by providing
them instructions on the law and by determining what evidence they may hear. To the
extent that rules of evidence permit the liberal admission of evidence about the fact
of causation and other facts,juries are freer to base theirjudgments on those facts and
thus freer to impose liability and shift wealth from defendants to plaintiffs. To the
extent that judges reflect the political philosophy of classes more economically
advantaged than those ofjury members, a class struggle can be seen in this microcosm
as well.
Id.
523. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
524. Daubert 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
525. See id. at 2796-98.
526. R! at 2799 n.13.
527. Farrell, supra note 510, at 2189.
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Farrell calls the constructionist tradition, and what I would call the
rhetorical tradition, in science-the belief that "there are no
objective, value-free facts, but only contingent statements of probabili-
ty made by particular communities."" Justice Blackmun quoted
Justice Cardozo's observation that "[tihe work of a judge is in one
sense enduring and in another ephemeral.... In the endless process
of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross and
a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine."521 Yet
this citation seems to suggest a Platonic view of legal interpretation
more than a rhetorical view. It suggests that in interpreting rules,
judges are forever moving forward to "discover" the true meaning of
the text, rather than engaging in a process of argumentation that
"creates" the meaning of the text in a particular moment of time, ever
subject to change. I am not sure this interpretation accurately
captures Justice Cardozo's philosophy, but I am quite sure that it
contradicts the view of interpretation Justice Blackmun stated in his
Bouaily dissent" and the view of interpretation Justice Brennan
stated for the entire court in Beech.551
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Daubertfailed to embrace consistently
the pragmatic and classical rhetoric tradition that he expressed in his
dissent in Bouijaily and that the Court expressed in Beech. To Justice
Blackmun's credit, he refused to apply a strict plain meaning
approach and did not end the discussion once he concluded that
Fryes test of "general acceptance" was not incorporated into the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Moreover, he demonstrated an awareness
of the need to provide some guidance for determining the admissibili-
ty of scientific evidence, a pressing issue for the adversary system, and
tried to provide it through his "general observations" on the scientific
method. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and some commentators, have
criticized the majority opinion in Daubert for the uncertainty and
additional questions that its "factors" raised. 2 Yet had the Daubert
528. Farrell, supra note 510, at 2193.
529. Daubert, 113 S. Ct at 2799 n.13 (quoting BEiJAMIN CGADOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921)).
530. See supra notes 452-63 and accompanying text.
531. See supra notes 304-45 and accompanying text.
532. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799-2800 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see a/so, ag., Robert G. Bloomquist, The Dangers of 'General Obs=,aions on E#pe'1 Sdenfyx
Testimony: A Comment on Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 Ky. LJ. 703, 728
(1994) (arguing that Daubert factors go beyond text of Rules and will create 'profound
ambiguity"); Alan W. Tamarelli, Daubert v. Men-ell Dow Pharmaceuticals: Pushing O1w Limits of
Scienhie Rdiability-The Questionable lI'som of Abandoning the Paer Raz Standard for Adritting
Expert Testimony, 47 VAND. L REv. 1175, 1197 (1994) (arguing that Daublt factors -ill create
"problems" in federal district courts, lead to greater amount ofscientific testimony, and waste
time); Diana K. Sheiness, Note, Out of the Twiight Zm= The Implications ofDaubert v. Merrell
19951 1793
THE AMERICAN UNIvERsi[y LAw REviW [Vol. 44:1717
majority adhered to the plain meaning approach, it simply would have
invalidated Frye.3 3 This would have resulted in far more questions
and uncertainty; if Frye is gone, but relevancy and reliability are
required, how should the courts measure it?
A true textualist would respond that this decision is the legislature's
to make. "Plain" readings of the text put Congress' feet to the fire;
if Congress does not like the Court's interpretation, Congress should
change the rule.5a4 But here is where the special quality of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, statutes created by and for the use of the
federal courts, becomes important. The Supreme Court, through its
committees, is responsible for generating new versions of its rules of
procedure. 5 It makes no practical sense for the Court to say that
it cannot give guidance until it promulgates a revised rule on expert
testimony. While the Daubert decision (regardless of how it was ar-
gued) would probably cause some uncertainty, Justice Blackmun's
opinion was an attempt "to balance greaterjudicial access against the
potential for abuse via manipulation of juries and the judicial
system."
8 6
His efforts were flawed, however, in that he attempted to ground
the resolution of the scientific evidence problem in the language of
Rules 702 and 104(a), arguing that they incorporate the scientific
method (as described by his "general observations") and command
the judge to use the method in evaluating scientific evidence.
5 3 7
While Justice Blackmun never said explicitly that he was using a
textual approach in Daubert, he argued like a textualist, and a bad
textualist at that,5l and as a result, he failed to guide and persuade
as well as he could have.
Finally, Justice Blackmun's Daubert opinion damaged his and the
Court's ethos in its failure to acknowledge the difficulty of the
problem, other possible resolutions of the problem, the opinion's
inconsistency with precedent, and, above all, its abandonment of its
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 69 WASH L. REv. 481, 488 (1994) (arguing that Daubert factors will
create "confusion" if not applied consistently by courts).
533. See supra notes 467-70.
534. See supra notes 198-99.
535. See supra notes 161-68.
536. Kaushal B. Majmudar, Note, Daubert v. Merrell Dom A Flexible Approach to the
Admissibility of Novel Scientifc Evidenc 7 HARv.J.L & TECH. 187, 208 (1993),
537. Dauber', 113 S. Ct. at 2799-800 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
538. Seesupra notes 492-93 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' argument that
"plain meaning" readings of Rules 702 and 104 would have sent issue of scientific evidence to
jury under Rule 104(b)); see also supra notes 494-500 and accompanying text (noting that
majority in United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), required jury to determine
admissibility of prior act evidence under Rule 104(b)).
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earlier acknowledgment that it has a responsibility to interpret, rather
than to enforce, the Federal Rules of Evidence. As any teacher
knows, clearly contradicting oneself, and failing to clarify one's
position, diminishes one's stature in the classroom. If the Court
appears afraid, or worse, unwiing, to admit that it was wrong or that
it has changed its mind, its persuasiveness is diminished and it teaches
only unintentionally, by its bad example.
D. Williamson v. United States: A Step Backward
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in Williamson v. United States was, to be candid, a complete
mess. The Court splintered 6-2-1-4-3, issuing four different opin-
ions 39 discussing the interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b) (3), the hearsay exception for statements against interest. The
facts of the case presented a fairly common scenario in criminal cases.
Reginald Harris, the central witness against the defendant, Fredel
Williamson, was stopped in a rental car after a deputy sheriff noticed
his car weaving on the highway. ° Harris consented to a search of
the car, which turned up nineteen kilograms of cocaine in two
suitcases in the car's trunk."1  After his arrest, Harris was inter-
viewed twice by a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Agent,
Donald Walton, first by telephone and then in person.r
In the first interview, Harris told Agent Walton that he had
obtained the cocaine from a Cuban in Fort Lauderdale, and that he
was in the process of delivering it to Williamson at a certain dumpster
that evening.' In the second interview, several hours later, Harris
essentially repeated the same story, but when Agent Walton started to
arrange a controlled delivery of the cocaine, Harris changed his
story. Harris then told Agent Walton that he had lied about the
Cuban and the circumstances of the delivery because he was afraid of
Williamson.' Harris said that actually he was transporting the
cocaine to Atlanta for Williamson, that Williamson had been driving
ahead of him in another car; and that Williamson had turned around
and driven by Harris' car while it was being searched. Thus,
539. See text accompanying infra notes 557-60.





545. See id at 2434.
546. See id at 2433.
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Harris explained, it would be futile to try to arrange a delivery.54 7
Harris did not want his story to be recorded, and he refused to sign
a written version of his statement. 548
Harris refused to testify at Williamson's trial, even after the
prosecution granted him use immunity. 9 The court then ordered
him to testify, and held him in contempt when he still refused."'
At this point, the trial court held that Harris was "unavailable," and
allowed Agent Walton to testify as to what Harris had said to him
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) (3), the hearsay
exception for statements against interest.5 1 Rule 804(b) (3) pro-
vides for the admissibility of a
statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."5 2
Williamson was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and
traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine.5 3 He
then appealed, arguing that the admission of Harris' statements
violated Rule 804(b) (3) and the Confrontation Clause.5" The
547. See id.
548. See id. at 2434.
549. See id.
550. See id.
551. See id. The trial court held that Harris was unavailable under Rule 804(a), that the
statements "clearly implicated" Harris and were thus "against his penal interest," and, as required
by Eleventh Circuit precedent, found that there were "sufficient corroborating circumstances
in this case to ensure the trustworthiness of his testimony." Id. (citing FED. RL EVID. 804(a);
United States v. Maurell, 788 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1986)). Rule 804(b)(3) requires that there
be corroboration where the declarant exculpates the accused, but does not contain an express
requirement that there be corroboration where the declarant inculpates the accused. FED. I-
EVID. 804(b)(3). Some courts of appeals, however, have found that such corroboration ih
required. E.g., United States v. Taggart, 944 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701 (5th Cir. 1978).
552. FED. RL EVID. 804(b) (3).
553. See Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.
554. See idt; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....").
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Eleventh Circuit affirmed without opinion, 55 and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.5"
The interpretation issue in Williamson resulted in four different
opinions. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court,
which was joined in full only by Justice Scalia.55  Justice Scalia also
wrote a separate concurrence.5 s Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion
concurring in part and concurring in thejudgmentjoined by Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.559 Justice Kennedy wrote an opin-
ion concurring in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas.56 These opinions, individually and collectively,
highlight the need for the Supreme Court to develop a consistent
approach to interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence. They also
indicate that the best approach is practical reasoning, to which only
Justice Kennedy's opinion comes near, and yet still misses by a
substantial margin.
As Justice Kennedy pointed out, all four opinions agreed that self-
inculpatory statements are admissible under Rule 804(b) (3) because
"reasonable people do not make those statements unless believing
them to be true."561 But the opinions divided over how broadly to
apply the exception." Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority
held that "only those declarations or remarks within the confession
that are individually self-inculpatory" are admissible under Rule
804(b)( 3 )sa The majority would exclude "non-self-inculpatory
statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is
generally self-inculpatory."5" In so holding, the majority argued for
a textualist approach to Rule 804(b) (3) that is not only impractical
but also incoherent.
555. United States v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir. 1992), vacaM4 114 S. Ct. 2431
(1994).
556. 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994).
557. Widiamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2433-38.
558. Id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).
559. Id. at 2438-40 (Ginsburg,J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment).
560. Id. at 2440-45 (KennedyJ, concurring in the judgment).
561. Id. at 2441.
562. Justice Scalia vrote a separate concurrence to rebutJustice Kennedy's concern that the
Court's narrow reading of Rule 804(b)(3) would render the exception useless. Id. at 2438
(ScaliaJ., concurring) (quoting id. at 2443 (KennedyJ., concurring in thejudgment)). Justice
Ginsburg, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter, agreed uith the approach of the
majority, but concluded that Harris' statements were too self-serving to be against his interest
because he made them after arrest and "in a way that minimized his o;wn role and shifted blame
to petitioner Fredel Wiliamson." Id. at 2439 (GinsburgJ., concurring in thejudgment). She
concurred in the judgment to vacate the decision and remand because she believed that, while
the admission of Harris' statements was an error, the Government should have had the chance
to argue that it was harmless error. Id. at 2440.
563. Id at 2434-35.
564. IM. at 2435.
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Justice O'Connor began with the text, trying to analyze how broadly
the Court should read Rule 804(b) (3)'s reference to a "state-
ment."" Quite reasonably, she looked to the definition within the
Rules of Evidence themselves, and found that the hearsay rule does
have its own definition of "statement" in Rule 801 (a) (1): "an oral or
written assertion."" Justice O'Connor did not make the plausible
argument that this definition does not address the problem of which
statements can be considered against the penal or pecuniary interest
of the declarant, and that it therefore requires alternative sources of
interpretation. Instead, she simply resorted to the textualists' favorite
source, Webster's Third New International Dictionary.567 She noted that
definition. 2(a) defines a statement as "a report or narrative,"5 3 so
that "Harris' entire confession-even if it contained both self-
inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory parts-would be admissible so
long as in the aggregate the confession sufficiently inculpated
him." 69 Justice O'Connor appears to have forgotten definition 2(a)
after this section of the opinion, while Justice Scalia, writing a
concurring opinion, seems to have missed it completely, stating that
"a reading of the term 'statement' to connote an extended declara-
tion ... is unsupportable.""' ° Justice O'Connor chose to focus on
the narrower definition of "statement," which is 2(b) in Webster's. "a
single declaration or remark." 7' This narrower definition "would
make Rule 804(b) (3) cover only those declarations or remarks within
the confession that are individually self-inculpatory."
57 2
Justice O'Connor's next paragraph was extraordinary. She
purported to find the solution in the text of Rule 804(b) (3), but
ultimately justified her conclusion through arguments without a
textual basis.573 She admitted that "the text of the Rule does not
directly" dictate how much of Harris' confession was admissible, and
then conflated the textualist and purposive approaches, asserting that
565. See id. at 2434-35.
566. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)(1), quoted in Williamson, 114S. Ct. at 2434.
567. See Looking it Up, supra note 375, at 1439 n.12 ("The various printings of Webster's Third
New International Dictionary, with 40 references, and the sixth edition of Black's Law
Dictionary, with 35 citations, have been most frequently cited over the past five Terms.").
568. WE sER's THIRD Nv INTERNATIONAL DIGTIONARY, supra note 482, at 2229, quoted in
Willamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.
569. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.
570. ML at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).
571. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 482, at 2229, quoted in
Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434.
572. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2434-35. Justice O'Connor followed this dictionary definition
with the definitions of "assertion" (defined in Webstert as a "declaration") and "declaration"
(defined in Webster's as a "statement"). Id. at 2435 (citations omitted).
573. See . at 2435.
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"the principle behind the Rule, so far as it is discernible from the
text, points clearly to the narrower reading."574 She then went on
to restate the "commonsense" basis of Rule 804(b) (3), that "reason-
able people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest"
do not say things against their interest unless "they believe them to be
true." 75 While this 'was an accurate paraphrase of Rule 804(b) (3),
it did not explain why the text "points dearly to the narrower
reading" of "statement." Justice O'Connor did not argue here; she
just asserted that the notion that reasonable people do not make
statements against their interest
simply does not extend to the broader definition of "statement."
The fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confes-
sion does not make more credible the confession's non-self-
inculpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix
falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly
persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.5
AlthoughJustice O'Connor invoked the text of the Rule to the extent
of looking only to the text for the Rule's purpose, she had no
difficulty in making comments about how one lies most effectively
without tying her comments to the text of the Rule, or any text for
that matter.
57
Justice O'Connor continued to blend the textualist and purposive
approaches, arguing that only individually self-inculpatory statements
could be considered reliable because the text says they are the only
statements a person would not make unless they were true.P She
noted that Congress could have, "subject to the constraints of the
Confrontation Clause," expanded Rule 804(b) (3) to cover more
statements "based on their proximity to the self-inculpatory state-
ments." 9 Here she revealed her view of the Court as the enforcer
rather than the interpreter of the Rules of Evidence. She, and the
Court, will take "the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b) (3)": the
narrow interpretation limiting Rule 804(b) (3) to individual self-
inculpatory statements.
Justice O'Connor rejected Justice Kennedy's attempt to use the




577. Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend whyJustice Scalia, the texwallst's textualist. signed
on to justice O'Connor's opinion.
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804(b) (3).s8 She quoted extensively from the Advisory Committee
Notes, including the following passage:
[T]he third party confession... may include statements implicat-
ing [the accused], and under the general theory of declarations
against interest they would be admissible as related statements....
[Supreme Court cases] by no means require that all statements
implicating another person be excluded from the category of
declarations against interest. Whether a statement is in fact against
interest must be determinedfrom the circumstances of each case.8'
Justice O'Connor found that this language "is not particularly
clear,"" 3 although she did not explain why it was unclear. Instead,
she focused on the Committee's citation to Dean McCormick's
treatise, The Law of Evidence"s
Justice O'Connor argued that McCormick's treatise supported her
reading because, while he would admit "'contextual statements,
neutral as to interest, giving meaning to the declaration against
interest,'" he would exclude "self-serving" statements. 85 She did not
explain how McCormick's treatise supported her narrow reading of
the Rule. The only way it could have supported her conclusion is if
all non-self-inculpatory statements are to be viewed as "self-serving."
But, in fact, McCormick argued just the opposite, that the court
should have a "certain latitude" to admit some statements, which he
described as "contextual,... neutral as to interest, giving meaning to
the declaration against interest.""s  Justice Kennedy pointed out
that McCormick's position was that some statements, seemingly
against interest, can actually be self-serving if they are made in a
certain context, such as post-arrest statements to law enforcement offi-
cials.587 Justice O'Connor did not explain why her narrow reading
was consistent with, let alone supported by, McCormick, who would
give a court discretion to admit some non-self-inculpatory state-
ments.-58
Justice O'Connor engaged in the classic textualist approach of
asserting rather than arguing when she simply refused to decide
"exactly how much weight to give the [Advisory Committee] Notes in
581. Compare id at 2435-36 udth id. at 2442 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
582. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note (emphasis added), quoted in
WiMiamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435-36.
583. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436.
584. Sex id.
585. Id. (quoting CHARLES McCo MIcK, THE LAW OF EvIDENCE, § 256, at 551-53 (1954)).
586. MCCoRMicK, supra note 585, at 551-53.
587. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2444 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
588. SeeMCCORMICK, supra note 585, at 553 (stating that decision to preserve self-serving and
inculpatory parts of contextual statement is within court's discretion).
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this particular situation" because "the policy expressed in the statutory
text points clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever
force the Notes may have."' But because Justice O'Connor never
discussed what weight the Notes might have, we never understand why
the text, which she conceded earlier was "ambiguous,"59 outweighs
the express belief of the Advisory Committee that some "collateral,"
"contextual," or "related" statements would be admitted."'
Justice O'Connor stated that "whether a statement is self-inculpatory
or not can only be determined by viewing it in context. Even
statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against the
declarant's interest."5 She failed to understand, however, the im-
plication of her comment and, thus, why her position was both
impractical and inconsistent. The Advisory Committee, taking the
classical rhetoric and pragmatic perspective, noted that a statement
against interest could only be evaluated for reliability within a specific
context.593 The Committee cited Dean McCormick to illustrate that
even some seemingly self-inculpatory statements could be self-serving,
and therefore unreliable, depending on the circumstances surround-
ing the making of the statement."
Justice O'Connor admitted that statements can only be interpreted
contextually, but insisted that only "individual self-inculpatory
statements" can be admitted 59 What she refused to acknowledge
was that the Rule, as it was written, was not expected to solve the
interpretative problem posed by"collateral" statements. The language
of the Rule (supported by the notes of its drafters) invites the judge
considering a statement or statements in a specific case to rule based
upon whether a reasonable person in this situation would have made
the statement or statements if they were not true.
Justice O'Connor, purportediy following the text of Rule 804 (b) (3),
tried to make it say something it does not say. that the Rule is limited
to "individually self-inculpatory" statements.59 In doing so, she tried
to duck the true interpretative problem. Although she paid lip service
to the importance of "context," she rendered context irrelevant by
589. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436.
590. Id at 2435.
591. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3) advisory committee notes.
592. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436-37.
593. See FED. R. EvD. 804(b) (3) advisory committee notes.
594. See iz. (citing McCoMMCK, supwra note 585).
595. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436.
596. See U
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adopting the narrowest possible reading of the Rule.!' By her
inconsistency, Justice O'Connor diminished the persuasiveness and
usefulness of both the Court's opinion and its ethos.
The major difference between Justice O'Connor's opinion for the
Court and Justice Kennedy's opinion concurring in the judgment is
that while the majority opinion excluded all statements that are not
"individually self-inculpatory" (the majority would admit no "collater-
al" statements),"'8 Justice Kennedy argued about which collateral
statements would be admissible.5" Though justice Kennedy drew
on a much wider variety of interpretive sources and was more candid
about the difficulty of the task, he too failed to understand the
historical and philosophical perspective behind Rule 804(b) (3), and
indeed, the Rules generally.
Justice Kennedy began by quoting the text of Rule 804(b) (3), but
he quickly moved to the scholarly debate on the real issue presented
by the case: whether statements that are "collateral" to self-inculpato-
ry statements are admissible.' He noted that there were three
general views of the problem. Dean Wigmore took the broad
approach, admitting all statements related to the statement against
interest." Dean McCormick took the middle approach, suggesting
that while a court had the discretion to admit some collateral
statements, which he labeled "neutral" (meaning that they did not
directly inculpate the declarant), the court should exclude "self-
serving" statements.' °2 Professor Jefferson advanced the narrow
view, adopted by the Court in Williamson, °3 that only individually
self-inculpatory statements are admissible under this exception; no
collateral statements should be admitted."'
Justice Kennedy displayed the candor thatJustice O'Connor lacked
by openly acknowledging the basic interpretive problem: "The text
of the Rule does not tell us whether collateral statements are
admissible . ... ."I While Justice O'Connor's response was to
597. See id. Justice O'Connor asserted that "whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not
can only be determined by viewing it in context." Id. She refused, however, to admit those
collateral statements later deemed necessary to determine whether the statements are self-
inculpatory. Id. Thus, because the trier of fact will not be permitted to hear collateral
statements, the "context" of the self-inculpatory remarks is irrelevant under the Court's holding,
598. Xd
599. See id. at 2442-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
600. See id. at 2440-41.
601. See id. at 2441 (citing 5JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1465, at 271 (3d ed. 1940)),
602. See id. (citing MCCORMIK, supra note 585, at 552-53).
603. I& at 2435.
604. 1& at 2441 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Bernard S. Jefferson,




dodge the problem of collateral statements by creating a limitation
that does not exist in the Rule, 6 Justice Kennedy's response was
to tackle the problem head-on. Justice Kennedy noted the reason for
the exception: the statements are presumed reliable because
reasonable people would not make them unless they believed them
to be true. °7 Yet Justice Kennedy argued that to use this as the
limit to the exception's application would beg the question:
Given that the underlying principle for the hearsay exception has
not resolved the debate over collateral statements one way or the
other, I submit that we should not assume that the text of Rule
804(b) (3), which is silent about collateral statements, in fact in-
corporates one of the competing positions. The Rule's silence no
more incorporates Jefferson's position respecting collateral
statements than it does McCormick's or Wigmore's.&u
Justice Kennedy thus set out to give meaning to Rule 804(b) (3). He
treated his role as building the language of the Rule rather than
enforcing it.
Justice Kennedy used "three sources" to build his argument that the
Rule "allows the admission of some collateral statements":P the
Advisory Committee Notes, the common law history of the exception,
and a maxim of statutory construction: that "Congress does not enact
statutes that have almost no effect.""'0 While Justice O'Connor
found the Advisory Committee Notes to be "not particularly
clear,""' Justice Kennedy found them to be "a forthright statement
that collateral statements are admissible under Rule 804(b)(3).6
Moreover, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court should be clear
about the weight it gives the Advisory Committee Notes, stressing that
the Court historically has given them strong weight.61
Justice Kennedy continued, arguing that even if the Advisory
Committee Notes had been silent on the admissibility of collateral
statements, he had another source of interpretation.61 4 He argued
that "[a]bsent contrary indications, we can presume that Congress
intended the principles and terms used in the Federal Rules of
Evidence to be applied as they were at common law." 15 As even
606. See supra note 596 and accompanying text.
607. WTIliamon, 114 S. Ct. at 2441 (KennedyJ., concurring in the judgment).
608. I& at 2441-42.
609. See ad. at 2441.
610. Id. at 2442.
611. I& at 2436.
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Professor Jefferson noted, at common law, "collateral statements
connected with the disserving statements" were admissible. 616
Justice Kennedy's final argument was based on the principle of
statutory construction that when Congress enacts a statute, it intends
that it should have meaningful effect.61 7 Justice Kennedy then tried
to show that the Court's narrow interpretation of the exception would
make it practically useless.61 While Justice Kennedy's hypotheticals
may not have shown that the Court's interpretation makes the
exception worthless,1 9 they did show how impractical the Court's
analysis is for a trial court. For example, it is unclear whether a court
could admit the statement "John and I robbed the bank."62
However, if the statements were instead: "I robbed the store. John
was with me," it is fairly clear, albeit arbitrary, that under the Court's
approach only the first sentence could be admitted.621
Justice Kennedy's approach to constructing the meaning of Rule
804(b) (3) is far more persuasive thanjustice O'Connor's opinion, but
fails in one respect. At points in his opinion, Justice Kennedy tried
for the same kind of textual clarity thatJustice O'Connor seemed to
seek. Specifically, he tried to draw a distinction between "collateral
neutral" and "collateral self-serving" statements. In his view, the
former would be admissible, while the latter would not.6 2 This
position opened him up to ridicule by Justice Scalia, who argued that
the purpose of the Rule is not advanced by such "manufactured
categories." "' Justice Scalia was correct here. In using this lan-
guage, Justice Kennedy was guilty of the very problem he identified
in Justice O'Connor's opinion; he tried to simplify the contextual
nature of the inquiry by creating "types" of statements that are, or are
not, admissible.624 Justice Kennedy cited with approval cases in
which courts have set out "categories" of situations in which the
statement should be excluded because it is unreliable, such as a
statement to law enforcement officials admitting guilt after a promise
616. Jefferson, supra note 604, at 57, quoted in Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2442 (Kennedy. J.,
concurring in the judgment).
617. SeeAmerican Paper Inst. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402,421 (1983)
(stating that courts should not impute to Congress intent contrary to that expressed in statute).
618. See Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2443 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
619. See id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rebuttingJustice Kennedy's hypothetical).
620. See id. at 2436-37 (arguing that admissibility of similar statement, "Sam and I went to
Joe's house," depends on its context).
621. See id. at 2435. Under the Court's approach, only the statement "I robbed the store"
would be admissible because it is the only statement tending to inculpate the speaker.
622. Id. at 2444 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
623. Id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).
624. See id. at 2441, 2444 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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of leniency.6" Yet in doing so, he lost sight of the Rule's underlying
historical and philosophical perspective: the meaning of a statement
(and in this case, its reliability) can only be determined in a contin-
gent, fact-specific context, and this meaning will be created by the
rhetoric of the advocates and the judge.
626
In the conclusion of his opinion, however, Justice Kennedy
regained a view of the context-bound quality of Rule 804(b) (3):
[A]pplication of the general principles here outlined to a particular
narrative statement often will require a difficult, fact-based
determination. District Judges, who are close to the facts and far
better able to evaluate the various circumstances than an appellate
court, therefore must be given wide discretion to examine a
particular statement to determine whether all or part of it should
be admitted.627
Justice Kennedy here eschewed the easy route taken by the majority,
which simply avoided the problem of collateral statements. Moreover,
he suggested that the problem was more difficult than even his
"collateral neutral" and "collateral self-serving" categories suggested.
He was candid about the uncertain and fact-based nature of the
application of this evidence rule; he made clear that the Rule does
not speak for itself.
In excluding all non-self-inculpatory statements, or under Justice
Kennedy's approach, all collateral self-serving statements, all of the
Justices expressed concern over the trustworthiness of certain
statements against interest. One senses that both Justice O'Connor
and Justice Kennedy fought to resolve Wi/liamson by interpreting the
text of Rule 804(b) (3) because they were attempting to avoid the
constitutional Confrontation Clause issue. Both Justice O'Connor's
and Justice Kennedy's opinions read as if the Confrontation Clause
serves no purpose in this situation.612 In a section of her opinion
joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor refused to reach the
Confrontation Clause issue raised by the defendant, but noted "that
the very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory-which our
reading of Rule 804(b) (3) requires-is itself one of the 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness' that makes a statement admissible
625. 1& at 2444 (citing United States v. Magana-Overa, 917 F.2d401,407-09 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Scopo, 861 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1988)).
626. See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
627. Wlrdliamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2445 (KennedyJ., concurring in thejudgment).
628. See iL at 2437 (noting that, in light of its disposition, Court need not reach
Confrontation Clause issue); id. at 2443 (KennedyJ., concurring in the judgment) (failing to
mention Confrontation Clause).
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under the Confrontation Clause."6' Given this statement, and the
Court's earlier decision in White v. Illinois, s° which made the
reliability of the statement the sole issue under the Confrontation
Clause,"' the implication is that the Confrontation Clause serves as
no barrier to the admission of "genuinely self-inculpatory statements"
under Rule 804(b) (3).
Justice Kennedy similarly seemed oblivious to the relevance of the
Confrontation Clause. His analytical approach to Rule 804(b) (3) was
as follows:
A court first should determine whether the declarant made a
statement that contained a fact against penal interest .... If so,
the court should admit all statements related to the precise
statement against penal interest, subject to two limits. Consistent with
the Advisory Committee Note, the court should exclude a collateral
statement that is so self-serving as to render it unreliable (if, for
example, it shifts blame to someone else for a crime the defendant
could have committed). In addition, in cases where the statement
was made under circumstances where it is likely that the declarant
had a significant motivation to obtain favorable treatment, as when
the government made an explicit offer of leniency in exchange for
the declarant's admission of guilt, the entire statement should be
inadmissible.
632
Justice Kennedy found only two limits to the admission of statements
directly against interest and related statements, both stemming from
the Rule and its purpose, but he indicated no limitation posed by the
Confrontation Clause.
The facts of Williamson present the paradigmatic case for Confronta-
tion Clause concerns. The hearsay statements of the declarant Harris
were put into evidence through testimony given by the DEA agent
who had interviewed Harris."3 Harris refused to allow his state-
ments to be recorded or to sign a written version of his statement.6-
629. i& at 2437.
630. 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992).
631. White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992). The broad holding of White is that the
prosecution need no longer produce the declarant or show that the declarant is unavailable to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 742 & n.8. The prosecution need only show that the
hearsay statement is reliable, either because it falls within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception"
or because there are "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
632. Wilianson, 114 S. Ct. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphas s
added; citation omitted). In this case, the DEA agent testified that although he had promised
to report Harris' cooperation to the prosecutor, he had not promised Harris "any reward or
other benefit for cooperating." I&a t 2434.




Professors Kirst and Berger have shown convincingly that a driving
force behind the Confrontation Clause was the concern over the
"procedural" problem; the framers of the clause were worried about
evidence manufactured or orchestrated by the Government and put
before the trier of fact through affidavits or other substitutes for live
testimony.' I have elsewhere argued that the Confrontation
Clause also contains a societal dimension, the belief that accusers
ought to be compelled to confront the defendant out of concern for
the quality of the relationship between the individual accuser and the
defendant, and the relationship between the state-as-accuser and the
defendant.' This belief reflects societal concerns about fairness
wholly separate from reliability or procedural concerns.' The
societal dimension inheres in the common demand that "if you are
going to say something bad about me, say it to my face." In William-
son, the defendant was convicted in large part because of statements
made by a witness who never had to say them to his face, statements
that were repeated by a government agent with the opportunity to
shape the statements to suit the case.
The point is that the Wdiamson opinions try, unconvincingly, to
hide from these Confrontation Clause concerns through their
treatment of the Rule.' The focus of the Rule, and of their
discussion, is on reliability, which is only one value protected by the
Confrontation Clause; the opinions ignore the procedural and societal
concerns behind the Clause. While one could argue that the Court
was simply following its principle of deciding cases on the narrowest
possible grounds, the Court's tortured attempt to avoid the real
problem of whether to admit statements related to statements against
interest suggests that the Court might have produced a better opinion
if it had dealt directly with the Confrontation Clause issue. As Justice
Kennedy argued, the issue of whether a statement is against interest,
and thus reliable, is really a question for trial courts; 9 the Supreme
Court cannot make that determination as a matter of statutory
interpretation.w
What the Supreme Court could have done, however, is argue well.
In this case, that would have meant admitting that the text of Rule
635. See Margaret A. Berger, The Dcomstudonizoan of the Confanalaon Clau A Pmpzd
for a Prseauodal Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L REV. 557, 567-86 (1992); Roger W. Kirt, The
Procdural Dimension of Confrontation Dodyine 66 NEB. L REV. 485 (1987).
636. See Scallen, supra note 118, at 635-48.
637. See Scallen, supra note 118, at 635-48.
638. See supra note 628 and accompanying text.
639. W!liamsn, 114 S. Ct. at 2445 (KennedyJ., concurring in the judgment).
640. See supra note 627 and accompanying text.
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804(b) (3) does not dictate the solution to the admissibility of Harris'
statements. Moreover, a complete argument would have required the
Court to reach and discuss all of the dimensions of the Confrontation
Clause: reliability, procedural, and societal. If the Court had used a
practical reasoning approach to this evidence problem, arguing
completely and candidly, it would have produced a more persuasive
opinion. It would have educated us on the limitations of appellate
courts in ruling on evidentiary questions. It would not have damaged
its ethos by pretending to solve the interpretative problem while
actually begging fundamental questions about the fairness of
admitting statements untested by cross-examination and elicited by a
government agent out of the defendant's presence.
E. Tome v. United States: One Step Forward, One Step Back
Although Justice Kennedy could not convince a majority of the
Court in Williamson, his broader approach to the interpretation of the
evidence rules narrowly prevailed in the Court's most recent opinion,
Tome v. United States. In Tome, the Court interpreted Federal Rule of
Evidence 801(d) (1) (B), which allows for the admission of a prior
consistent statement if "the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination" and if the statement is "offered
to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive."641 The precise ques-
tion in Tome was whether, as under the common law, the statement
had to have been made before the "improper influence or motive"
arose. Justice Kennedy's arguments, while moving somewhat beyond
Justice O'Connor's approach in Williamson by more openly weighing
interpretative sources in addition to the text, ultimately proved
unsatisfying. Like Justice Blackmun in Daubert, Justice Kennedy
argued more under a practical reasoning than a textualist approach,
but he finally purported to find the answer to the interpretative
problem in the text of the Rule.
The prosecution charged that Tome, who was divorced from his
four-year-old daughter's mother and had primary physical custody of
the child, sexually abused the child, which the child disclosed to her
mother while they were on vacation.' The defense argued that the
allegations were fabricated so that the mother, who had unsuccessfully
petitioned for primary custody of the child, would not have to return
641. FED. R. EvD. 801(d) (1) (B).
642. SeeTome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 699 (1995).
1808
INTERPRETING EvIDENcE RULES
the child to her father.' At the trial, the child, now six and a half
years old, grew increasingly reticent in answering questions.6' After
she testified, the prosecution introduced seven different statements by
the child to various witnesses, describing the sexual abuse, although
it conceded that these statements were made after the alleged motive
to fabricate them arose.6' The trial court admitted the statements
despite the defendant's objection, finding that the statements
rebutted the defense's assertion that the statements were fabricated
to allow the child to stay with the mother.6"  The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the "pre-motive requirement
is a function of the relevancy rules, not the hearsay rules."' The
Tenth Circuit held that "the relevance of the prior consistent
statement is more accurately determined by evaluating the strength
of the motive to lie, the circumstances in which the statement is
made, and the declarant's demonstrated propensity to lie." '
A five-to-four majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected
the Tenth Circuit's balancing approach, holding that Rule
801(d) (1) (B) incorporates the common law requirement that the
statement be made before the motive to fabricate arose.6' Justice
Kennedy writing for the Court, began, not with the text of the Rule,
but with the long history of the common law "pre-motive" require-
ment, and its endorsement by Justice Story and by the leading
common law commentators, McCormick and Wigmore.1 After this
introduction to the pedigree of the pre-motive requirement, Justice
Kennedy framed the issue before the Court as "whether Rule
801(d) (1) (B) embodies this temporal requirement. We hold that it
does."651
After setting forth the Court's conclusion, Justice Kennedy spent
the rest of the opinion setting forth various arguments to support this
reading of the Rule. While Justice Kennedy's approach somewhat




646. Id. at 700. The trial court also admitted one of the statements, to a babysitter, under
the residual exception, Rule 803(24), and statements to tw doctors under the exception for
statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment, Rule 803(4). The Court
noted that the prosecution had offered the statements of a social worker under both Rule
803(24) and Rule 801(d) (1) (B), but the trial court did not make dear on which ground it us
admitting the statement. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 700.
647. United States v. Tome, 3 F.3d 342, 350 (10th Cir. 1993), r14 115 S. CL 696 (1995).
648. Id.
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that the Rule "embodies" an element that it does not contain, rather
than arguing that the Rule ought to be construed in a way that
incorporates the temporal requirement he advocated.
Justice Kennedy first turned to the text of the Rule itself, and found
that "[t] he language of the Rule, in its concentration on rebutting
charges of recent fabrication, improper influence and motive to the
exclusion of other forms of impeachment, as well as in its use of
wording which follows the language of the common-law cases, suggests
that it was intended to carry over the common-law pre-motive
rule."652 In this part of his argument, Justice Kennedy's opinion
resembled that ofJustice O'Connor's in Williamson; bothJustices tried
to argue that the language of the Rule imposes a particular limitation
on the admissibility of hearsay."3
But where Justice O'Connor essentially ended her argument with
the policy she found in the text of the Rule, Justice Kennedy contin-
ued to build his argument. He first carefully examined the placement
of prior consistent statements within the special category of
"nonhearsay" in Rule 80 1.65' He noted that this allowed some prior
consistent statements to be admissible as "substantive evidence, not
just to rebut an attack on the witness' credibility."65 He stressed
that by limiting the type of prior consistent statements that would be
considered nonhearsay to those that "rebut a charge of 'recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,'"656 the Rule drafters
emphasized the temporal requirement.6 7  He stated that "[a]
consistent statement that predates the motive is a square rebuttal of
the charge that the testimony was contrived as a consequence of that
motive."658
Justice Kennedy then made two additional arguments based on the
language of the text, but looking to the intention of the drafters of
the Rule. He stressed first that while Congress could have adopted a
much broader rule, allowing in any prior consistent statement that is
relevant to a witness' credibility, it chose instead much narrower lan-
guage.659 Then, Justice Kennedy noted that the language used by
652. l at 702.
653. lX
654. 1l at 701.
655. lM.
656. Id (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)).
657. I& at 701.
658. Id
659. Id at 702.
1810
]INTRPRETiNG EVIDENCE RULES
the drafters "bears close similarity to the language used in many of
the common law cases that describe the premotive requirement"'
In a part of his opinion joined only by justices Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg," justice Kennedy turned to the Advisory Committee Note
to Rule 801(d) (1) (B) to support his conclusion that the Rule
embodies the common law premotive requirement. He emphasized
that where "'Congress did not amend the Advisory Committee's draft
in any way... the Committee's commentary is particularly relevant
in determining the meaning of the document Congress enacted.'"'
Justice Kennedy also stressed the distinguished credentials of the
Committee and that it had "consulted and considered the views,
criticisms, and suggestions of the academic community in preparing
the Notes."6'
Justice Kennedy pointed out that the Advisory Committee drew
heavily upon the common law as it was portrayed in the work of
Wignore and McCormick, and that when the Advisory Committee
drafted a Rule that was a significant departure from the common law,
"in general the Committee said so."' He illustrated this with
several examples where the Committee had rejected the common law
approach,' and stated that the Note for Rule 801(d) (1) (B) con-
tained no indication that the Committee intended to depart from the
common law pre-motive requirement.6w Justice Kennedy interpret-
ed this silence as an intent to incorporate that requirement, saying
that "it is difficult to imagine that the drafters, who noted the new
substantive use of prior consistent statements, would have remained
silent if they intended to modify the premotive requirement."'
Justice Kennedy supported this argument by looking to the Advisory
Committee's general approach in structuring Rule 801(d) (1), the
Rule dealing with prior statements. He specifically relied on the
Committee's rejection of Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(1), which
660. I.; see also id. at 701 (referring to this as "the same phrase used b/ the Adv-isory
Committee in its description of the 'traditiona[l]' common law of emidence, which uas the
background against which the Rules were drafted').
661. Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment and all parts of the opinion except this
part, Part B. I&L at 706 (Scalia, J. concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Scalia
objected to Part B ofJustice Kennedy's opinion because it referred to the Advisory Committee
Notes as more than persuasive commentary, as evidence of the "intente or "purpose of the
drafters. I& He apparently missed the reference to the intent of Congress and the drafters in
the part of the opinion he didjoin. Sw id. at 701-02.




666. Id at 702-03.
667. Id. at 703.
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would have allowed the introduction of any out-of-court statement by
a declarant who testifies at the trial, subject to the other rules of
evidence.6" Justice Kennedy argued that if the Tenth Circuit's
balancing approach was adopted in lieu of the pre-motive require-
ment, the distinction between Rule 801 (d) (1) (B) and Uniform Rule
of Evidence 63(1) would disappear, because any damaging testimony
of a witness could be met by an allegation that the witness was
fabricating, opening "the floodgates to any prior consistent statement
that satisfied Rule 403."669 Justice Kennedy concluded this section
of the opinion by establishing a presumption: "'A party contending
that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing
that the legislature intended such a change.
' "670
In the next section of the opinion, which was joined by Justice
Scalia as well, Justice Kennedy rejected the Government's attempt to
rely on academic commentators who were critical of the limits on the
use of prior statements when the declarant testified at trial.671
These commentators suggested that courts should move toward a
balancing approach for determining the admissibility of prior
statements.672 The Court rejected this argument in large part
because the Advisory Committee also rejected it:
The statement-by-statement balancing approach advocated by the
Government and adopted by the Tenth Circuit creates the precise
dangers the Advisory Committee noted and sought to avoid: It
involves considerable judicial discretion; it reduces predictability;
and it enhances the difficulties of trial preparation because parties
will have difficulty knowing in advance whether or not particular
out-of-court statements will be admitted. See Advisory Committee's
Introduction [to Article VIII, 28 U.S.C. App.] at 771.67
Justice Kennedy concluded his argument by acknowledging the
practical difficulty of applying the pre-motive requirement, but
stressed that, "as the Advisory Committee commented," it was less of
a burden and more predictable than the balancing approach
suggested by the Government and the Tenth Circuit.674 Moreover,
Justice Kennedy candidly acknowledged the difficulty of determining
"when a particular fabrication, influence, or motive arose," but
668. Id.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 704 (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989)).
671. Id.
672. Id.
673. Id. at 704-05 (citation omitted).
674. Id. at 705. He also sympathized with the problems of proof in child-abuse cases but
noted that while the evidence rules cannot be altered for certain kinds of cases, the statements
might be admissible under another hearsay exception, such as Rule 803(24). Id.
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stressed that "a majority of common-law courts were performing this
task for well over a century" and there had been no evidence
presented that courts could not continue to do so.6 s
There is much to praise in Justice Kennedy's approach, but his
attempt to argue that the answer to the interpretative problem was
incorporated in the Rule itself is inconsistent with his concurrence in
Williamson and the practical reasoning approach. Justice Kennedy
argued in Wi/!iamson that the exception for statements against interest
did not address the problem of collateral statements."8 Similarly,
the rule on prior consistent statements itself simply did not address
the common law pre-motive requirement.
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas, is more consistent
with the practical reasoning approach, although he too insisted that
the "plain words ... mean exactly what they say." '1 Justice Breyer
noted that the problem raised by the Rule and by Justice Kennedy's
interpretation of the Rule was a problem of relevance, not hear-
say.67s Justice Breyer also turned first to the common law commen-
tators McCormick and Wigmore, but only to point out that they had
not characterized this as a hearsay problem, but one of impeachment
or relevancy. 9 Justice Breyer argued that the text of Rule
801 (d) (1) (B) simply does not deal with the relevancy problem.
Justice Breyer pointed out that some statements, such as those used
to rebut a charge of faulty memory, could have rehabilitative effect no
matter when they were made.' He also focused on the placement
of Rule 801(d) (1) (B) in the category of nonhearsay statements,
arguing that it had more to do with ajury's inability to separate the
substantive value of a prior statement from its rehabilitative purpose
than with the pre-motive requirement."
Curiously, however, once Justice Breyer had dispensed with the
language of the Rule, he went on to consider whether the pre-motive
rule continued to exist as a matter of relevance."' Not surprisingly,
he found that there is no absolute rule barring post-motive statements
from being used to rehabilitate a witness; in his view, courts must
analyze the problem on a case-by-case basis under the standards for
675. I.
676. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2441-42.
677. Tome, 115 S. Ct. at 708 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
678. i&
679. IkL at 706.
680. I& at 707.
681. 1&
682. I& at 708.
19951 1813
THE AMELUCAN UNIVERsiTY LAW REVEW [Vol. 44:1717
determining relevancy in Rules 401 and 403.1 What is surprising
is that Justice Breyer found it necessary to discuss the issue at all.
One reason he might have reached the issue of whether the pre-
motive requirement still existed was to show the relationship of this
case to Daubert, and to argue that perhaps some common law rules of
evidence do still exist after the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In calling attention to Daubert, however, Justice Breyer
highlighted the inconsistency of Tome with that case. The Court in
Daubert explicitly held that the Frye test was not incorporated in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.' Yet here, Justice Kennedy and a
majority of the Court held that the common law pre-motive test, an
unstated relevancy requirement, was embodied in the text of the Rule.
Justice Kennedy's efforts to place the text of the Rule in its
common law context and the context of the language choices
available to and made by the drafters, as well as his acknowledgement
of the difficulty of application of the Rule to concrete cases, were all
admirable. He demonstrated both completeness, in considering all
possible sources of interpretation, and candidness, in acknowledging
the weight those sources were to be given and the difficulties involved
in considering them. By finding that the language of the rule
"embodies" the pre-motive common law rule and by neglecting to
reconcile his conclusion with Daubert, however, Justice Kennedy
ultimately failed to create a solid "construction" of the Rule. By
resorting to a plain meaning argument, he adopted the role of the
enforcer, missing the chance to educate about the limits of a
textualist approach, a lesson he began in Williamson.
CONCLUSION
It is best to end with the beginning, Federal Rule of Evidence 102:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.m
How shall we interpret this Rule, which tells us how to interpret it and
all of the others? The Chair of the Advisory Committee, Albert
Jenner, stressed that Rule 102 was to be taken seriously:
[It] is not mere rhetoric. It is not the language employed in the
Civil Rules, Criminal Rules, or Appellate Rules; those rules
683. L at 709.
684. See supra notes 441-51 and accompanying text.
685. FED. R. EVID. 102; see also FED. P. Cv. P. 1.
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emphasize uniformity. Here we are saying that the Law of Evidence
should have a measure of flexibility if room for growth is to be
afforded. We leave some play in the joints.15
However, Rule 102 is subject to different interpretations. To rely on
the text alone is also to serve the ends of justice in the views of
proponents of the plain meaning school of interpretation.
It will not suffice just to tell the Court to refrain from its textualist
plain meaning talk. One must show the Court how and why its
arguments could be improved. A practical reasoning approach to
legal reasoning exposes thejustificatory, persuasive, or argumentative
quality of judicial interpretation in the most direct and honest
manner. Moreover, while it does not mandate a particular and fixed
substantive basis for evaluating interpretative choices, it does allow the
critic both to identify and challenge the choices that were made and
to argue for alternative choices. This kind of dialogue among courts
and commentators may not provide the absolute certainty and
predictability of results that some legal theorists would like, but then
neither have the other approaches to statutory interpretation.
The Supreme Court has not lived up to the example it set for itself
and for its audience in Beech Aircraft Corp. It has not lived up to the
understanding of interpretation that grounded the classical theories
of legal rhetoric and that grounded the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Unless the Supreme Court moves from its textualist
arguments to the practical reasoning approach, it might be better off
leaving the interpretation of evidence rules to the lower courts and
the recently reestablished Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Yet this deference would be both unfortunate and
unsuccessful. It would be unfortunate because the Supreme Court,
as the highest court in the land, has much to teach us about how "the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined"' in
trials. It would be unsuccessful because, with all due respect, no
matter how diligent the Advisory Committee is, the nature of the law
and language is such that it is seldom perfectly clear. The Court will
always be called upon to interpret evidence rules. The Court's view
of its role and how it executes its role will always invoke and influence
its ethos. Ancient rhetoricians argued that moral character cannot be
taught, in the sense of being transmitted, to others. But they also
argued that a speaker does teach about character through the quality
686. Forum Discussion, The Proposed Rules of Evidence for the Unikd States Distrit Caurft and
Magistrate, 37 IMs. CouNs.J. 565,571 (1970) (remarks ofA visory Committee Chairman Albert
Jenner), quoted in Mengler, supra note 125, at 439.
687. FED. R. EvID. 102.
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of the speech. As long as the Supreme Court issues opinions attached
to its judgments, it will teach. As long as the Court teaches, it should
strive to do the best possible teaching.
